Collingwood’s Claim that History is a Science

Abstract

Though Collingwood emphatically declared that history is a science, this claim has hardly been taken seriously by Collingwood scholars, primarily because Collingwood has never worked it out properly. Collingwood’s claim concerning the scientific nature of history is based on his view that it is inferential, though in a specific way, that is, being neither inductive nor deductive. He has never explained the nature of the specific type of inference involved, however. It is argued that this third way of inference as conceived by Collingwood corresponds to the theory of abductive reasoning as developed by Charles Peirce, initially called by him hypothetical reasoning. Afterwards, Peirce changed the syllogistic form in which he initially framed his theory of hypothetical inference into a theory in which hypothesis, deduction, and induction are conceived as three stages in scientific inquiry, using the term ‘abduction’ instead of hypothetical inference. In his Autobiography Collingwood gives two examples of this type of reasoning, corresponding to Peirce’s conception of scientific reasoning. In The Principles of History, however, Collingwood develops a too limited conception of historical inference. The chapter ends with considering the views of J. Hintikka on Peirce’s theory of abduction. He conceives this theory as exhibiting particular strategic rules, in which interrogation plays a prominent part. This view accords well with Collingwood’s logic of question and answer, Hintikka indeed referring to him. Considering the argument developed in this chapter, Collingwood’s claim that history is a science is after all noticeably supported.