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Location Game and Applications in Transportation Networks

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Computational Management Science

Abstract

We consider a market where the consumers are distributed in the vertexes of a transportation graph. The edges of the graph are the transportation links. The vertexes are the hubs. The consumers are the passengers who use this kind of transportation. The demand is determined by the flow of passengers. There are n companies (players) who make a service in this market. First, players form their transportation networks, and then they announce the prices for the service. The objective of a player is to maximize the payoff. We derive the equilibrium in this non-cooperative game. The results of numerical simulations are provided.

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Acknowledgements

The research was supported by the grant of the Russian Fund for Basic Research (project 13-01-91158) and the Division of Mathematical Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

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Mazalov, V., Shchiptsova, A., Tokareva, Y. (2016). Location Game and Applications in Transportation Networks. In: Fonseca, R., Weber, GW., Telhada, J. (eds) Computational Management Science. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 682. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20430-7_8

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