Abstract
The linkages between internal political structures and international behaviour, as in the case of the GDR, demonstrate strong evidence of patterns of diffusion and dependence. The structural process between the two superpowers can be observed in the variation of the diffuse dependence of the GDR on the USSR. The Soviet position is examined vis-à-vis the position of others because material power and capabilities determine not only Soviet behaviour but also the international position of the GDR.
The Soviet-German policy had developed in tandem with the qualitative and quantitative changes in Soviet GDR policy that were conditioned upon the achievements of the leadership in which the GDR was the sine qua non condition justifying the objective of Soviet-German policy on the German question. The leadership ability needs to be adapted to external idealist parameters where the new ideas were looking his legitimation as power shifts to alter leadership. The political analysis can be determined by the application of a ‘symbolic understanding’ that investigates and analyses links between various political actors that will deepen and widen understanding of policy decisions that have been taken.
The argument of this chapter is that the international system constrained Soviet policy on German question, while the leadership acted to satisfy internal needs and minimise adverse consequences. The national policy, demonstrating domestic preferences, accounts for the timing of the shift in the Soviet leaders’ strategy, a shift that created disagreement with the GDR’s leaders, whilst the international system informs us about actors’ abilities to satisfy their domestic counterparts about the outcome of an ultimate international cooperation.
The German question remains open, yet its solution is not currently on the agenda of world history, and we shall need our neighbours to approve it as well. (Helmut Kohl, 08 September 1987, cited in Hans-Joachim Spanger, ‘The GDR in East-West Relations’ Adelphi Papers 240, Institute for Strategic Studies (1989): 3–88.)
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
TASS reported sarcastically about Genscher’s tour in Moscow. Genscher’s tour offers nothing new in Moscow’s relations with Bonn: the West German Foreign Minister spent 40 min failing to explain why had made his detour in Moscow (The Guardian 1985).
- 3.
- 4.
Hans-Dietrich Genscher was a respectable foreign minister with great experience in foreign affairs. The INF controversy brought about extensive discussions in the House of Commons. Sir Russell Johnston (Inverness, Nirn and Lohaber) paid particular attention to the views of Genscher, the most experienced foreign minister in the Western bloc, by attempting to negotiate a multilateral agreement without NATO’s modernisation of shorter-ranger nuclear weapons to be undermined. Russell Johnston’s argument was constructed around the time Gorbachev had been moving further and faster than anyone imagined that any Soviet leader could or would. Then, the one-sided approach of pressing for the modernisation of the NATO short-range nuclear weapons should not be neglected the German liberal attempting to set up the pathway to negotiation of multilateral agreement. For the opposed argument, see Dr Heith Hampson (Leeds) (Hansard Debates, House of Commons, Column 374–375 25 November 1988, 12.3 pm).
- 5.
The extension ‘zero option’ to include SRINF in the range from 500 to 1000 km.
- 6.
These discrepancies between West German conservatives and Liberals reflect differences of what made threat for the West Germany. Liberals had set up a broad view.
- 7.
Helmut Kohl’s decision 26 August 1987 was taken on the condition that the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the USA, would ban missiles and Moscow would not modernise missiles of a range under 500 km. Kohl has stressed a particular need for negotiations on 100–500 km range missiles. Yuli Kvizinski, when informed about Kohl’s decision, reported to Genscher that the Soviet Union would never accept this decision.
- 8.
The old thinking is found in many speeches by Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and Constantine Chernenko postulating that the main hostility of the capitalist West and the consequent primacy of military power in Soviet security.
- 9.
Record of conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist United Party of Germany E. Honecker available at SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, IV 2/1/672.
- 10.
See Footnote 9.
- 11.
SAPMO-BArch, ZPA, IV 2/1/672.
- 12.
- 13.
See the report of Keesing Archiv der Gegenwart Sowjetunion Auβenpolitische Kontakte, 28588.
- 14.
See Footnote 13.
- 15.
See Footnote 13.
- 16.
See analytical talks between Erich Honecker and Mikhail Gorbachev during Honecker’s visit in Moscow on 28th September 1988 available at SAPMO-BArch, ZPA IV 2/1/685.
- 17.
- 18.
According to Krenz’s testimony.
- 19.
Interview with David Childs, 13 February 2002.
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Megas, A. (2015). Multiple Political Rivalry: Meaning and Significance. In: Soviet Foreign Policy Towards East Germany. Contributions to Political Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20001-9_7
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