Abstract
This chapter consists of an account of Roy Bhaskar’s philosophy. In the first of two interviews we discussed the three phases of critical realism , ethics , predetermination , four-planar social being , epistemic relativism , ontological realism , judgemental rationality , emergence , mind and the world. A metaphor that he used in relation to basic critical realism, that of under-labouring , is foregrounded. Science , and social science, insofar as the latter includes the possibility of making value statements, are about the world . This is a fundamental theme that runs through basic critical realism and it is retained in the other phases: dialectical critical realism and metaReality . Basic critical realism consists of transcendental realism , critical naturalism and a theory of explanatory critique ; that is, a philosophy of science , a philosophy of social science and a development towards ethics. The theme of ontology is probably the single most important theme in basic critical realism, but along the way at the level of science and at the level of social science, and proto-ethics, it seeks to resolve certain long-standing philosophical problems. So, in the philosophy of science, transcendental realism seeks to resolve, for example, the problem of induction ; and in the philosophy of social science transcendental realism seeks to resolve the problem of structure and agency , or the problem of the role of conceptuality in social life; and the theory of explanatory critique seeks to show how you can derive value judgements or value implications from factual statements.
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Notes
- 1.
Pratten in Hartwig (2007, pp. 195–196) gives an account of two basic modes or broad schema of explanation of phenomena in a structured and differentiated world: ‘The first, referred to as pure (or theoretical or abstract) explanation or the DREI(C) proceeds in a few basic steps. First, a regularity in some phenomenon, typically anomalous for existing theory (e.g. the invariance of an experimental result), is Described; secondly some explanatory mechanism is Retroduced, antecedently available cognitive resources are used to make plausible models of unknown mechanisms; […] third, competing explanations are elaborated and some are Eliminated on the grounds of their inferior empirical adequacy […]; so that fourth, the Identification of the causal mechanism at work is hopefully achieved, whereupon the latter becomes the phenomenon to be explained and the initial theory is Corrected in the light of the new knowledge . In that the statements of the tendencies producing the phenomenon are retrospectively deducible from the explanatory structure, which may itself come to be defined as a natural kind, this model gives us the best possible grounds for attributing natural necessity and necessary truth .’
Pratten in Hartwig (2007, p. 196) goes on to provide a second model of explanation: ‘referred to as applied (or practical or concrete) explanation, or the RRREI(C) model—a form that is essential when conditions are fundamentally open—proceeds in a manner that is somewhat different. First, a complex event or situation of interest is Resolved into its separate components, i.e. into the effects of its separate determinants; second, these components are then Redescribed in theoretically significant terms; third, a knowledge of independently validated tendency statements is utilised in the Retrodiction of possible antecedent conditions, which involves working out the way in which known causes may have been triggered and interacted with one another such as to give rise to the concrete phenomenon under investigation; whereupon, fourth, alternative accounts of possible causes are Eliminated on evidential grounds. This may be followed by Identification and Correction as in the pure model.’
- 2.
Morgan in Hartwig (2007) identifies Critical Realism ’s major contribution to the mind–body problematic: ‘which shares with Searle’s biological naturalism (1998) a refusal of the basic terms of the debate set out by dualism and reductionism , on the basis that both are rooted in an ontological idealist-materialist dichotomy. Dualism leaves consciousness as a mysterious non-corrigible intangible, whilst reductionism, in the name of materialism , puts aside the totality of a conscious being , which is the very property that gives rise to questioning the nature of mind in the first place. Synchronic Emergent Powers Materialism argues that consciousness is an emergent non-reducible property of the material brain. The term synchronic is used to differentiate the use of the term emergence from its diachronic application to the evolution of the species and their capacities. Thus consciousness is concurrent with a given form of material brain. But this does not in itself indicate a hard claim about the temporal relationships of conscious action and brain materiality. […] … from a philosophical standpoint Critical Realists tend to argue that it won’t make conceptual sense to talk about it in the language of idealism or materialism.’.
Morgan (2007) goes onto argue that ‘ The emergent power of mind that reasons can be causes is an important aspect of this. In common sense terms it is relatively unproblematic to assert that beliefs and desires result in intentional actions and thus consciousness informs individual behaviour, and through the Transformational Model of Social Activity affects natural and social structures. Denials of this are less about rejecting the idea that consciousness is interactive and more about preserving the integrity of different philosophical positions’ understanding of causation and freedom. Postmodernism, forms of strong social constructionism, and many political philosophers reject the idea that reasons are causes because they associate causation with Humean constant conjunction. Since consciousness entails choice and the outcome of reasoned action is multi-realised, it is not causal under this definition, and to apply this definition is to open the way for forms of reduction of behaviour to either genetic determinations or behaviouristic stimulus-response to the detriment of cherished notions of free will, choice and so on. […] Since Critical Realism focuses attention on the generation of the possibility of reason and on the subsequent generative mechanisms of reason, this false choice between causation and reason, reductive materialism and defensive idealism, is avoided.’
- 3.
Bhaskar and Danermark (2006).
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Scott, D., Bhaskar, R. (2015). Being and Knowing. In: Roy Bhaskar. SpringerBriefs in Education(). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19836-1_2
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