Abstract
Following Dilthey, it has often been argued that, since methodological individualism is inconsistent with the deterministic explanation of action grounded in holistic macro-sociological laws, and since it defends an interpretative approach, it is supportive of a dualistic epistemology (e.g. Boudon 1991). In other words, methodological individualism has been regarded as incompatible with the deductive-nomological model of explanation (which argues that any scientific explanation is based on covering laws) and, in more general terms, with the method of the natural sciences (see Di Nuoscio 2006, pp. 129 ff.; also Little 1990). In my opinion, Hayek, in spite of some lexical ambiguities (see, for example, Hayek 1967, pp. 3–42), does not follow this line of thought. It seems to me that his position is widely compatible with the deductive-nomological model as developed by Popper and Carl G. Hempel which underlines the fundamental unity of the scientific method.
This chapter draws directly from my article “Apriorism and Fallibilism: Mises and Popper on the Explanation of Action and Social Phenomena”, Nuova Civiltà delle Macchine, anno XXVI, n. 4- 2008: 5–32.
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Notes
- 1.
The theory that the interpretative understanding of human conduct and scientific explanation presupposes the same nomological approach is also defended by theorists of the enactive paradigm who, as mentioned earlier, are the followers of Hayek’s anti-positivistic proto-connectionism within the field of cognitive science (see, in particular, Petitot 2009, pp. 29 and 161).
- 2.
As will be mentioned later, there are four major praxeological laws, entailing that action is necessarily based on: (i) intentionality; (ii) rationality; (iii) economical evaluation; and (iv) causality (see Di Nuoscio 2009).
- 3.
Following Imre Lakatos, Mario J. Rizzo interprets Mises’ approach as a very “sophisticated methodological falsificationism” (Rizzo 1983, pp. 53–73). I regard Rizzo’s standpoint as in a sense correct because Mises and Lakatos did share some similar ideas. However, unlike Lakatos, I believe that, if analysed in a careful way, Popper’s falsificationism appears to be not so much like a naive affair. In my opinion, both Lakatos and Mises misunderstood Popper (see Champion 2002). Zanotti and Cachanosky (2015) have recently defended an interpretation of Mises’ epistemology, which is similar to Rizzo’s.
- 4.
In addition, for both Mises and Popper, the criticism of observativism did not involve scepticism or relativism. In other words, both maintained, differently from Thomas Kuhn and the so-called “New Philosophy of Science”, that the theoretical nature of “facts” involves neither an incommensurability of alternative theories nor an impossibility to grasp the truth. In particular, Popper underlined that two or more alternative theories always share a common meaning because they are attempts to solve the same problem; he consequently considered that alternative theories are always comparable in the light of their common problem (Popper 1994, pp. 33 ff.).
- 5.
I take this law as an example following Guido Hülsmann (Hülsmann 2003, pp. 74–75). I agree with Hülsmann’s arguments against the possibility of applying the ceteris paribus clause as intended by mathematical economics, but I disagree with him when he states that social sciences, unlike natural sciences, are not based on the use of the clause “other things being equal”.
- 6.
Sometimes Mises seemed to admit implicitly that attempts to solve practical problems influenced the formation of economic concepts. Consider his analysis of concepts such as “market”, “capital”, “accountancy” or “division or labour” (see von Mises 2004, pp. 143 ff.).
- 7.
Incidentally, Popper considered it impossible, as did Mises, to reduce the mental to the physical (see Eccles and Popper 1997; see also von Mises 2002, pp. 102–104).
- 8.
Consequently, like Mises, Popper believed that “the burning interest in questions of origin shown by some evolutionists and historicists, who despise old-fashioned history and wish to reform it into a theoretical science, is somewhat misplaced” (Popper 1961, p. 144).
- 9.
According to the deductive-nomological model (as claimed by Popper), we can find a cause only on the basis of a general law. Consider, for example, this fact: a little boy asks his mother, “Why did you drink a glass of water?” His mother answers, “Because I was thirsty.” “I was thirsty” is in this case the initial condition of the explanation. The mother points it out by using implicitly a trivial commonsense law: “People who are thirsty are inclined to drink.” Note, in addition, that the use of this law also entails the application of the ceteris paribus clause: it cannot be applied if there is nothing to drink.
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Di Iorio, F. (2015). Nomological Explanation and Empirical Control in the Social Sciences. In: Cognitive Autonomy and Methodological Individualism. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 22. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19512-4_6
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