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China and the Moon: Endogenous Conditioning Factors

  • Chapter
When China Goes to the Moon...

Part of the book series: Studies in Space Policy ((STUDSPACE,volume 11))

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Abstract

Concrete plans and strong motivations for reaching the Moon are not, on their own, sufficient for China to send its taikonauts there. The high complexity of the manned lunar exploration programme involves a number of conditioning factors and prerequisites that must be fulfilled in order to succeed in this endeavour.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    According to the official records (NASA website: http://history.nasa.gov/Apollomon/Apollo.html), NASA budget increased from $500 million in 1960 to a high point of $5.2 billion in 1965. In that year, NASA funding level represented 5.3 % of the federal budget and roughly the 0.8 % of the US GDP. In total, between 1959 and 1973, NASA spent $23.6 billion on human spaceflight, exclusive of infrastructure and support, of which nearly $20 billion was for Apollo (equivalent to $110 billion in 2010 terms).

  2. 2.

    This comparison has been made though a computational analysis provided by Wolfram Alpha website. See http://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=United+States+real+GDP+1969. China has a GDP of $8221 trillion in nominal terms and of $4522 trillion in real terms. United States in 1969 had a GDP of $1041 trillion in nominal terms and of $4711 trillion in real terms.

  3. 3.

    “Country at a glance: China”. The World Bank (2013). Web. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china. Accessed 17 November 2014.

  4. 4.

    See Appendix A for additional economic indicators on China.

  5. 5.

    Cit. Wiesbrot, Mark. “2016: When China overtakes the US”. The Guardian. 27 April 2011. Web. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/apr/27/china-imf-economy-2016. Accessed 28 August 2013.

  6. 6.

    Mazzei, Franco, Vittorio Volpi (2010). La rivincita della Mano Visibile. Il Modello economico asiatico e l’Occidente. Egea, Milano: p. 140.

  7. 7.

    As also underlined by some analysts, it is true that China’s rapid growth in the last three was assisted by a steady integration with the global economy and a rapid expansion of trade and foreign investment. But all these factors were in fact carefully managed by the state, to make sure that they fitted in with the government’s development goals. Wiesbrot, Mark. “2016: When China overtakes the US”. The Guardian. 27 April 2011. Web. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/apr/27/china-imf-economy-2016. Accessed 28 August 2013.

  8. 8.

    A valuable contribution in this debate has been offered by Bruno Amable, who provided a typology of capitalism based on the theory of institutional complementarity. Among the different models, he identified an Asian model of capitalism. See Amable, Bruno (2003). The Diversity of Modern Capitalism. Oxford University Press, Oxford. (See in particular Chap. 3).

  9. 9.

    Johnson, Chalmers (1982). MITI and the Japanese Miracle. Stanford University Press, Stanford. Johnson applied this model to explain the Japanese economic boom. However, the model has been subsequently extended to interpret the growth of the so-called Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea), of the second generation’s NIEs (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Philippines), and finally of China.

  10. 10.

    Mazzei, Franco, Vittorio Volpi (2010). La rivincita della Mano Visibile. Il Modello economico asiatico e l’Occidente. Egea, Milano.

  11. 11.

    Rugman, Alan M., and Simon Collinson (2009). International Business. 5 th Edition. Prentice Hall, Harlow: p. 620.

  12. 12.

    Ibid. p. 620.

  13. 13.

    The World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P. R. China (2013). China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. The World Bank, Washington DC.

  14. 14.

    Being aware of the many critics to Chinese official statistics, given the possibility of data manipulation, it has to be however stressed that also in this eventuality, data might only be slightly different.

  15. 15.

    Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. “China Statistical Yearbook 2012” China Statistics Press. 2012. http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2012/indexeh.htm.

  16. 16.

    The World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P. R. China (2013). China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. The World Bank, Washington DC.

  17. 17.

    Wei, Shang-Jin. “Why Do the Chinese Saves so Much?”. Forbes. 2 February 2010. Web. http://www.forbes.com/2010/02/02/china-saving-marriage-markets-economy-trade.html. Accessed 5 September 2013.

  18. 18.

    To give an idea of how extensive the SOE sector, it should be remarked that central SOEs represent just a small portion of the total number of SOEs. In 2007, there were 120,000 SOEs, of which only 22,000 were central. Knight, John and Sai Ding (2009). “Why does China Invest so much?” University of Oxford Discussion Paper Series No. 441.

  19. 19.

    International Monetary Fund (2013). “People’s Republic of China”. IMF Country Report No.13/211: p. 31.

  20. 20.

    This interpretation is offered by economists such George Friedman and institutions like the IMF. For other economists, it was on the contrary the enhancement of the productivity levels that allowed Chinese exponential growth. For this interpretation, see Hu, Zuliu and Mohsin S. Khan (1997). “Why China grows so fast?” International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.

  21. 21.

    Mazzei, Franco, Vittorio Volpi (2010). La rivincita della Mano Visibile. Il Modello economico asiatico e l’Occidente. Egea, Milano: pp. 133–178.

  22. 22.

    Banister, Judith (2013). “China’s manufacturing employment and hourly labor compensation, 2002–2009”. International Labour Comparison, US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Web. http://www.bls.gov/fls/china_method.htm. Accessed 2 September 2013.

  23. 23.

    Ibid.

  24. 24.

    The percentages are calculated on the basis of the data made available by the US Bureau of Statistics.

  25. 25.

    Mazzei, Franco, Vittorio Volpi (2010). La rivincita della Mano Visibile. Il Modello economico asiatico e l’Occidente. Egea, Milano: pp. 153–154.

  26. 26.

    Rabinovitch, Simon. “IMF says renminbi ‘moderately undervalued’” Financial Times. 25 July 2012. Web. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/370ef804-d62c-11e1-b547-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2e1G9htZN. Accessed 5 September 2013. For other analysts, however, RMB still remains substantially undervalued in the range of 15–30 %.

  27. 27.

    Ibid.

  28. 28.

    Mazzei, Franco, Vittorio Volpi (2010). La rivincita della Mano Visibile. Il Modello economico asiatico e l’Occidente. Egea, Milano: p. 155.

  29. 29.

    The World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P. R. China (2013). China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. The World Bank, Washington DC.

  30. 30.

    The creation of this wide margin was accelerated by the global financial crisis started in 2008.

  31. 31.

    International Monetary Fund (2014). World Economic Outlook Database. IMF Web. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/index.aspx.

  32. 32.

    The World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P. R. China (2013). China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. The World Bank, Washington DC: p. 3.

  33. 33.

    Ibid. p. 9.

  34. 34.

    Ibid. p.10.

  35. 35.

    International Monetary Fund (2013). “China: New Round of Reforms Needed for Continued Success”. IMF Survey Magazine: Countries & Regions. Web. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2013/car071713a.htm. Accessed 18 September 2013.

  36. 36.

    Berkofsky, Axel (2012). “L’economia cinese cresce velocemente. Ma sarà abbastanza?” Osservatorio di Politica Internazionale n. 62: p. 2.

  37. 37.

    Gipouloux, François (2005). La Chine du 21 siècle. Une nouvelle superpuissance. Armand Collin, Paris.

  38. 38.

    International Monetary Fund (2013). “People Republic of China Report”. IMF Country Report No. 13/211: p. 21. Web. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13211.pdf. Accessed 10 October 2013.

  39. 39.

    Chang, Gordon G. (2012). “In morte del Miracolo Cinese”. In: USA contro Cina. Limes, Rivista Italiana di Geopolitica No. 06/2012. December 2012.

  40. 40.

    International Monetary Fund (2013). “People Republic of China”. IMF Country Report No. 13/211: p. 21. Web. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13211.pdf. Accessed 10 October 2013.

  41. 41.

    Ibid. p. 20.

  42. 42.

    Ibid. p. 20.

  43. 43.

    The IMF has drawn a scenario beyond 2018 illustrating the consequences of continuing the current model of growth. IMF explains it as follows: The scenario assumes a further build-up of excess capacity and misallocation of resources. With demographic trends implying a decline in the labour force after 2015 and exhaustion of surplus labour around 2020, the returns on investment would be progressively lower than envisaged, which would cause bankruptcies and financial losses. […] The outcomes could be costly not just in terms of direct fiscal cost of clean-up, but also because the financial losses and deleveraging would in turn generate an adverse feedback loop that hampers employment and growth. The convergence process would stall, with the economy slowing to around 4 %, and GDP per capita would remain about a quarter of that of the United States through 2030. Ibid. p. 20.

  44. 44.

    Bello, Walden. “Chain-gang economics”. Foreign-policy in Focus. 30 October 2006. Web. http://fpif.org/chain-gang_economics/. Accessed 7 October 2013.

  45. 45.

    Ibid.

  46. 46.

    The World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P. R. China (2013). China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. The World Bank, Washington DC.

  47. 47.

    Mazzei, Franco, Vittorio Volpi (2010). La rivincita della Mano Visibile. Il Modello economico asiatico e l’Occidente. Egea, Milano: pp. 135–136.

  48. 48.

    Disegni, Simone (2012). “China’s rise and the global economic downturn: threat to steady growth or opportunity to rebalance?”. ISPI Analysis No. 107. Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, Milano.

  49. 49.

    Ibid.

  50. 50.

    The World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P. R. China (2013). China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. The World Bank, Washington DC.

  51. 51.

    The hokou system (the household registration) has prevented rural migrants to have access to welfare provisions and transformed them into second-class citizens in the cities. See Knight, John (2013). “Inequality in China: An Overview”. The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6482. Washington DC: p. 8.

  52. 52.

    Kochhar, Geeta (2008). “China’s Urban Poor: An expanding Social Stratum”. University of Nottingham—China Policy Institute, Discussion Paper No. 37.

  53. 53.

    Friedman, George (2010). The Next 100 Years. A Forecast for the 21st Century. Anchor Books, New York: p. 96.

  54. 54.

    See Thompson, Thomas N. “Choking China. The Superpower that Is Poisoning the World”. Foreign Affairs Snapshots. 8 April 2013. Web. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139141/thomas-n-thompson/choking-on-china. Accessed 10 October 2013.

  55. 55.

    International Monetary Fund (2013). “People Republic of China”. IMF Country Report No. 13/211: p. 21. Web. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13211.pdf. Accessed 10 October 2013.

  56. 56.

    Ibid. p. 19.

  57. 57.

    The World Bank (2013). “People’s Republic of China. Developing Skills for Economic Transformation and Social Harmony. Yunnan Province”. The World Bank Repot No. ACS3321.

  58. 58.

    According to the Financial Times definition, a hard landing “occurs when an economy that has recorded a period of very rapid growth experiences a severe slowdown, normally due to overheating and an excessive policy response such as substantial credit tightening, a revaluation of the currency, etc.” See “Lexicon: Hard-landing”. Financial Times. Web. http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=hard-landing. Accessed 12 September 2013.

  59. 59.

    Wolf, Martin. “Risks of a hard landing for China”. Financial Times. 2 July 2013.

  60. 60.

    The World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P. R. China (2013). China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. The World Bank, Washington DC: p. 10.

  61. 61.

    Anderlini, Jamil. “Economist weight Chinese hard landing”. Financial Times. 19 August 2012. Web. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cc05e828-e860-11e1-8ffc-00144feab49a.html#axzz2bVSNjZFc. Accessed 15 September 2013.

  62. 62.

    The World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P. R. China (2013). China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. The World Bank, Washington DC.

  63. 63.

    Solomone, Stacey (2013). China’s Strategy in Space. Springer, New York: pp. 37–41.

  64. 64.

    Ibid. p. 39.

  65. 65.

    See, for instance, Feigenbaum, Evan A., and Damien Ma. “The rise of China’s reformers?”. Foreign Affairs Snapshots. 17 April 2013. Web. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139295/evan-a-feigenbaum-and-damien-ma/the-rise-of-chinas-reformers. Accessed 2 September 2013.

  66. 66.

    According to the calculations of the WB and the IMF, there are more than 170 million people still living below the $1.25 international poverty line.

  67. 67.

    “Gross national income per capita 2013, Atlas method and PPP”. World Development Indicators database, World Bank (2014). Web. http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GNIPC.pdf. Accessed 20 December 2014.

  68. 68.

    Deng Xiaoping’s speech “We Must Carry out Socialist Construction in an Orderly Way under the Leadership of the Party”. 8 March 1987. In: “The selected works of Deng Xiaoping. Modern Day Contributions to Marxism–Leninism”. Web. http://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/2013/03/18/we-must-carry-out-socialist-construction-in-an-orderly-way-under-the-leadership-of-the-party/. Accessed 10 October 2013.

  69. 69.

    See in particular: O’Donnel, Guglielmo (1996). “The illusion of Consolidation”. Journal of Democracy Vol. 7 (2): 34–51. Carothers, Thomas (2002). “The end of the Transition Paradigm” Journal of Democracy. Vol. 13 (1): 5–21. Cappelli, Ottorino (2010). “Premodern State Building in Post-Soviet Russia”. In: Hill, Ronald J., and Ottorino Cappelli (eds). Putin and Putinism. Routledge, New York.

  70. 70.

    The goal of democracy has been present only in the rhetoric of Chinese leaders, but it is clear that a first answer would lie in the replacement of this rhetoric with at least good political governance. See Van Wie Davis, Elisabeth (2009). “Governance in China in 2010”. Asian Affairs. Vol. 35 (4): 195–211.

  71. 71.

    As Sun Liping, of the Tsinghua University, writes: “The ultimate outcome of the rigid thinking of stability preservation and the massive stability preservation project is in fact the intensification of social tensions”. Liping, Sun (2012). “The Wukan model and China’s Democratic potentials”. In: Leonard, Mark (ed). China 3.0. European Council on Foreign Relations, London: p.74.

  72. 72.

    The World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P. R. China (2013). China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. The World Bank, Washington DC.

  73. 73.

    For the majority of analysts, this number is conservative. Although dissimilar figures have been provided by foreign reports, there is no doubt that the annual number of so-called mass incidents has grown exponentially since the 1990s, passing from 8700 in 1993 to nearly 60,000 in 2003 to around 180,000 in 2008. See Tanner, Murray Scot (2014). “China Social Unrest Problem”. Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Web. http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Tanner_Written%20Testimony.pdf. Accessed 30 June 2014.

  74. 74.

    Minxin, Pei. “Signs of a New Tiananmen”. The Diplomat. 4 February 2012. Web. http://thediplomat.com/2012/04/04/signs-of-a-new-tiananmen-in-china/. Last accessed 27 September 2013.

  75. 75.

    See Van Wie Davis, Elisabeth (2009). “Governance in China in 2010”. Asian Affairs. Vol. 35 (4): 201.

  76. 76.

    The term is used to indicate the succession of revolutionary waves that started in Tunisia in 2011 and then spreading to the area.

  77. 77.

    On this point, see Scisci, Francesco. “The Jasmine Lesson: Reform beats revolution”. Asia Times. 31 July 2013. Web. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/CHIN-02-310713.html. Accessed 27 September 2013. See also Scisci, Francesco. “Lessons from Tahrir to Tiananmen”. Asia Times. 17 February 2011. Web. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MB17Ad01.html. Accessed 27 September 2013.

  78. 78.

    Leonard, Mark (2012). “What does the new China think?”. In: Leonard, Mark (ed). China 3.0. European Council on Foreign Relations, London: p.10.

  79. 79.

    Mark Leonard and François Godement have explained that the Chinese like to think of history progressing in 30-year cycles. Chinese think of China 1.0 as the years of Mao Zedong (1949–1978), of China 2.0 as the years of the reforms and growth (1978–2008), and of China 3.0 as the forthcoming years of the recently established leadership. Ibid.

  80. 80.

    Ibid.

  81. 81.

    Cit. Solomone, Stacey (2013). China’s Strategy in Space. Springer, New York: p. 94.

  82. 82.

    See Sect. 4.2.2.

  83. 83.

    For the elaboration of this section, I have drawn heavily on the stimulating researches of Mark Leonard; see Leonard, Mark (2008). What does China Think? HarperCollins Publishers, London; see also Leonard, Mark (2012). “What does the new China think?”. In: Leonard, Mark (ed). China 3.0. European Council on Foreign Relations, London: pp. 9–24.

  84. 84.

    Ibid. p 11.

  85. 85.

    Van Wie Davis, Elisabeth (2009). “Governance in China in 2010”. Asian Affairs. Vol. 35 (4): 199.

  86. 86.

    Leonard, Mark (2012). “What does the new China think?”. In: Leonard, Mark (ed). China 3.0. European Council on Foreign Relations, London: p. 15.

  87. 87.

    Ibid. p. 11.

  88. 88.

    See, for instance, Jun, Ma (2012). “Accountability without elections”. In: Leonard, Mark (ed). China 3.0. European Council on Foreign Relations, London: pp. 80–87.

  89. 89.

    It is worth underlining that features of this debate have become part of the political process: “intellectuals are for instance asked to brief the politburo in study sessions, prepare reports that feed into the party’s five-year plans and advise on the government’s white paper”. Van Wie Davis, Elisabeth (2009). “Governance in China in 2010”. Asian Affairs. Vol. 35 (4): 199.

  90. 90.

    See, for instance, Wei, Pan and Shang Ying (2012). “A New Approach to Stability Preservation” In: Leonard, Mark (ed). China 3.0. European Council on Foreign Relations, London: pp. 88–94.

  91. 91.

    Leonard, Mark (2012). “What does the new China think?”. In: Leonard, Mark (ed). China 3.0. European Council on Foreign Relations, London: p 11.

  92. 92.

    See, for instance, Xuetong, Yan (2012). “The weakening of the unipolar configuration”. In: Leonard, Mark (ed). China 3.0. European Council on Foreign Relations, London: pp. 112–117.

  93. 93.

    The difference between these two “archetypes” has been illustrated by M. Leonard as follows: Guangdong, a prosperous coastal region, has stood for a quest to move up the value chain economically while using a free media, civil society, and political openness to quell social tensions. Chongqing, by contrast, was about turning a backward inland province into a laboratory for egalitarian social policies and domestic consumption. Cit. Leonard, Mark (2012). “What does the new China think?”. In: Leonard, Mark (ed). China 3.0. European Council on Foreign Relations, London: p 11.

  94. 94.

    According to sinologists, Chinese identity comprises three dimensions. The first is “the political dimension of sovereignty, which means the full acceptance of the political and religious legitimacy of Tianxia […]. The second is the symbolic dimension of civilisation, which means the sharing of common cultural practices through fully accepting the values of Zhongguo. The third is the [ethnic] genealogical dimension of family ramifications, which refers to the direct […] descendants of Chinese ancestors”. Quoted from: Mazzei, Franco (2003). “Intercultural Variables and Japanese Socio-Economic Performances”. In: Lavagnino, Alessandra Cristina et al. (eds). Reflections on Asia. Essays in honour of Enrica Collotti Pischel. Franco Angeli, Milano.

  95. 95.

    It should be noted that also in the United States and Europe, the aerospace sector is not a model of free-market capitalism and that industrial competitiveness is largely determined by nonmarket factors. For an assessment of the space sector in Europe, see Hayward, Keith (2011). “The Structure and Dynamics of the European Space Industry Base”. ESPI Perspectives 55. European Space Policy Institute, Vienna: 3.

  96. 96.

    The bourgeoisie in China has not been the driving force for the emergence of capitalism, the development of which was instead managed by the state. See Sect. 5.1.1.

  97. 97.

    Bergère, Marie-Claire (2000). La Chine de 1949 à nos jours. A. Colin, Paris.

  98. 98.

    Mazzei, Franco, Vittorio Volpi (2006). Asia al Centro. Universitá Bocconi Editore, Milano.

  99. 99.

    Van Wie Davis, Elisabeth (2009). “Governance in China in 2010”. Asian Affairs. Vol. 35 (4): 195–211.

  100. 100.

    Deng Xiaoping statement on the realisation of a Xiaokang society (1979). Quoted from: Leonard, Mark. “China’s Affluence Crisis”. Reuters US Edition. 31 July 2012. Web. http://blogs.reuters.com/mark-leonard/2012/07/31/chinas-affluence-crisis/. Accessed 04 October 2013.

  101. 101.

    If it is true that the Internet has been often used to promote social requests, in the Chinese case it is also true the other way round: the government often uses the Internet to shape the public opinion. In this regard, Michael Anti has underlined that the government’s strategy of “blocking and cloning” social media sites could actually reinforce the one-party state rather than weaken it. See Anti, Michael (2012). “The Chinanet and Smart Censorship”. In: Leonard, Mark (ed). China 3.0. European Council on Foreign Relations, London: pp. 100–105.

  102. 102.

    The World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P. R. China (2013). China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. The World Bank, Washington DC: p. 9.

  103. 103.

    Solomone, Stacey (2013). China’s Strategy in Space. Springer, New York: p. 69.

  104. 104.

    As Yan Xuetong poignantly argued in a renowned essay: “the rise of China is granted by nature. The Chinese are very proud of their early achievements in the human history of civilization. In the last 2,000 years China has enjoyed superpower status several times, such as during the Han Dynasty, the Tang Dynasty, and the early Qing Dynasty. Even as recently as the 1820, just 20 years before the Opium War, China’s GDP accounted for 30% of the world GDP. This history of superpower status makes the Chinese people very proud of their country on the one hand and very sad about China’s current international status on the other hand. They believe China’s decline is a historical mistake which they should correct”. Cit. Xuetong, Yan (2001). “The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes”. Journal of Contemporary China Vol. 10 (26): 33–39.

  105. 105.

    Zhongwei, Lu. “China Shoots for the Moon”. Beijing Review. 18 September 2003.

  106. 106.

    See, for instance, the below reported Jiang Zemin speech in August 1999 and Hu Jintao speech of January 2006 on the role of technology innovation, in which he stressed: “in the face of international scientific development and increasing international competition, by seeing the development of science and technology as a central thread in the development strategy and actively committing to its progress, China can seize the opportunity for development”.

  107. 107.

    Krugman, Paul (1994). “The Myth of the Asian Miracle”. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 73 (6).

  108. 108.

    See The State Council of the People’s Republic of China. The National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006–2020). An Outline. Beijing, China. 2006. Available at: http://sydney.edu.au/global-health/international-networks/National_Outline_for_Medium_and_Long_Term_ST_Development1.doc. See also Segal, Adam. “China’s Innovation Wall. Beijing Push for Home-ground Technology”. Foreign Affairs Snapshots. 28 September 2010. Web. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66753/adam-segal/chinas-innovation-wall. Accessed 19 October 2013.

  109. 109.

    To compare the reliance on foreign technology, in 2006 it was estimated to be the 60 % and the 2006 gross expenditure on R&D was 1.3 % of China’s GDP. See “China issues guidelines on sci-tech development program”. Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal. 9 September 2006. Web. http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-02/09/content_184426.htm. Accessed 23 October 2013.

  110. 110.

    It has to be also underlined that while the Guidelines identified the goals and specific sector to focus, it was the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) for high-technology industries that formally detailed the 16 megaprojects. Ibid.

  111. 111.

    Raustialia, Kal and Christopher Sprigman (2013). “Fake It Till You Make It. The Good News about China’s Knockoff Economy”. Foreign Affairs Vol. 92 (4): 25–30.

  112. 112.

    Cit. McGregor, James (2010). “China’s Drive for Indigenous Innovation. A Web of Industrial Policies”. Global Regulatory Cooperation Project—US Chamber of Commerce. APCO worldwide. Web. http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/100728chinareport_0.pdf.

  113. 113.

    Raustialia, Kal, and Christopher Sprigman (2013). “Fake It Till You Make It. The Good News about China’s Knockoff Economy”. Foreign Affairs Vol. 92 (4): 25–30.

  114. 114.

    The US government has, for instance, banned Chinese scientists who were involved in research projects at NASA and advisory bodies in both countries from continuing their research in the United States and even from attending NASA conferences. Recently this ban has been partially reversed. See “Nasa reverses conference’s ban on Chinese scientists”. BBC News. 21 October 2013. Web. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24618824. Accessed 21 October 2013.

  115. 115.

    It is well known that Sinic countries (China, Japan, Taiwan, the two Koreas, and Singapore) may be considered “re-elaboration cultures”, in the sense that the same “object or process” can be continuously copied or repeated, without losing its original value. In these countries, the concepts of original and copy carry quite different meanings than in “Western cultures”. Especially in literary and artistic production, sinologists have explained that “original” means a sort of conformity to a primary source. A work can thus be regarded as original when it conforms to the primary source. For these cultures, this conformity is never perceived as either a mere slavish imitation nor as plagiarism but as something that possesses its own value, as it expresses deference or recognition for predecessors. In addition, what ultimately counts for these cultures is the final product, not its point of departure.

  116. 116.

    See, for instance, the map of disputes between the WTO Members. “Map of Disputes between WTO Members”. World Trade Organisation (2014). Web. http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu_e/dispu_maps_e.htm?country_selected=CHN&sense=e. Accessed 5 January 2014.

  117. 117.

    Raustialia, Kal and Christopher Sprigman (2013). “Fake It Till You Make It. The Good News about China’s Knockoff Economy”. Foreign Affairs Vol. 92 (4): 25–30.

  118. 118.

    Another interesting observation made is that China, “aware that with recombinative innovation comes both explicit and implicit knowledge, has been extremely successful in sinifying the explicit knowledge so that implicit influences are reduced”. See Solomone, Stacey (2013). China’s Strategy in Space. Springer, New York: p. 37.

  119. 119.

    Ibid. p. 37.

  120. 120.

    Quoted from: Ibid. p. 36.

  121. 121.

    Quoted from: McGregor, James (2010). “China’s Drive for Indigenous Innovation. A Web of Industrial Policies”. Global Regulatory Cooperation Project—US Chamber of Commerce. APCO worldwide: p. 17. Web. http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/100728chinareport_0.pdf.

  122. 122.

    Interestingly, even the United States have to a large extent lost their know-how and are thus now obliged to invest in reverse engineering and make up for lost ground.

  123. 123.

    Cit. Solomone, Stacey (2013). China’s Strategy in Space. Springer, New York.

  124. 124.

    Segal, Adam. “China’s Innovation Wall. Beijing Push for Home-ground Technology”. Foreign Affairs. 28 September 2010. Web. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66753/adam-segal/chinas-innovation-wall. Accessed 19 October 2013.

  125. 125.

    “China issues guidelines on sci-tech development program”. Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal. 9 September 2006. Web. http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-02/09/content_184426.htm. Accessed 23 October 2013.

  126. 126.

    For an informed examination of the Qing dynasty’s strategy for preserving the essence of Chinese culture while at the same time utilising elements of the West for practical purposes, see Wilkinson, Endymion (2013). Chinese History. A New Manual. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA: pp. 477–479.

  127. 127.

    Cit. Leonard, Mark (2008). What does China Think? HarperCollins Publishers, London: pp.10–11.

  128. 128.

    “China’s 12th Five Year Plan. How it actually works and what’s in store for the next five years”. APCO Worldwide. 10 December 2010. Web. http://www.apcoworldwide.com/content/pdfs/chinas_12th_five-year_plan.pdf. Accessed 3 November 2013.

  129. 129.

    Ibid.

  130. 130.

    See Sect. 2.1.

  131. 131.

    The United States example has, for instance, shown that innovation used to be an undertaking led by private companies rather than by the government. It then evolved in the 1980s into a collaborative exercise involving universities, research institutes, and government programmes. Block, Fred, and Matthew R. Keller (2008). “Where Do Innovations Come From? Transformations in the US National Innovation System, 1970–2006”. The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation. Web. http://www.itif.org/files/Where_do_innovations_come_from.pdf. Accessed 5 November 2013.

  132. 132.

    “China issues guidelines on sci-tech development program”. Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal. 9 September 2006. Web. http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-02/09/content_184426.htm. Accessed 23 October 2013.

  133. 133.

    The World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P. R. China (2013). China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. The World Bank, Washington DC: p. 21.

  134. 134.

    Ibid. pp. 34–36.

  135. 135.

    Cit. McGregor, James (2010). “China’s Drive for Indigenous Innovation. A Web of Industrial Policies”. Global Regulatory Cooperation Project—US Chamber of Commerce. APCO worldwide: pp. 11–12.

  136. 136.

    Ibid. p. 12.

  137. 137.

    See Shi, Yigong and Yi Rao. “China’s Research Culture”. Science. Vol. 329. 3 September 2010. Web. http://www.swissnexchina.org/resources/chinas-research-culture.pdf. Accessed 20 November 2013. See also Huang, Yangzhong. “The US is Quietly losing its Innovation Edge to China”. The Diplomat. 27 October 2013. Web. http://thediplomat.com/china-power/the-us-is-quietly-losing-its-innovation-edge-to-china/. Accessed 20 November 2013.

  138. 138.

    As underlined by Yigong Shi and Yi Rao, “a significant proportion of researchers in China spend too much time on building connections and not enough time attending seminars, discussing science, doing research, or training students (instead, using them as labourers in their laboratories). Most are too busy to be found in their own institutions. Some become part of the problem: They use connections to judge grant applicants and undervalue scientific merit”. Ibid.

  139. 139.

    McGregor, James (2010). “China’s Drive for Indigenous Innovation. A Web of Industrial Policies”. Global Regulatory Cooperation Project—US Chamber of Commerce. APCO worldwide: 12.

  140. 140.

    The World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P. R. China (2013). China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. The World Bank, Washington DC.

  141. 141.

    A noteworthy reason for this “inertia” can lie in the successful experience offered by the Japanese model. In the experience of China’s neighbour, bureaucracy played a predominant role in guiding the innovation efforts, thanks to—among others—its high efficiency. This efficiency is however difficult to achieve in China at the moment. In addition the industrial and market environment was completely different.

  142. 142.

    See Sect. 2.1. See also Solomone, Stacey (2013). China’s Strategy in Space. Springer, New York: pp. 17–30.

  143. 143.

    See Solomone, Stacey (2013). China’s Strategy in Space. Springer, New York.

  144. 144.

    The World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P. R. China (2013). China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. The World Bank, Washington DC: p. 35.

  145. 145.

    See Zeng, Ming, and Peter Williamson (2007). Dragons at your door: How Chinese cost innovation is disrupting global competition. Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston: pp. 57–88.

  146. 146.

    “China’s R&D investment 2nd in the world: report”. China Daily. 15 November 2011. Web. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-11/15/content_14093946.htm. Accessed 7 November 2013.

  147. 147.

    Huang, Yangzhong. “The US is Quietly losing its Innovation Edge to China”. The Diplomat. 27 October 2013. Web. http://thediplomat.com/china-power/the-us-is-quietly-losing-its-innovation-edge-to-china/. Accessed 20 November 2013.

  148. 148.

    Chinese Academy of Sciences. “CAS statistical data”. CAS fact-sheet. Web. http://english.cas.cn/ST/stsd/200909/P020120814348911674163.pdf. Accessed 20 November 2013.

  149. 149.

    See Statistics of European Federation of Academies of Sciences and Humanities. European Federation of Academies of Sciences and Humanities. Web. http://www.allea.org/Pages/ALL/4/731.bGFuZz1FTkc.html. Accessed 20 November 2013.

  150. 150.

    The World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P.R.C. “China’s Growth through Technological Convergence and Innovation” in China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. Washington, DC: World Bank. 2013. p. 156.

  151. 151.

    The World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P.R.C. China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. Washington, DC. World Bank. 2013. p. 38.

  152. 152.

    Chinese Academy of Sciences. “Strategic Planning”. CAS Fact-sheet. Web. http://english.cas.cn/ST/spi2020/201106/P020110608576186252276.pdf. Accessed 20 November 2013.

  153. 153.

    Block, Fred, and Matthew R. Keller (2008). “Where Do Innovations Come From? Transformations in the US National Innovation System, 1970–2006”. The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation. Web. http://www.itif.org/files/Where_do_innovations_come_from.pdf. Accessed 5 November 2013.

  154. 154.

    McGregor, James (2010). “China’s Drive for Indigenous Innovation. A Web of Industrial Policies”. Global Regulatory Cooperation Project—US Chamber of Commerce. APCO worldwide: p. 36.

  155. 155.

    The World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P. R. China (2013). China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. The World Bank, Washington DC: pp. 175–176.

  156. 156.

    McGregor, James (2010). “China’s Drive for Indigenous Innovation. A Web of Industrial Policies”. Global Regulatory Cooperation Project—US Chamber of Commerce. APCO worldwide: p. 6.

  157. 157.

    It even seems that president Hu in 2009 modified Deng’s famous slogan Taoguang Yanghui, Yousuo Zuowei (Keep a low profile and bide our time, while getting something accomplished) by adding the word jiji (actively), so to make the final phrase “while actively getting something accomplished. Ibid. p. 24.

  158. 158.

    Ibid. p. 27.

  159. 159.

    The World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P. R. China (2013). China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. The World Bank, Washington DC: p. 21.

  160. 160.

    The international IPR agreements signed by China include: the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1985); the Madrid Agreement for the International Registration of Trademarks (1989); the International Patent Cooperation Treaty (1994); and, with its WTO accession, the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (2001).

  161. 161.

    McGregor, James (2010). “China’s Drive for Indigenous Innovation. A Web of Industrial Policies”. Global Regulatory Cooperation Project—US Chamber of Commerce. APCO worldwide: p. 25.

  162. 162.

    The World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P. R. China (2013). China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. The World Bank, Washington DC: p. 21.

  163. 163.

    Cit. Wu, Weiping, and Yu Zhou (2012). “The Third Mission Stalled? Universities in China’s Technological Progress”. Journal of Technology Transfer Vol. 37 (6).

  164. 164.

    Ibid.

  165. 165.

    The World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council, P. R. China (2013). China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative Society. The World Bank, Washington DC: p. 23.

  166. 166.

    Ibid. p. 24.

  167. 167.

    Richard Nisbett, Richard (2003). The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently… And Why. Free Press, New York.

  168. 168.

    Mazzei, Franco (2003). “Intercultural Variables and Japanese Socio-Economic Performances”. In: Lavagnino, Alessandra Cristina et al. (eds). Reflections on Asia. Essays in honour of Enrica Collotti Pischel. Franco Angeli, Milano.

  169. 169.

    As a famous Confucian analects (13) recites: “the wise man is looking for harmony without assimilation. The mean man is looking for assimilation without harmony”. Zhou, Yuanxia (2008). “The Modern Significance of Confucianism”. Asian Social Science Vol 4 (11): 12–16.

  170. 170.

    In the Sinic world, the concept of harmony is not seen as something static, but as a process, a constant flux.

  171. 171.

    Cit. Reischauer, Edwin, and M. B. Jansen (1995). The Japanese Today—Change and Continuity. Harvard University Press, Cambridge: p. 141.

  172. 172.

    It could be, for instance, argued that it is ultimately this type of logic that allow China seeing itself as both a market and socialist economy without having a conflict between the two opposing states existing at the same time and place.

  173. 173.

    See Mazzei, Franco, Vittorio Volpi (2006). Asia al Centro. Universitá Bocconi Editore, Milano.

  174. 174.

    Cit Mazzei, Franco (2003). “Intercultural Variables and Japanese Socio-Economic Performances”. In: Lavagnino, Alessandra Cristina et al. (eds). Reflections on Asia. Essays in honour of Enrica Collotti Pischel. Franco Angeli, Milano.

  175. 175.

    See Richard Nisbett’s book for more detailed analysis on China’s rationality. These connotations leave much space for pragmatism that is reflected in a flexible and adaptive management style. Pragmatism has eventually allowed accompanying the traditional consensual policymaking procedures with new, Western-derived managerial methods. In the telecommunications and aerospace industries, for instance, the new managers are pushing for innovation in managerial style and corporate culture to foment R&D breakthroughs while also keeping the CCP’s role relevant in innovative managerial systems.

  176. 176.

    Guo, Huadong, Ji Wu (eds) (2010). Space Science and Technology in China: A Roadmap to 2050. Chinese Academy of Sciences, Science Press (Springer), Beijing.

  177. 177.

    See Solomone, Stacey (2013). China’s Strategy in Space. Springer, New York.

  178. 178.

    Cit. Perrett, Bradley (2010). “Longer Marches”. Aviation Week & Space Technology Vol. 172 (11): 22–23.

  179. 179.

    Johnson-Freese, Joan (2004). “Space Weiqi. The Launch of Shenzhou V”. Naval College Review Vol. 57 (2): 121–145.

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    Marco Aliberti

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Aliberti, M. (2015). China and the Moon: Endogenous Conditioning Factors. In: When China Goes to the Moon.... Studies in Space Policy, vol 11. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19473-8_5

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