Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Why the Moon?

  • Chapter
When China Goes to the Moon...

Part of the book series: Studies in Space Policy ((STUDSPACE,volume 11))

  • 824 Accesses

Abstract

An assessment of Chinese plans to land its taikonauts on the Moon first requires a detailed investigation of the rationales possibly guiding China’s leadership towards this ambitious endeavour. Such an analysis helps us better understand the underlying philosophy of China’s space programme and, more broadly, China’s sociopolitical behaviour, beyond the pervasive but too reductive interpretation of a strategic confrontation between a fast-rising power and a declining hegemon.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    See Calza, Giancarlo (2006). “Cina. Grandiosità e bellezza”. In Lionello Lanciotti, Maurizio Scarpari (eds). Cina. Nascita di un impero, Skira editore, Milano

  2. 2.

    Ibid.

  3. 3.

    Fahr-Becker, Gabriele (ed) (1999). The Art of East Asia. Könneman, Köln: p. 71

  4. 4.

    Ibid. p. 83

  5. 5.

    Wang, Zheng (2013). “Il nazionalismo cinese tra mito e trauma”. Istituto Affari Internazionali, Orizzonte Cina July-August 2013. See also: Wang, Zheng. “Not Rising But Rejuvenating: The Chinese Dream”. The Diplomat. 5 February 2013. Web. http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/chinese-dream-draft/?allpages=yes. Accessed 20 March 2014

  6. 6.

    The first Opium war and the takeover of China by the Communist Party are identified as the demarcating events of the “century of shame”. See Mazzei, Franco, Vittorio Volpi (2006). Asia al Centro. Universita’ Bocconi Editore, Milano

  7. 7.

    Cit. Sheehan, Michael (2013). “Did you see that, grandpa Mao? The prestige and propaganda rationales of the Chinese space program”. Space Policy Vol. 29 (2): 89

  8. 8.

    According to the sinologist David Bachman, China’s foreign policy can be seen merely as an extension of its domestic one. See Bachman, David. “Domestic Sources of Chinese Foreign Policy”. In Kim, S.S. (ed) (1994). China and the World. Westview Press, Boulder: p. 44.

  9. 9.

    For some scholars, the initiation of the Shenzhou programme in 1992 may have been intended in particular to create a positive focal point for national pride to counter the negative 1989 Tiananmen Square images. See Johnson-Freese, Joan (2005). “Space Wei Qi. The Launch of Shenzhou V”. Naval War College Review Vol. 57 (2): p. 124.

  10. 10.

    Cit. Handberg, Roger, and Zhen Li (2007). Chinese Space Policy. A study in domestic and international politics. Routledge, New York

  11. 11.

    President Hu Jintao on 26 November 2005. Quoted from: Sheehan, Michael (2013). “Did you see that, grandpa Mao? The prestige and propaganda rationales of the Chinese space program”. Space Policy Vol. 29 (2): 89–166

  12. 12.

    The meaning of the word comes from an ancient name for China and has the same phonetic sound, although the ideogram for zhou is different in meaning.

  13. 13.

    Solomone, Stacey (2013). China’s Strategy in Space. Springer, New York: p. 65

  14. 14.

    Harvey, Brian (2004). China’s Space Program. From Conception to Manned Spaceflight. Springer, New York

  15. 15.

    Even Mao Zedong’s most famous poem, “Reply to Li Shuyi”, has as a central tenet the figure of the “lonely moon goddess”, which is utilised to recall his murdered wife Yang Kaihui.

  16. 16.

    Yang, Lihui, et al (2005). Handbook of Chinese Mythology. Oxford University Press, New York: p. 86

  17. 17.

    “China names moon rover ‘Yutu’”. Xinhua News. 27 November 2013. Web. http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/China_names_moon_rover_Yutu_999.html. Accessed 20 March 2014

  18. 18.

    Qiang, Hou. “The Moon in Chinese poetry”. Xinhua News. 2 December 2013. Web. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/02/c_132932871.htm. Accessed 2 April 2014

  19. 19.

    Kua Fu is another important figure in Chinese mythology: according to the legend, he was a giant who chased the sun and died while getting too close.

  20. 20.

    “Sacred and glorious mission” are the words utilised by both China’s Premier Wen Jiabao on occasion of the Shenzhou 6 mission and by President Xi Jinping at the launching operations of the Shenzhou 10.

  21. 21.

    A highly indicative demonstration of the relevance attributed to the human spaceflight in terms of identification with the ruling class is quite ironically shown by the fact that the first manned mission in 2003 was not broadcast live on television to avoid embarrassment in case of failure. As explained by Joan Johnson-Freese, President Jiang Zemin made it very clear that if space successes are spectacular, failure would be devastating for the regime. Live broadcasting thus started with the Shenzhou-6 missions—that is when a higher level of confidence was gained. See Johnson-Freese, Joan (2005). “Space Wei Qi. The Launch of Shenzhou V”. Naval War College Review Vol. 57 (2).

  22. 22.

    Besides China’s first astronaut Yang Liwei, who was promoted to Major General and became a national icon, it should be mentioned that after her flight, Liu Wang, China’s first space woman, soon became one of the most celebrated women in contemporary China.

  23. 23.

    The Chinese overseas diaspora has been also targeted by promotion activities related to the human spaceflight endeavours.

  24. 24.

    Sheehan, Michael (2013). “Did you see that, grandpa Mao? The prestige and propaganda rationales of the Chinese space program”. Space Policy Vol. 29 (2): 110

  25. 25.

    Solomone, Stacey (2006). “The Culture of China’s Space Program: A Peking Opera in Space”. Journal of Future Studies. Vol. 11(1): 43–58

  26. 26.

    Cit. Wang, Zheng. “Not Rising But Rejuvenating: The Chinese Dream”. The Diplomat. 5 February 2013. Web. http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/chinese-dream-draft/?allpages=yes. Accessed 20 March 2014

  27. 27.

    Speech by Xi Jinping at the exhibition “the Road toward Renewal” on 29 November 2012. (Emphasis added).Quoted from: “Xi pledges “great renewal of Chinese nation”. Xinhua News. 29 November 2012. Web. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-11/29/c_132008231.htm. Accessed 10 April 2014

  28. 28.

    “Lunar probe boosts Chinese Dream”. Space Daily. 3 December 2013. Web. http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Commentary_Lunar_probe_boosts_Chinese_dream_999.html. Accessed 10 April 2014

  29. 29.

    For instance, on that occasion President Xi Jinping affirmed: “China will take bigger steps in space exploration in pursuit of its space dream… the space dream is part of the dream to make China stronger. The mission’s crew members carry a space dream of the Chinese nation, and represent the lofty aspirations of the Chinese people to explore space ….” Quoted from Yi, Yang. “Exploration part of the China dream”. Xinhua News. 23 June 2013. Web. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/25/c_132483952_2.htm. See also: “Xi wows bigger strides in space exploration. Space Daily. 25 June 2013. Web. http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Xi_vows_bigger_stride_in_space_exploration_999.html.

  30. 30.

    In its report CAS stressed “China fell from a world economic power into a poverty-stricken country, subject to insult and humiliation by other powers”. Science and technology are offering a way forward for the great rejuvenation. Guo, Huadong, Ji Wu (eds) (2010). Space Science and Technology in China: A Roadmap to 2050. Chinese Academy of Sciences, Science Press (Springer), Beijing.

  31. 31.

    See, for example, Seedhouse, Erich (2010). The New Space Race. China vs the United States, Springer—Praxis Publishing, Chichester, UK. Handberg, Roger, and Zhen Li (2007). Chinese Space Policy. A study in domestic and international politics. Routledge, New York. Moltz, James Clay (2011). Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks. Columbia University Press, New York.

  32. 32.

    Quoted from Kaufman, Marc. “NASA Star Is Fading, Its Chief Says”. Washington Post. 14 September 2008. Web. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/13/AR2008091302142.html. Accessed 2 April 2014

  33. 33.

    Quoted from Griffin, Michael D. “To Explore Strange New Worlds”. Remarks to the 39th Lunar and Planetary Science Conference. 10 March 2008. Web. http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/216616main_LPSC_10_Mar_08.pdf. Accessed 10 April 2014

  34. 34.

    For this interpreation see in particular Kulacki, Gregory, and Jeffrey Lewis. (2009). A Place for One’s Mat: China’s Space Program, 1956–2003. American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, MA

  35. 35.

    The term was coined by the scholar Kenneth Pommeranz. In China’s narrative, the emergence of this divergence was due to the Chinese purported inability to embrace modern science and develop technology.

  36. 36.

    See Cunningham, Fiona (2009). “The Stellar Status Symbol: True Motives for China’s Manned Space Program”. China Security Vol. 5 (3): 73–88.

  37. 37.

    Kulacki, Gregory, and Jeffrey Lewis. (2009). A Place for One’s Mat: China’s Space Program, 1956–2003. American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, MA

  38. 38.

    Indeed, as noted by some scholars, when in 1992 the 30-year plan to send humans into space and build a national space station was approved, Chinese space professionals believed that they would have been latecomers to an expanding human presence in low Earth orbit. Establishing a sustainable human presence in LEO was perceived by some leading members of the Chinese space community as a technological benchmark that would be reached by many of the nations that China saw as developmental role models or peers. Not only were the USA and Russia implementing ambitious plans to develop a space station, but Japan, Canada, and Europe were also making consistent investments in this domain. Chinese space experts believed that these efforts would continue well into the early decades of the following century and that Korea and India would invest in manned spaceflight and ultimately either develop space station plans of their own or join the USA and Russia as partners. China decided to move forward to keep pace with the development supposed to be taking place in other nations, in order to avoid losing its voice at international level. See Kulacki, Gregory (2012). “Why China is building a space station”. Union of Concerned Scientists: pp. 6–7.

  39. 39.

    Kulacki, Gregory, and Jeffrey Lewis. (2009). A Place for One’s Mat: China’s Space Program, 1956–2003. American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, MA: p. vii

  40. 40.

    Ibid. p. 4

  41. 41.

    It bears noting that still in 2012 similar words were pronounced by Senator Wolf: “we don’t want to give [China] the opportunity to take advantage of our technology, and we have nothing to gain from dealing with them” (see Sect. 6.3).

  42. 42.

    Harvey, Brian (2013). China in Space. The Great Leap Forward. Springer, New York.

  43. 43.

    Kulacki, Gregory (2012). “Why China is building a space station”. Union of Concerned Scientists: pp. 6–7.

  44. 44.

    Medeiros, Evan S (2009). China’s International Behaviour. Activism, Opportunism and Diversification. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA: p. 208.

  45. 45.

    Cit. Ibid. p. 209.

  46. 46.

    Cit. Ibid. p. xxii.

  47. 47.

    As underlined by many sinologists, one of the most constant obsessions of China’s foreign policy is that of becoming contained and encircled by a hegemonic state and its allies. See, among the analyses, Kissinger, Henry (2011). On China. Penguin Books, New York. See also: Mazzei, Franco; Vittorio Volpi (2006). Asia al Centro. Universita’ Bocconi Editore, Milano.

  48. 48.

    Zhao, Suisheng. (2013). “A new model of Great Power Relationship and China-US Competition in the Asia Pacific”. ISPI Analysis No. 211. Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, Milano.

  49. 49.

    Dellios, Rosita (2005). “China’s space program: A strategic and political analysis”, Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East–west Cultural and Economic Studies Vol. 7 (1). Web. http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cm/vol7/iss1/1

  50. 50.

    The core purpose of the HSTI programme is to build space skills in countries currently without a space programme. In particular it aims at involving more countries in activities related to human spaceflight and space exploration and at increasing the benefit from the outcome of such activities through international cooperation, to make space exploration a truly international effort. The role of the initiative in these efforts consists of providing a platform to exchange information, to foster collaboration between partners from spacefaring and non-spacefaring countries, and to encourage emerging and developing countries to take part in space research and to benefit from space applications. More information on the HSTI is available at the UNOOSA website: http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/en/SAP/hsti/index.html.

  51. 51.

    Lan, Chen. “Quarterly Report on the Chinese Space Programme. July-September 2013”. In Lan, Chen, and Jacqueline Myrrhe (eds). Go Taikonauts. All about the Chinese space programme. Issue 10. December 2013: p. 6.

  52. 52.

    Cit. Dellios, Rosita (2005). “China’s space program: A strategic and political analysis”, Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East–west Cultural and Economic Studies Vol. 7 (1). Web. http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cm/vol7/iss1/1

  53. 53.

    For a more detailed assessment on the benefits China expects to harvest from international space cooperation, see Sect. 5.4.

  54. 54.

    Addressed by President John F. Kennedy to the UN General Assembly. 20 September 1963. US Department of State. Web. http://www.state.gov/p/io/potusunga/207201.htm. Accessed 15 May 2014.

  55. 55.

    The “Four Modernisation” policy was officially approved by the Central Committee of China’s Communist Party in December 1978.

  56. 56.

    Deng Xiaoping’s speech at the opening ceremony of the national conference on science”. 18 March 1978. In Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping. Volume 2 (1975–1982). Web. http://archive.org/stream/SelectedWorksOfDengXiaopingVol.1/Deng02_djvu.txt. Accessed 1 April 2014.

  57. 57.

    Cit. Guo, Huadong, Ji Wu (eds) (2010). Space Science and Technology in China: A Roadmap to 2050. Chinese Academy of Sciences, Science Press (Springer), Beijing. p. 34.

  58. 58.

    Ibid. p. 34.

  59. 59.

    Ibid. p. 50.

  60. 60.

    Ibid. p. 50.

  61. 61.

    Officially, China joined the ISECG as a fully fledged member in occasion of the International Space Exploration Forum (9 January 2014).

  62. 62.

    “The Global Exploration Strategy. The Framework for Coordination”. International Space Exploration Coordination Group. April 2007. Web. http://www.globalspaceexploration.org/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=119c14c4-6f68-49dd-94fa-af08ecb0c4f6&groupId=10812

  63. 63.

    “Global Exploration Roadmap”. International Space Exploration Coordination Group. April 2007. Web. https://www.globalspaceexploration.org/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=119c14c4-6f68-49dd-94fa-af08ecb0c4f6&groupId=10812

  64. 64.

    Ideally, also high-energy particle physics, which is facing some limitations in carrying out experiments on Earth, could be performed on the Moon. See Guo, Huadong, Ji Wu (eds) (2010). Space Science and Technology in China: A Roadmap to 2050. Chinese Academy of Sciences, Science Press (Springer), Beijing: p.16.

  65. 65.

    Ibid. p. 18.

  66. 66.

    The gravity of the Moon is only 1/6 of the Earth, the magnetic field is less than 1/1000 that of the Earth, while space radiation is significantly increased.

  67. 67.

    Guo, Huadong, Ji Wu (eds) (2010). Space Science and Technology in China: A Roadmap to 2050. Chinese Academy of Sciences, Science Press (Springer), Beijing: p. 50.

  68. 68.

    As Premier Wen Jiabao remarked: “We fundamentally have to rely on two main drivers, one, to persist in the promotion of opening and reforms, and two, rely on the progress of science and technology and the strengths of innovation”. McGregor, James (2010). “China’s Drive for Indigenous Innovation. A Web of Industrial Policies”. Global Regulatory Cooperation Project—US Chamber of Commerce. APCO worldwide. Web. http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/100728chinareport_0.pdf

  69. 69.

    Statement of President Jang Zemin; August 1999. Quoted from: Ibid. p. 10.

  70. 70.

    See The State Council of the People’s Republic of China. The National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006–2020). An Outline. Beijing, China. 2006. Available at: http://sydney.edu.au/global-health/international-networks/National_Outline_for_Medium_and_Long_Term_ST_Development1.doc. See also: Segal, Adam. “China’s Innovation Wall. Beijing Push for Homeground Technology”. Foreign Affairs Snapshots. 28 September 2010. Web. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66753/adam-segal/chinas-innovation-wall.

  71. 71.

    To compare reliance on foreign technology, in 2006 it was estimated to be 60 %, while 2006 gross expenditure on R&D was 1.3 % of China’s GDP. See Government of the PRC Official Web Portal. http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-02/09/content_184426.htm.

  72. 72.

    More precisely, the plan earmarks eight fields of technology in which 27 breakthrough technologies are to be pursued. It has also to be underlined that while the guidelines identified the goals and specific sector to focus on, it was the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) for High-Technology Industries that formally detailed the 16 megaprojects. Government of the PRC “China issues guidelines on sci-tech development program”. Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal. 9 February 2006. Web. http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-02/09/content_184426.htm. Accessed 23 December 2013.

  73. 73.

    This interpretation is offered by economists such as George Friedman and institutions like the IMF. For other economists, it was, on the contrary, the enhancement of productivity levels that allowed Chinese exponential growth. For this interpretation, see Hu, Zuliu, and Mohsin S. Khan (1997). “Why China grows so fast? International Monetary Fund, Economic Issues 8. Washington D.C. Web. https://www.imf.org/EXTERNAL/PUBS/FT/ISSUES8/issue8.pdf

  74. 74.

    Krugman, Paul (1994). “The Myth of the Asian Miracle”. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 73 (6).

  75. 75.

    From the perspective of the production functions, four macro-determinants determining economic growth can be identified: factors of production, the industrial structure, technology, and institutions.

  76. 76.

    As Justin Yifu clearly states, “technological progress means higher productivity. So, even when the industrial structure and factors of production remain unchanged, with better technology the economy’s output and growth will improve as well”. Land and natural resources are basically fixed and the growth of labour is rather limited. Even if capital accumulates at great speed, the law of diminishing return means that unless there is technological progress, returns will decline…. And technological progress is also a prerequisite for institutional improvement. Yifu, Justin. “China’s potential for sustained dynamic growth”. In Leonard, Mark (ed) (2012). China 3.0. European Council on Foreign Relations, London.

  77. 77.

    Cit. Dellios, Rosita (2005). “China’s space program: A strategic and political analysis”, Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East–west Cultural and Economic Studies Vol. 7 (1).

  78. 78.

    Cit. Handberg, Roger, and Zhen Li (2007). Chinese Space Policy. A study in domestic and international politics. Routledge, New York: p. 133.

  79. 79.

    See Siddivò, Marisa, and Alessandra De Chiara (2012). “High-tech industry clustering in less favoured areas: International comparison of two aerospace industrial districts in China and Italy”. Journal of Science and Technology Policy in China Vol. 3 (2): 164–190. The research in particular demonstrates that the rationale for the construction of the Xi’an Cluster is definitely not an efficiency-driven process but is the outcome of policymakers’ plans to redress interregional economic disparities.

  80. 80.

    Worth mentioning is that a visitor centre and a space theme park—containing, among others, spaceflight simulators, a model of a lunar landscape and some Shenzhou cabins—will be built nearby, thus stimulating the tourism in the region. Vick, Charles. “Hainan/Wenchang”. Global Security. 21 June 2010. Web. http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/sanya.htm. Accessed 18 April 2014.

  81. 81.

    See “Spinoff database published by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration”. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Web. http://spinoff.nasa.gov/spinoff/spinsearch?BOOL=AND&ALLFIELDS=&CENTER=&BOOLM=AND&MANUFACT=&STATE=&CATEGORY=&ISSUE=&Spinsort=ISSUE Accessed 10 April 2014.

  82. 82.

    See “Spinoff from Japan’s Aerospace Technology. JAXA Industrial collaboration and coordination centre”. Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency. Web. http://aerospacebiz.jaxa.jp/en/spinoff/. Accessed 10 April 2014.

  83. 83.

    To date, more than 400 space technologies have been transferred on the ground and applied to a number of fields like education and medical care.

  84. 84.

    “Benefits Stemming from Space Exploration”. International Space Exploration Coordination Group. August 2013.

  85. 85.

    “Shenzhou X astronaut gives lecture”. China Daily. 20 June 2013. Web. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013shenzhoux/2013-06/20/content_16638698.htm. Accessed 12 May 2014.

  86. 86.

    “Space lecture inspires dreams of the universe”. Xinhua News. 21 June 2013. Web. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/21/c_124894304.htm. Accessed 12 May 2014.

  87. 87.

    Liu Cixin has gained immense popularity, both in China and abroad, for “Three Bodies”, a dystopian trilogy of space science fiction.

  88. 88.

    Quoted from Zhi, Chen. “Space lecture inspires dreams of the universe”. Xinhua news. 21 June 2013. Web. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/21/c_124894304.htm. Accessed 12 May 2014.

  89. 89.

    For an extensive review on the effects of Chinese space science fiction on the aerospace industry and society, see Solomone, Stacey (2013). China’s Strategy in Space. Springer, New York.

  90. 90.

    Cit. Seedhouse, Erich (2010). The New Space Race. China vs the United States, Springer—Praxis Publishing, Chichester, UK: p. 12.

  91. 91.

    Cit. Lele, Ajey (2010). “An Asian Moon race”. Space Policy 26 (4): 227.

  92. 92.

    Ibid.

  93. 93.

    Cunningham, Fiona (2009). “The Stellar Status Symbol: True Motives for China’s Manned Space Program”. China Security Vol. 5 (3): 73–88.

  94. 94.

    Cit. Dangen, Sun (2006). “Shenzhou and Dreams of Space”. China Security Vol. 2 (1): p. 61.

  95. 95.

    Cit. Cunningham, Fiona (2009). “The Stellar Status Symbol: True Motives for China’s Manned Space Program”. China Security Vol. 5 (3): 73–88.

  96. 96.

    This interpretation is to a large extent confirmed by the fact that, from their beginning, efforts to establish the Shenzhou manned spaceflight programme have been driven by the scientific community, rather than the military. See Sect. 4.1.

  97. 97.

    Seedhouse, Erich (2010). The New Space Race. China vs the United States, Springer—Praxis Publishing, Chichester, UK: p. 39.

  98. 98.

    Hu, Angang (2007). Economic and Social Transformation in China: Challenges and Opportunities. Routledge, New York: p. 34.

  99. 99.

    Xianqi, Chiang, Jungin Sui (2006). “Active exploration and peaceful uses of outer space”. China Security Vol. 2 (1): p. 22.

  100. 100.

    It has even been noted that the lack of transparency in China’s space programme—and more in general of power structures and its policymaking processes—is also due to the always present fear about divulging information to foreigners who will use it to exploit China, rather than the idea of maintaining a strategic advantage.

  101. 101.

    Cit. Dellios, Rosita (2005). “China’s space program: A strategic and political analysis”, Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East–west Cultural and Economic Studies Vol. 7 (1).

  102. 102.

    As underlined by Mark Hilborne, a state with few assets in space has less to fear from offensive actions than countries (like the USA) completely dependent on them. Hilborne, Mark (2015). “The impact of China’s Rise in Space”. In Al-Ekabi, Cenan, Blandina Banares, Peter Hulsroj, Arne Lahcen (eds). ESPI Yearbook on Space Policy 2012/2013. Space in a Changing World. Springer, Vienna.

  103. 103.

    Cit. Zhao, Huanxin, and Lei Zhao. “China shoots for the Moon”. Xinhua News. 2 December 2013. Web. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/02/c_132933884.htm. Accessed 10 May 2014.

  104. 104.

    龙乐豪. 关于中国载人登月工程若干问题的思考. (Long Lehao. “On Issue of China Manned Lunar Exploration”). Missile and Space Vehicles No. 6. 2010. Web. http://wenku.baidu.com/view/21d5423a5727a5e9856a619b.html

  105. 105.

    This position however is not included in the roadmap to 2050 proposed by China nor in any other official documents.

  106. 106.

    He also underlined that there are many ways humans can use the Moon, like the utilisation of a belt of solar panels to support the whole world. He summed up his vision for lunar exploration by saying “There are so many potential developments—it’s beautiful—so we hope we can fully utilise the Moon to support sustainable development for humans and society. Quoted from: Shukman, David. “Why China is fixated on the Moon”. BBC News. 29 November 2013. Web. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/25141597. Accessed 11 May 2014.

  107. 107.

    Lasker, John. “Race to the Moon for Nuclear Fuel”. Wired.com 15 December 2006. Web. http://www.wired.com/science/space/news/2006/12/72276. Accessed 11 May 2014.

  108. 108.

    Connor, Neil. “Mining the moon is pie in the sky for China, experts say”. Agence France-Presse. 15 December 2013. Web. http://phys.org/news/2013-12-moon-pie-sky-china-experts.html. Accessed 12 May 2014.

  109. 109.

    See Carrasco, Jose’ Manuel, Jordi Bernabeu, and Eugenia Colell. “The Moon as an astronomical platform”. In Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Exploration and Utilisation of the Moon. European Space Agency. 2000: pp. 79–86.

  110. 110.

    Ibid. p. 79.

  111. 111.

    “Global Exploration Roadmap”. International Space Exploration Coordination Group. April 2007: p. 17.

  112. 112.

    Guo, Huadong, Ji Wu (eds) (2010). Space Science and Technology in China: A Roadmap to 2050. Chinese Academy of Sciences, Science Press (Springer), Beijing: pp 61–62. It is also recommended that between 2030 and 2050, China will establish a space physics observation platform.

  113. 113.

    Zhao, Huanxin, and Lei Zhao. “China shoots for the Moon”. Xinhua News. 2 December 2013. Web. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-12/02/c_132933884.htm. Accessed 10 April 2014.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. European Space Policy Institute, Vienna, Austria

    Marco Aliberti

Authors
  1. Marco Aliberti
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Aliberti, M. (2015). Why the Moon?. In: When China Goes to the Moon.... Studies in Space Policy, vol 11. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19473-8_3

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19473-8_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-19472-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-19473-8

  • eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation