Abstract
This chapter provides an introductory overview of China’s fast developing and increasingly complex space programme. The analysis is performed according to a categorisation created by Jim Dator, who developed a framework to understand the process of technology advancement. In his view, all technological areas of development—including space programmes—can be understood as a product of three components: hardware, software, and orgware.
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Notes
- 1.
Dator, Jim (1983). “Loose Connections: A Vision of Transformational Society”. In: Masini, Eleonora (ed). Visions of Desirable Societies. Pergamon Press, Oxford. Dator’s categorization has been successfully adopted and applied to the analysis of space programmes also by space policy analyst Stacey Solomone. See Solomone, Stacey (2013). China’s Strategy in Space. Springer, New York: pp. 17–22.
- 2.
Johnson-Freese, Joan (1998). The Chinese Space Program. A Mystery Within a Maze. Krieger Publishing Company, Malabar, FL.
- 3.
Cheng, Dean, and Kerry Murray (2001). “Orbital Dragons: Implications of Chinese Access to Dual-Purpose Space Technologies”. In: Williamson, Ray A. Dual-Purposes Technologies: Opportunities and Challenges for US Policymaking. Space Policy Institute. Washington DC: p.72.
- 4.
Ning, Lu (2001). “The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, State Council Ministries, and Party Departments”. In: Lampton, David M. (ed). The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform. Stanford University Press, Stanford: pp. 45–49.
- 5.
Swaine, Michael D. (2012). “China’s Assertive Behavior Part Three: The Role of the Military in Foreign Policy”. China Leadership Monitor No. 36. Hoover Institution.
- 6.
The practice of creating Leading Small Groups has become so relevant for China’s policymaking processes, that these groups are now considered the most important national coordinating bodies and the centres of cross-ministry negotiation and consultation. Miller, Alice (2008). “The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups”. China Leadership Monitor No. 26. Hoover Institution.
- 7.
Ibid.
- 8.
Only little analysis in the literature has so far acknowledged the possible existence and role of a Space Leading Group. One of the first is provided by the Chinese scholar Yanping Chen in an article published by Space Policy in 1993 (“China’s space commercialisation effort. Organisation, policy and strategy”. Space Policy Vol. 9 (1). 1993: 45–53). The SLG is also mentioned, although not extensively explained in the books of Joan Johnson-Freese (The Chinese Space Program. A Mystery Within a Maze. Krieger Publishing Company, Malabar, 1998) and Brian Harvey (China in Space. The Great Leap Forward. Springer, New York, 2013).
- 9.
The likelihood of an SLG is also reinforced by the acknowledged creation of an ad hoc LSG for the management of specific highly sensitive space projects like Shenzhou and Chang’e.
- 10.
Francis, Ed, and Susan M. Puska (2010). “Contemporary Chinese Defense Industry Reforms and Civil-Military Integration in Three Key Organizations”. Study of Innovation and Technology in China. Policy Brief No. 5. Web. http://igcc.ucsd.edu/assets/001/500870.pdf. Accessed 18 January 2014.
- 11.
Ibid.
- 12.
In the measures, it is for instance specified that COSTIND (SASTIND) is in charge—together with Ministry of Foreign Affairs—of the national registration of space objects (art. 4). SASTIND is also responsible for maintaining the National Register. See “Measures for the Administration of Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space”. Unofficial translation by the Faculty of International Law of China University of Science and Law. 8 February 2001. Available at: http://www.spacelaw.olemiss.edu/library/space/China/Laws/JSL_33.2_China%20Law.pdf. For a commentary, see Ling, Yan (2008). “Comments on the Chinese Space Regulations”. Chinese Journal of International Law. Vol. 7 (3). Web. http://chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/7/3/681.full.pdf.
- 13.
See “Organisation and Functions”. China National Space Administration. 20 February 2013. Web. http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n615709/n620681/n771918/index.html.
- 14.
Cheng, Dean, and Kerry Murray (2001). “Orbital Dragons: Implications of Chinese Access to Dual-Purpose Space Technologies”. In: Williamson, Ray A. Dual-Purposes Technologies: Opportunities and Challenges for US Policymaking. Space Policy Institute. Washington DC.: p.74.
- 15.
“China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General”. Nuclear Threat Initiative. 20 January 2014. Web. http://www.nti.org/facilities/124/.
- 16.
Solomone, Stacey (2013). China’s Strategy in Space. Springer, New York: p. 21.
- 17.
The other three departments are the General Staff Department, the General Political Department, and the General Logistics Department.
- 18.
Francis, Ed, and Susan M. Puska. (2010) “Contemporary Chinese Defense Industry Reforms and Civil-Military Integration in Three Key Organisation”. Study of Innovation and Technology in China. Policy Brief No. 5. Web. http://igcc.ucsd.edu/assets/001/500870.pdf. Accessed 18 January 2014.
- 19.
Ibid: pp. 2–3.
- 20.
US–China Economic and Security Review Commission. 2011 Annual Report to Congress. US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, United States. November 2011.
- 21.
For this interpretation, see also Kulacki, Gregory, and Jeffrey Lewis. (2009). A Place for One’s Mat: China’s Space Program, 1956–2003. American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, MA. See also Harvey, Brian (2013). China in Space. The Great Leap Forward. Springer, New York.
- 22.
Rathgeber, Wolfgang (2007). “China’s Posture in Space. Implications for Europe”. ESPI Report 3. European Space Policy Institute, Vienna: p. 32.
- 23.
Francis, Ed, and Susan M. Puska. (2010) “Contemporary Chinese Defense Industry Reforms and Civil-Military Integration in Three Key Organisation”. Study of Innovation and Technology in China. Policy Brief No. 5. Web. http://igcc.ucsd.edu/assets/001/500870.pdf. Accessed 18 January 2014.
- 24.
Harvey, Brian (2013). China in Space. The Great Leap Forward. Springer, New York: p. 18 and p. 359.
- 25.
Cheng, Dean. “Five Myths about China’s Space Program”. The Heritage Foundation. 29 September 2011. Web. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/09/five-myths-about-chinas-space-program.
- 26.
“History of CASC”. China Aerospace Industry Corporation. Web. http://english.spacechina.com/n16421/n17138/n382513/c386575/content.html. Accessed 20 February 2014.
- 27.
For more information on the so-called New Right policymakers, see Sect. 5.2.
- 28.
For a description of the role of SASAC, see “Main functions and responsibilities of SASAC”. State-owned Assets Supervisions and Administration Commission. Web. http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2963340/n2963393/2965120.html. Accessed 20 February 2014.
- 29.
“Company profile”. China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation. Web. http://english.spacechina.com/n16421/n17138/n17229/c127066/content.html. Accessed 20 February 2014.
- 30.
Ibid.
- 31.
For detailed examination of CAST, see Harvey, Brian (2013). China in Space. The Great Leap Forward. Springer, New York: pp. 52–53.
- 32.
Cit. “Company profile”. China Great Wall Industry Corporation. Web. http://www.cgwic.com/About/index.html. Accessed 20 February 2014. See also “China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC).” Nuclear Threat Initiative. Web. http://www.nti.org/facilities/50/. http://www.cgwic.com/Partner/. Accessed 20 February 2014.
- 33.
“Introduction to CASIC”. China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation. Web. http://english.casic.cn/n189298/n189314/index.html. Accessed 21 February 2014.
- 34.
“Footprints in Space”. China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation. Web. http://english.casic.cn/n189300/n1547687/index.html. Accessed 21 February 2014.
- 35.
“Directory of the CAS Subordinate Institutions”. Chinese Academy of Sciences. Web. http://english.cas.cn/CASI/In/200909/P020120813569850110467.pdf. Accessed 21 February 2014.
- 36.
“CAS Institutions”. Chinese Academy of Sciences. Web. http://english.cas.cn/CASI/. Accessed 21 February 2014.
- 37.
The CAS holds a 36 % stake in Legend Holdings Ltd., which is Lenovo’s largest shareholder with a 32.5 % stake. Osawa, Juro and Lorrainne Luk. “How Lenovo Built a Chinese Tech Giant”. Wall Street Journal. 30 January 2014. Web. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303973704579352263128996836. Accessed 22 February 2014.
- 38.
Even the decision to create the BeiDou national satellite navigation system resulted from the efforts of a core group of scientists of CAS. Besha, Patrick (2010). “Policy making in China’s space program: A history and analysis of the Chang’e lunar orbiter project”. Space Policy Vol. 26 (4): 214–221.
- 39.
“Institute of Remote Sensing and Digital Earth-Chinese Academy of Sciences”. Chinese Academy of Sciences. Web. http://english.irsa.cas.cn/. Accessed 18 February 2014.
- 40.
“National Space Science Centre-Chinese Academy of Sciences”. Chinese Academy of Sciences. Web. http://english.nssc.cas.cn/au/mfdg/. Accessed 18 February 2014.
- 41.
“National Astronomical Observatories Chinese Academy of Sciences”. Chinese Academy of Sciences. Web. http://english.nao.cas.cn/au/history/. Accessed 21 February 2014.
- 42.
CMA is a large-scale organisation employing 52,988 staff members and accounting for 2300 bureaus nationwide. “China Meteorological Administration”. China Meteorological Administration Web. http://www.cma.gov.cn/en/aboutcma/introduction/201203/t20120319_166488.html. Accessed 18 February 2014.
- 43.
“BeiDou Navigation Satellite System”. Web. http://en.beidou.gov.cn. Accessed 22 February 2014.
- 44.
“National Satellite Oceanic Application Center”. Web. http://www.nsoas.gov.cn/NSOAS_En/index.html. Accessed 21 February 2014.
- 45.
“National Remote Sensing Centre of China”. Web. http://www.nrscc.gov.cn/nrscc/en/functions/. Accessed 23 February 2014.
- 46.
See Johnson-Freese, Joan (1998). The Chinese Space Program. A Mystery Within a Maze. Krieger Publishing Company, Malabar, FL.
- 47.
The cost of project 921, for instance was given as ¥18 billion (about 1.5 billion €), of which ¥8 billion covered new facilities and ¥10 billion the development of Shenzhou. Later they quoted costs for an unmanned Shenzhou launch of ¥800 million and manned at ¥1 billion (80 million € and 100 million €, respectively). The cost of Chang’e up to 2012 was given as ¥2.3 billion (230 million €). Harvey, Brian (2013). China in Space. The Great Leap Forward. Springer, New York.
- 48.
The Space Foundation (2013). The Space Report 2013 | The Authoritative Guide to Global Space Activity. The Space Foundation, Colorado Springs. See also ESD Partners (2013). European Space Directory. ESD Partners Publication, Paris.
- 49.
Source: “GDP (current US$)”. The World Bank (2014). Web. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD. Accessed 13 February 2014.
- 50.
“World Economic Outlook Database.” International Monetary Fund (2014). Web. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/index.aspx. Accessed 24 February 2014.
- 51.
Many analysts do not include infrastructure-related expenditures in the overall budget—i.e. the expenditures for the launching facilities, the tracking systems, and the testing facilities.
- 52.
For figures elaborated on the data provided by Euroconsult, see Euroconsult (2013). Government Space Markets—World Prospects to 2022. Fourth Edition. A Euroconsult Research Report, Paris.
- 53.
Ibid.
- 54.
Ibid.
- 55.
Jones, Morris. “The Next Tiangong”. Space Daily. 3 March 2014. Web. http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/The_Next_Tiangong_999.html. Accessed 3 March 2014. See also Lan, Chen, and Jacqueline Myrrhe (eds). Go Taikonauts. All about China’s space programme. Issue 10. December 2013: pp. 31–33.
- 56.
As brilliantly explained by Stacey Solomone, for China it is more important to show intentions than capabilities. “It is a sign of weakness to show one’s capabilities, while using secrecy to hide them is a means to retain harmony and balance. Revealing capabilities would create an imbalance. This might seem counter-intuitive to a Western policy maker, but not from a Chinese perspective”. For them, mutual dependence among actors in the global space community maintains balance. Because the Chinese clearly state their intention in the Space White Paper, then there is no need to reveal their hardware capabilities. Solomone, Stacey (2013). China’s Strategy in Space. Springer, New York: p.59.
- 57.
McGregor, James (2010). “China’s Drive for Indigenous Innovation. A Web of Industrial Policies”. Global Regulatory Cooperation Project—US Chamber of Commerce. APCO Worldwide. A more detailed analysis of these guidelines is also provided in Sect. 4.3.
- 58.
For a detailed description of the 12th Five-Year Plan’s policy processes, see Gilligan, Greg. “China’s 12th Five-Year Plan. How it actually works and what’s in store for the next five years”. APCO worldwide. 10 December 2010.
- 59.
Government of the People’s Republic of China. “China’s Space Activities in 2011”. White Papers of the Government of China. Beijing, China. 29 December 2011. Web. http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7145648.htm.
- 60.
In the case of the 2001 Space White Paper, the document describes the progress and achievements realised by China since 1956, thus filling an information gap regarding the development of the Chinese space programme during the previous 45 years. For a comparative analysis of the three White Papers, see Lele, Ajey, and Gunjan Singh (2012). “China’s White Paper on Space: An Analysis”. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Issue Brief.
- 61.
See Pollpeter, Kevin (2012). “China’s Space White Paper: Increasing Transparency…to a degree”. China Brief Vol. 12: (3).
- 62.
Ibid.
- 63.
Government of the People’s Republic of China. “China’s Space Activities in 2011”. White Papers of the Government of China. Beijing, China. 29 December 2011. Web. http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7145648.htm.
- 64.
Guo, Huadong, Ji Wu (eds) (2010). Space Science and Technology in China: A Roadmap to 2050. Chinese Academy of Sciences, Science Press (Springer), Beijing.
- 65.
See Harvey, Brian (2013). China in Space. The Great Leap Forward. Springer, New York, and the data provided by the annual compendiums of commercial space transportation of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
- 66.
Government of the People’s Republic of China. “China’s Space Activities in 2011”. White Papers of the Government of China. Beijing, China. 29 December 2011. Web. http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7145648.htm.
- 67.
Ibid.
- 68.
More detailed information on the new launcher’s fleet is provided in a number of analysis documents. See in particular Harvey, Brian. China in Space. The Great Leap Forward, Springer, New York, 2013: pp. 361–366.
- 69.
Ibid. p. 364.
- 70.
China–Brazil Earth Resources Satellites (CBERS) is a joint China–Brazil programme in the field of earth observation developed under an agreement signed in July 1988. Three satellites were launched between 1999 and 2007. In November 2008, the two governments agreed to jointly continue the development of CBERS: CBERS-5 and CBERS-6 are expected to launch in 2017 and 2020, respectively.
- 71.
Sensibly, China continues to rely on the Dragon programme with ESA for obtaining high-resolution geographical information of China. For more information on the Dragon programme, see “ESA-MOST Dragon Cooperation Programme”. European Space Agency. 21 August 2011. Web. http://earth.esa.int/dragon/. Accessed 19 February 2014. See also Desnos, Yves-Louis, and Li Zengyuan. “EO Science and Applications development in China”. In: Dragon Programme Mid-term results. Proceedings of the 2005 Dragon Symposium. European Space Agency. January 2006.
- 72.
The French–Chinese Oceanic Satellite (CFOSAT) aims at monitoring wind and waves globally for the purpose of marine meteorology, ocean dynamics, climate variability, and surface processes. See Harvey, Brian (2013). China in Space. The Great Leap Forward. Springer, New York: p. 209.
- 73.
Euroconsult (2013). Government Space Markets—World Prospect to 2022. Fourth Edition. A Euroconsult Research Report, Paris.
- 74.
Yaogan satellites specifically used for military reconnaissance are named Jianbing.
- 75.
Government of the People’s Republic of China. “China’s Space Activities in 2011”. White Papers of the Government of China. Beijing, China. 29 December 2011. Web. http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7145648.htm.
- 76.
Ibid.
- 77.
“Reaching for the stars: China’s commercial space industry.” Editorial: China Brain. Web. http://www.china-brain.com/inner.php?eid=0082&goback=%2Egde_131398_member_247974113#.UvPYjfldUj4. Accessed 10 February 2014. See also “Chinese DFH-4 Platform Product Line Improvement.” 2012. International Astronautical Federation. http://www.iafastro.net/iac/archive/browse/IAC-12/B2/4/14084/. Accessed 16 February 2014.
- 78.
The “fire and smoke” satellites are named after an ancient system of communicating utilising beacons along the Great Wall which were lit all along the wall in case of barbaric invasions. See Harvey, Brian (2013). China in Space. The Great Leap Forward. Springer, New York: p. 146.
- 79.
Ibid. p. 146.
- 80.
Euroconsult (2014). Profiles of Government Space Programs, Analysis of Over 80 Countries & Agencies. Euroconsult Profiles Series, Paris.
- 81.
Three satellites of the FY-3 series have been launched so far, the last of which on 23 September 2013.
- 82.
Euroconsult (2014). Profiles of Government Space Programs, Analysis of Over 80 Countries & Agencies. Euroconsult Profiles Series, Paris.
- 83.
The first phase of the programme, started in 1994 and completed in 2007, envisaged the creation of an experimental system. The second phase (2008–2012) was aimed at creating a regional system. The current and third phase (2013–2020) aims at building a global satellite navigation capability.
- 84.
The constellation comprises 5 GEO satellites and 30 non-geo satellites. “BeiDou Navigation Satellite System”. Web. http://www.beidou.gov.cn/2012/12/14/2012121481ba700d7ca84dfc9ab2ab9ff33d2772.html. Accessed 20 February 2014.
- 85.
Evans, Ben. “A Red Flag on the Red Planet: China’s Mars Ambitions”. AmericaSpace. 15 October 2013. Web. http://www.americaspace.com/?p=43535. Accessed 15 March 2014.
- 86.
For more information on the SEC programme, see Guo, Huadong, Ji Wu (eds) (2010). Space Science and Technology in China: A Roadmap to 2050. Chinese Academy of Sciences, Science Press (Springer), Beijing: pp.64–65.
- 87.
Ibid: pp. 59–64.
- 88.
The main missions of the BHP programme include Hard X-ray Modulation Telescope (HXMT) satellite, Space Variable Object Monitor (SVOM) satellite, and Gamma-ray Burst Polarisation (POLAR) experiment on board China’s spacelab. Ibid. p.60.
- 89.
Roach, Stephen S (2011). “China’s 12th Five-Year Plan: Strategy vs. Tactics”. Morgan Stanley Asia. Web. http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/China_12th_Five_Year_Plan.pdf. Accessed 20 March 2014.
- 90.
Solomone, Stacey (2013). China’s Strategy in Space. Springer, New York: pp. 94–95.
- 91.
Government of the People’s Republic of China. “China’s Space Activities in 2011”. White Papers of the Government of China. Beijing, China. 29 December 2011. Web. http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7145648.htm.
- 92.
Al-Ekabi, Cenan (2014). “European Space Activities in the Global Context”. In: Al-Ekabi, Cenan, Blandina Banares, Peter Hulsroj, Arne Lahcen (eds). ESPI Yearbook on Space Policy 2011/2012. Space in Times of Financial Crisis. Springer, Vienna: pp. 42–25.
- 93.
Lan, Chen; Jacqueline Myrrhe (eds). Go Taikonauts. All about China’s space programme. Issue 10. December 2013. See also Lan, Chen, and Jacqueline Myrrhe (eds). Go Taikonauts. All about China’s space programme. Issue 11. February 2014.
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Aliberti, M. (2015). China’s Space Programme: An Overview. In: When China Goes to the Moon.... Studies in Space Policy, vol 11. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19473-8_2
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