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The Binding Force and Field of Application of the Fundamental Rights Enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

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Common European Legal Thinking

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Abstract

With his book Europäische Verfassungsvergleichung (Comparative European Constitutional Law) published in 2010, Albrecht Weber made a seminal contribution to ius commune europaeum. It summed up in his view the quintessence of all his research and lecturing in the field of European public law. It is therefore fitting to celebrate his 70th birthday by compiling a special volume in his honour entitled “Common European Legal Thinking”. As a long‐time friend and colleague who has worked with him notably in an international context, it gives me great pleasure to contribute to the present work.

From the moment the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was proclaimed, Albrecht Weber took a close interest in how it had evolved and published subsequently on various aspects of its content. So on the occasion of his 70th birthday it is appropriate to pay tribute to his oeuvre by discussing a number of problems associated with the Charter.

For his valuable assistance I would like to thank Dr. Andreas Hamacher.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Weber 2002, Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Introduction and Text in German, English and French); Weber 2000, Die Europäische Grundrechtecharta auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Verfassung (The European Charter of Fundamental Rights on the road to a European constitution), NJW, p. 537 et seqq.; and Weber 2008, Vom Verfassungsvertrag zum Vertrag von Lissabon (From constitutional treaty to the Treaty of Lisbon), EuZW, p. 7 et seqq.

  2. 2.

    On this and on the genesis of the norm see Borowsky, in Meyer (2014), Art. 51 para 2 et seqq. (also para 16 with citations).

  3. 3.

    See e. g. Hatje, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 13 TEU para 23. Subsequently the author assigns these subsidiary institutions not to the “institutions” category but to the “bodies, offices and agencies” category, Hatje, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 51 EUCFR para 11. See, with the same basic tenor, the study by Streinz 2013.

  4. 4.

    See Hatje, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 51 EUCFR para 11.

  5. 5.

    See Borowsky, in Meyer (2014), Art. 51 para 18 et seq.

  6. 6.

    See Jarass 2013, Art. 51 para 3 with citations; the author argues cogently that authorities obliged to respect fundamental rights must not be able to evade this obligation by delegating their tasks to private law entities. See also Borowsky, in Meyer (2014), Art. 51 para 16.

  7. 7.

    Jarass 2013, Art. 51 para 3, argues that, by virtue of its specific provisions on fundamental rights, the Charter can acquire binding force for the Member States over and above that stipulated in Art. 51.1, first sentence EUCFR. The author makes explicit reference in this connection to Art. 21.2 and Art. 45 EUCFR.

  8. 8.

    See Borowsky, in Meyer (2014), Art. 51 para 20; with reference to Art. 42–44 EUCFR also Jarass 2013, Art. 51 para 3.

  9. 9.

    Hatje in Schwarze (2012), Art. 51 para 8, deems leges speciales to be primarily those guarantees that are addressed “explicitly only to the Union” in its capacity as fundamental rights guarantor.

  10. 10.

    See Hatje, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 51 EUCFR para 14. For Union primary law Jarass 2013, Art. 51 para 15, adds the qualification “in so far as it is binding on Member States”.

  11. 11.

    See e. g. Jarass 2013, Art. 51 para 12, where the author refers to Rengeling and Szczekalla 2004, para 330 with citations. See also Case C‐617/10, Åkerberg Fransson (ECJ 26 February 2013) para 19 et seqq.

  12. 12.

    See Jarass 2013, Art. 51 para 16 et seq. with citations; in the first edition (2010), the author put it more clearly.

  13. 13.

    For further explanation of these terms see Jarass and Beljin 2004, p. 6 et seqq.; also Jarass 2013, Art. 51 para 18 et seqq. On binding force in the context of judicial functions performed at Member State level see also Hoffmann and Rudolphi 2012, p. 598. In the context of Union law implementation Borowsky, in Meyer (2014), Art. 51 para 25 refers to the English term “agency situation”.

  14. 14.

    See also the apt comment by Jarass 2013, Art. 51 para 18 and Introduction para 54 with reference to Joined Cases C‐465/00, C‐138/01 and C‐139/01, Rechnungshof v. Österreichischer Rundfunk et al. (ECJ 20 May 2003) para 68, 80.

  15. 15.

    See in detail von Bogdandy et al. 2012, p. 65 et seqq.

  16. 16.

    Cf. in this respect Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson (Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón of 12 June 2012) para 51, 57.

  17. 17.

    See Ladenburger, in Tettinger and Stern (2006), Art. 51 para 35; also Jarass 2013, Art. 51 para 16.

  18. 18.

    Hain 2009, p. 18, e. g. argues that the Federal Republic of Germany tends towards “over‐fulfilment” of the EU’s state‐aid rules.

  19. 19.

    See also the distinctions drawn by Ladenburger, in Tettinger and Stern (2006), Art. 51 para 35.

  20. 20.

    See Jarass 2013, Art. 51 para 25.

  21. 21.

    See inter alia Borowsky in Meyer (2014), Art. 51 para 29. For an analysis of the current discussion see Kingreen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 51 EUCFR para 13 et seqq. (16 et seq.).

  22. 22.

    See inter alia Jarass 2013, Art. 51 para 21; also Hoffmann and Rudolphi 2012, p. 599; Blanke and Böttner 2014, para 337 et seq. Hatje, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 51 EUCFR para 18 et seq., argues for a broad interpretation of the “implementation concept”.

  23. 23.

    Hoffmann and Rudolphi 2012, p. 598 with footnote 15, with reference to Case 1‐260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi AE v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforisis and Sotirios Kouvelas (“ERT”) (ECJ 18 June 1991) para 42 et seqq.

  24. 24.

    On grounds of the “uniform application and interpretation of Union law” Grewe 2012, p. 299, argues for a broad understanding of the binding force of the fundamental rights.

  25. 25.

    Hoffmann and Rudolphi 2012, p. 598, point out that following the Charter’s incorporation into European primary law the ECJ has issued no (clear) ruling to date on the question of what binding force the fundamental rights have for Member States in the case of a legitimate limitation of European fundamental freedoms.

  26. 26.

    See Hoffmann and Rudolphi 2012, p. 598, with reference to Joined Cases C‐411/10 and C‐493/10, N.S. et al. (ECJ 21 December 2011).

  27. 27.

    See Jarass 2013, Art. 51 para 23 and Art. 53 para 10–13.

  28. 28.

    See inter alia Borowsky, in Meyer (2014), Art. 53 para 22; also comments by Kirchhof 2013, p. 5, on overlapping competences of the European Court of Justice and Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court in cases where a national and a European legislative act employ “identical wording”.

  29. 29.

    In such cases a cumulative effect is assumed also by Ladenburger, in Tettinger and Stern (2006), Art. 51 para 30 as well as Jarass 2013, Art. 53 para 11. See also Schmitz 2001, p. 836, where the author uses the metaphor of “layered nets” to describe how European fundamental rights function in practice.

  30. 30.

    See Jarass 2013, Art. 53 para 11. Borowsky, in Meyer (2014), Art. 53 para 22 posits a “hierarchy of protection principle” (Grundsatz der Meistbegünstigung).

  31. 31.

    See Grewe 2012, p. 299.

  32. 32.

    Grewe 2012, p. 299 rightly argues for the assumption that the fundamental rights are now generally binding on the Member States.

  33. 33.

    Notably in ECJ judgments no clear line is apparent, see Jarass 2013, Art. 51 para 27. For further discussion of these issues see Borowsky, in Meyer (2014), Art. 51 para 31 with footnotes 177 and 178. For a general summary of the case for assuming the Charter fundamental rights are directly binding in the private sphere see Hatje, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 51 EUCFR para 22.

  34. 34.

    See discussion by Jarass 2013, Art. 51 para 27; also Hatje, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 51 EUCFR para 22.

  35. 35.

    See comments by Borowsky, in Meyer (2014), Art. 51 para 31. On an emerging direct effect in the private sphere see Hatje, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 51 EUCFR para 22, where the author argues that even when a direct effect in the private sphere cannot be assumed, this does not point to the existence of a “genuine gap in protection”.

  36. 36.

    See Müller-Graff 2014, p. 27 with further reference.

  37. 37.

    For further discussion see Stern 1994, § 77 III.

  38. 38.

    See Jarass 2013, Art. 51 para 39 et seqq.; Borowsky, in Meyer (2014), Art. 51 para 22; and Kingreen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 51 EUCFR para 23 et seqq.

  39. 39.

    On fundamental rights serving an “equal treatment function” see Jarass 2013, Art. 51 para 44. For a systematic overview of equal rights in the Charter see Hölscheidt, in Meyer (2014), before Title III para 15 et seqq.

  40. 40.

    See inter alia Frenz 2009, para 460.

  41. 41.

    See on this “immanent reduction” problem the discussion in Frenz 2009, para 466 et seqq. On how “human dignity” affects the freedom of the arts and sciences stipulated in Art. 13 see Bernsdorff, in Meyer (2014), Art. 13 para 13.

  42. 42.

    Case 267/91 and 268/91, Keck and Mithouard (ECJ 24 November 1993). See comments on this ruling by inter alia Kingreen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 34–36 TFEU para 49 et seqq. On the evolution of case law following the ECJ’s Keck ruling and the current validity of the formula then developed see Brigola 2012.

  43. 43.

    See Frenz 2009, para 472 et seqq.

  44. 44.

    See the perceptive analysis by Frenz 2009, para 473, where the author highlights also the qualitative differences that have emerged between European fundamental freedoms and European fundamental rights.

  45. 45.

    See comments by Frenz 2009, para 476, where the author rightly points out that in the absence of a general catch‐all fundamental right the European Charter of Fundamental Rights “does not encompass the whole spectrum of behaviours”.

  46. 46.

    See Frenz 2009, para 489, where the author argues that such protection can be assumed when otherwise “an unintended protection gap” would arise. See there also the concept of “mother fundamental right”.

  47. 47.

    See Becker, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 52 EUCFR para 4.

  48. 48.

    Inter alia Becker, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 52 EUCFR para 7 sees in this stipulation in Art. 52.1 EUCFR only a “relative prohibition”, arguing that where respect for the essence of rights is concerned the demands made on the limiting authority are less stringent than those laid down in Germany’s Basic Law. For a general discussion of the essence guarantee in Germany’s Basic Law see inter alia Brüning, in Stern and Becker (2015), Art. 19 para 10 et seq. On the genesis of the essence guarantee see Stern 1994, § 85 I. For a detailed overview of the reception of “the essence guarantee in case law and literature” see Nierhaus, in Kahl et al. (2008), Art. 19(2) para 11 et seqq.

  49. 49.

    On the development of ECJ case law on the essence of certain rights see the discussion by Becker, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 52 EUCFR para 7 with citations.

  50. 50.

    See Becker, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 52 EUCFR para 7 as well as Streinz and Michl, in Streinz (2012), Art. 52 EUCFR para 26 with reference to Case C‐408/03, Commission v. Belgium (ECJ 23 March 2006) para 68.

  51. 51.

    Blanke 2015, p. 39 et seq., with regard to the freedom for entrepreneurs (Art. 16 EUCFR).

  52. 52.

    von Danwitz, in Tettinger and Stern (2006), Art. 52 para 40 argues that the wording “genuinely meet” implies the need for “full scrutiny of suitability”, since its prime purpose is to establish criteria for determining the proportionality of a given measure.

  53. 53.

    See Becker, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 52 EUCFR para 5 with citations.

  54. 54.

    See inter alia Case 116/82, Commission v. Germany (ECJ Judgments of 18 September 1986) para 19 et seqq. and Case C‐331/88, The Queen v. The Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and The Secretary of State for Health, ex parte Fedesa et al. (ECJ 13 November 1990) para 13.

  55. 55.

    See Becker, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 52 EUCFR para 6; also Borowsky, in Meyer (2014), Art. 52 para 22b.

  56. 56.

    The last‐named criterion is also termed “appropriateness”. See also Borowsky, in Meyer (2014), Art. 52 para 22b. These criteria are discussed in depth by von Danwitz in Tettinger and Stern (2006), Art. 52 para 40 et seqq. and Becker in Schwarze (2012), Art. 52 EUCFR para 6. See also the contribution by Galetta in this volume.

  57. 57.

    See Joined Cases C‐96/03 and 97/03, Tempelmann and Mr and Mrs T.H.J.M. van Schaijk v. Directeur van de Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees (ECJ 10 March 2005) para 47; also Borowsky, in Meyer (2014), Art. 52 para 22b. For an almost classical example of ECJ scrutiny dating from 1989 see Case 265/87, Hermann Schräder HS Kraftfutter GmbH & Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt Gronau (ECJ 11 July 1989) para 21.

  58. 58.

    See von Danwitz, in Tettinger and Stern (2006), Art. 52 para 42.

  59. 59.

    See Case C‐283/11, Sky v. Österreichischer Rundfunk (CJEU 2 January 2013) para 50–67; Blanke 2015, p. 38 et seqq.

  60. 60.

    The basis for incorporating this stipulation in the Charter text was an ECJ judgment on the Grant case, see Case C‐249/96, Grant (ECJ 17 February 1998) para 45; also explanatory comments by the Presidium of the Convention on Art. 51, reproduced inter alia by Geiger, Khan and Kotzur (2010), p. 1017. The key passage in the judgment is also cited and discussed by Borowsky in Meyer (2014), Art. 51 para 45 with footnote 222.

  61. 61.

    Inter alia Borowsky, in Meyer (2014), Art. 51 para 14 and 37 regards the “fears” expressed as “probably not entirely groundless”. See also Hatje, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 51 EUCFR para 28.

  62. 62.

    See Borowsky, in Meyer (2014), Art. 51 para 14 and 37.

  63. 63.

    See Hatje, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 51 EUCFR para 28.

  64. 64.

    See Hatje, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 51 EUCFR para 28 et seq., where the author rightly points out that this norm serves not least “to protect the principle of conferral” (para 29).

  65. 65.

    For an analysis of the substance of the fears giving rise to the stipulation contained in Art. 51.2 EUCFR see Borowsky, in Meyer (2014), Art. 51 para 37. Kingreen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 51 EUCFR para 22 rightly assumes, however, that performance obligations are meaningless “if they are addressed to entities that lack any relevant competence”.

  66. 66.

    This term is employed inter alia by Borowsky in Meyer (2014), Art. 51 para 37; also by Streinz, Ohler and Hermann 2010, § 14 V.3. Kingreen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 6 TEU para 13 argues that the second part of this clause corresponds to the “general competence protection clause” contained in Art. 6.1 (2) TEU.

  67. 67.

    See Borowsky, in Meyer (2014), Art. 51 para 37 with reference to the “explanatory comments” on this norm; also Folz, in Vedder and Heintschel von Heinegg (2012), Art. 51 EUCFR para 8.

  68. 68.

    Both A. Hatje and M. Borowsky tend to this more restrictive view. See Hatje, in Schwarze (2012), Art. 51 EUCFR para 29. In support of Hatje’s view Borowsky, in Meyer (2014), Art. 51 para 39 cites examples of “Charter‐external” circumstances that could justify the application of Art. 352 TFEU.

  69. 69.

    See the in‐depth analysis by Borowsky, in Meyer (2014), Art. 51 para 40 et seqq. The irrelevance of this lack of congruency for the “limited Union competences” is rightly pointed out by Ladenburger in Tettinger and Stern (2006), Art. 51 para 52 and the further discussion in para 54 et seqq.

  70. 70.

    See also comments by Borowsky, in Meyer (2014), Art. 51 para 41.

  71. 71.

    C. Ladenburger argues that the inclusion in the Charter of “a thematically complete catalogue of fundamental rights” is “right”, see Ladenburger, in Tettinger and Stern (2006), Art. 51 para 64 with numerous citations.

  72. 72.

    See Ladenburger, in Tettinger and Stern (2006), Art. 51 para 60.

  73. 73.

    This clause is considered by Kingreen, in Calliess and Ruffert (2011), Art. 6 TEU para 13 – as already noted – to be a “general competence protection clause”.

  74. 74.

    Obwexer 2012, p. 118.

  75. 75.

    Fifth indent of the Preamble to the Charter; see Grabenwarter and Pabel, in Blanke and Mangiameli (2013), Art. 6 TEU para 27 and 34 et seqq.

  76. 76.

    Obwexer 2012, p. 118.

  77. 77.

    In recent years the scope of the ECJ’s jurisdiction at least where fundamental rights are concerned has been steadily extended. The statement by L. Scheeck that the ECJ “is not a human rights court” might today more aptly read “not a purely human rights court”. It is a court with extensive jurisdiction for EU law, an important part of which now concerns protection of European fundamental rights and human rights.

  78. 78.

    See Folz, in Vedder and Heintschel von Heinegg (2012), Art. 51 EUCFR para 9.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Cologne, Köln, Germany

    Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Klaus Stern

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  1. Faculty for Economics, Law and Social Sc, University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany

    Hermann-Josef Blanke

  2. Court of Justice of the European Union, Luxembourg, Luxembourg

    Pedro Cruz Villalón

  3. University of Applied Sciences for Administration and Public Management in the State of Lower Saxony, Hannover, Germany

    Tonio Klein

  4. Università di Pavia, Pavia, Italy

    Jacques Ziller

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Stern, K. (2015). The Binding Force and Field of Application of the Fundamental Rights Enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In: Blanke, HJ., Cruz Villalón, P., Klein, T., Ziller, J. (eds) Common European Legal Thinking. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19300-7_16

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