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General Principles of International Law: Struggling with a Slippery Concept

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Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 46))

Abstract

Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice includes general principles of law recognized by civilized nations among the sources of international law. There has been strong debate over the meaning of this expression. One of the most disputed aspects has been whether it refers only to those principles which are recognized by the majority of the domestic legal systems or also to those principles pertaining to the international legal system per se. In support of the latter argument stands international case law that has often resorted not only to those general principles of law common to most domestic legal systems but also to those traceable back to the international legal system itself. But what this last expression means—as well as its legal nature—is anything but clear. The present chapter will look at a specific principle—the principle of humanity—as the starting point and guideline for further reflections on the meaning and legal nature of general principles of international law. This analysis will have, as an unavoidable implication, the questioning of the role of the judiciary in the process of detecting and upholding what amounts to general principles of international law.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Cheng (1987) [1953], xv.

  2. 2.

    Gaja (2013), para. 2. So far, the International Court of Justice has never grounded a decision based on the reference to general principles of international law.

  3. 3.

    Bassiouni (1990), p. 768.

  4. 4.

    See, inter alia, Treves (2005), p. 248, Crawford (2012), p. 34.

  5. 5.

    Ellis (2011), p. 955.

  6. 6.

    Voigt (2008), p. 8.

  7. 7.

    International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Appeals Chamber), Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, case no. IT-95-17/1-A, judgment of 21 July 2012, para. 264.

  8. 8.

    For the travaux préparatoires of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) (whose Article 38(I)(c) has subsequently been transposed in Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice) see PCIJ, Advisory Committee of Jurists, Pròces-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee (16 June–24 July, 1920) with Annexes, p. 322.

  9. 9.

    See, for instance, Shaw (2003), p. 94 (according to the Author, however, whether “general principles of law” include merely general principles derived from national legal systems or also general principles of international law is a problem easy to overcome since both these categories would fall within a unitary category).

  10. 10.

    See, inter alia, Verzijl (1968), p. 62. The Author acknowledges the existence of general principles of law of such fundamental nature that, without their universal recognition, the functioning of the legal community can hardly be imagined and distinguished them from general principles accepted in municipal legal systems. However, according to the Author, these basic principles may not be rank as a separate category of sources of law, since they are necessarily already embodied in customs or treaties. See also Pellet (2012), p. 836.

  11. 11.

    See, e.g., Voigt (2008), p. 8.

  12. 12.

    Lammers (1980), p. 67.

  13. 13.

    Ibid.

  14. 14.

    Ibid.

  15. 15.

    Bassiouni (1990), p. 772.

  16. 16.

    Tunkin (1974), p. 202.

  17. 17.

    Ibid.

  18. 18.

    See, e.g., Raimondo (2008), p. 41. See also Waldock (1962), p. 69 (according to whom, it is necessary to keep clear the distinction between “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations”, derived from domestic legal systems, and “general principles of international law”, whose formal source is customary or treaty law).

  19. 19.

    Brownlie (1998), p. 18. For a general overview of doctrinal opinion see also Vitányi (1982), p. 103.

  20. 20.

    For a general overview see again Gaja (2013), para. 17.

  21. 21.

    Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome, 17 July 1998; entered into force on 1 July 2002). For a different interpretation of Article 21 of the Statute see Pellet (2002), p. 1070. According to the Author, the expression “the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the law of armed conflicts”, embodied in Article 21 of the Statute, constitutes a verbal tic meant to refer exclusively to international customs. It is noteworthy, however, that in the commentary to the International Law Commission’s Draft Statute, the expression principles and rules of general international law is meant to include “general principles of law, so that the Court can legitimately have recourse to the all corpus of criminal law, whether found in national forum or in international practice, whenever it needs guidance in matters not clearly regulated by treaty”. See Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. II, 1994, p. 51.

  22. 22.

    Herczegh (1969), p. 46.

  23. 23.

    Brownlie (1998), p. 19.

  24. 24.

    See, in general, Le Bris (2012).

  25. 25.

    See, inter alia, Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, UN Doc. A/RES/1653 (XVI), 24 November 1961, Preamble.

  26. 26.

    Emphasis added. Opened for signature on 29 July 1989, entered into force on 4 September 1990.

  27. 27.

    Opened for signature on 18 October 1907, entered into forced on 26 January 1910.

  28. 28.

    Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and the sick in armed forces in the field, Article 63; Convention for the amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at seas, Article 62; Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, Article 142; Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, Article 158. All the four Conventions were opened for signature in Geneva on 12 August 1949 and entered into force on 21 October 1950. A reference to “elementary dictate of humanity” is also contained in the Preamble to the International Agreement for Collective Measures against Piratical Attacks in the Mediterranean by Submarines (Nyon Agreement), League of Nations, Treaty Series 181, 135, entered into force on 14 September 1937.

  29. 29.

    Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and related to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, opened for signature on 8 June 1977 and entered into force on 7 December 1978.

  30. 30.

    Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and related to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts, opened for signature on 8 June 1977 and entered into force on 7 December 1978. The Preamble of the Protocol recalls that: “… in cases not covered by the law in force, the human person remains under the protection of the principle of humanity and the dictates of public conscience”.

  31. 31.

    Cassese (2008), p. 40.

  32. 32.

    For a general overview see, inter alia, Meron (2000), pp. 78–89.

  33. 33.

    United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, vol. XII, London, 1949, p. 75.

  34. 34.

    Ibid.

  35. 35.

    Responsabilité de l’Allemagne à raison des dommages causés dans les colonies portugaises du sud de l’Afrique (Portugal contre Allemagne), 31 July 1928, in Reports of International Arbitral Awards (vol. II), p. 1011.

  36. 36.

    Ibid., p. 1026.

  37. 37.

    Corfu Channel case (​​United Kingdom v. Albania) [1949] ICJ Rep. 4, p. 22.

  38. 38.

    Ibid., separate opinion of Judge A. Álvarez, p. 45.

  39. 39.

    Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (​Nicaragua v. United States) [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, para. 218.

  40. 40.

    Ibid.

  41. 41.

    Ibid.

  42. 42.

    See again Le Bris (2012), p. 130.

  43. 43.

    See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Rep. 240, para. 79; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion [2004] ICJ Rep. 136, para. 157.

  44. 44.

    See South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) [1966] ICJ Rep. 6, second phase, para. 50.

  45. 45.

    ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., case no. IT-95-16-T, 14 January 2000, para. 524.

  46. 46.

    Ibid., para. 525.

  47. 47.

    ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milan Martič, case no. IT-95-11-R61, 8 March 1996, para. 13.

  48. 48.

    The role that the principle of humanity may played also outside humanitarian and human rights law has been underlined, inter alia, by Wright, who noted that the principles embodied in the Martens clause, including the laws of humanity, constitute the animating and motivating principle of all law. See Q. Wright, Forward, in United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Report of Trials of War Criminals, vol. XV, London, 1949, xiii. For a general overview on the concept of “humanity” in international law see also Dupuy (1991).

  49. 49.

    Emphasis added. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, The M/V “Saiga” (No. 2) cas e (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), judgment of 1 July 1999, para. 155.

  50. 50.

    Jørgensen (2000), p. 128.

  51. 51.

    See, e.g., Fitzmaurice (1986), p. 4.

  52. 52.

    See, inter alia, Waldock (1962), p. 63.

  53. 53.

    Francioni (1996), p. 173.

  54. 54.

    See, for instance, Thirlway (2013), p. 236.

  55. 55.

    Waldock (1962), p. 65.

  56. 56.

    Ibid.

  57. 57.

    Fitzmaurice (1986), p. 4.

  58. 58.

    Lefkowitz (2010), pp. 189–190.

  59. 59.

    See, e.g., Weil (1992), p. 160.

  60. 60.

    For an overview of this doctrinal debate see, e.g., Meron (2006), p. 386.

  61. 61.

    See Lammers (1980), p. 72.

  62. 62.

    Ibid.

  63. 63.

    See Zagor (2012), p. 276.

  64. 64.

    See again Jørgensen (2000), p. 128.

  65. 65.

    See Le Bris (2012), p. 130.

  66. 66.

    Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons cit., dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, p. 406.

  67. 67.

    Ibid.

  68. 68.

    Ibid., p. 407.

  69. 69.

    Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) [2010] ICJ Rep. 14, separate opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, para. 208.

  70. 70.

    Ibid., para. 210.

  71. 71.

    See, e.g., Tunkin (1974), p. 203.

  72. 72.

    See, e.g., Lammers (1980), p. 72.

  73. 73.

    See, inter alia, Dworkin (1978), pp. 22–26. On the issue, it is worth mentioning also Professor Fitzmaurice’s assertion, pursuant to which “By a principle or general principle, as opposed to a rule … of law, is meant chiefly something which is not in itself a rule, but which underlines a rule, and explains and provides the reason for it”. See Fitzmaurice (1957), p. 7 (according to Fitzmaurice, the aforesaid definition of general principles would explain their importance in international law, where the practice is not uniform and there may be areas of doubt or controversy) (ibid., p. 9). See also Petersen (2007), p. 286.

  74. 74.

    With reference to the principle of humanity embodied in the Martens clause and applied by national and international courts, for instance, Cassese and Meron have upheld diametrical opposite views. While the former deduced from general practice that the principle of humanity does not amount to an autonomous source of law, distinguishable from the customary process [see Cassese (2008), p. 64], according to the latter, the principle of humanity acts as a restraining factor on States from doing what is not expressly forbidden by either customs or treaty rules. See Meron (2006), p. 28.

  75. 75.

    Shaw (2003), p. 102.

  76. 76.

    Wright (1949), p. 494.

  77. 77.

    See again Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons cit., dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, p. 409.

  78. 78.

    Ibid.

  79. 79.

    Emphasis added. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons cit., dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry, p. 493.

  80. 80.

    These two different functional approaches to general principles of law have been envisaged by Bassiouni, both with reference to general principles of municipal law and general principles of international law. See Bassiouni (1990), p. 777.

  81. 81.

    See Le Bris (2012), p. 132.

  82. 82.

    See, inter alia, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay cit., separate opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, para. 212: “In my conception, [international principles of general international law] conform to an autonomous formal “source” of international law, that no international tribunal can minimize or overlook. Their proper consideration cannot at all be limited to verifying whether they have entered the realm of international law through custom or treaties. They disclose the axiological dimension … of the applicable law, besides being indicators of the degree of evolution of the status conscientiae of the international community as a whole”.

  83. 83.

    Pineschi (2014), p. 106.

  84. 84.

    See again ICTY, Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al cit., para. 524.

  85. 85.

    Ibid.

  86. 86.

    See, inter alia, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay cit., separate opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, para. 212.

  87. 87.

    See Bassiouni (1990), p. 776.

  88. 88.

    See, for instance, Christenson (19871988), p. 586. Although not referring explicitly to the principle of humanity, the Author implicitly encompasses it, by means of examples, among those “principles of general international law that are or ought to be so compelling that they might be recognized by the international community for the purpose of invalidating or forcing revision in ordinary norms of treaty or custom in conflict with them”.

  89. 89.

    Tsagourias (2007), p. 76.

  90. 90.

    Ibid., p. 77.

  91. 91.

    South West Africa cases cit., dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka, p. 298.

  92. 92.

    Ibid.

  93. 93.

    Ibid.

  94. 94.

    Lauterpacht (1958), pp. 165–166.

  95. 95.

    This expression was used by Judge Shahabuddeen in his dissenting opinion on the Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons cit. See dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, p. 406.

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Carpanelli, E. (2015). General Principles of International Law: Struggling with a Slippery Concept. In: Pineschi, L. (eds) General Principles of Law - The Role of the Judiciary. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 46. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19180-5_7

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