Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Philosophy and Cognitive Science II pp 3–20Cite as

Reframing the Problem of Cognitive Penetrability

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:

Part of the book series: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics ((SAPERE,volume 20))

Abstract

I propose a reframing of the problem of cognitive penetrability (CP) that adds to the discussion on whether some cognitive effects on perceptual processing constitute cases of CP a dimension that was initially the main motive for introducing the notion of CP and was later almost abandoned, namely, whether the cognitive effects undermine the epistemological role of perception in grounding perceptual beliefs. I distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic cognitive effects on perception and argue that intrinsic cognitive effects on perception entail CP, while extrinsic effects entail CP only if they undermine the evidential role of perception in grounding perceptual beliefs. I also explain why the effects of two sorts of “body of knowledge” that are embedded in the visual circuits and guide perceptual processing from within are not cases of CP.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD   169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

References

  • Attneave, F. (1971). Multistability in perception. Scientific American, 225, 63–71.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Britz, J., & Pitts, M. (2011). Perceptual reversals during binocular rivalry: ERP components and their concomitant source differences. Psychophysiology, 48, 1489–1498.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Burge, T. (2010). Origins of objectivity. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Carrasco, M. (2011). Visual attention: The past 25 years. Vision Research, 51, 1484–1525.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chaumon, M., Drouet, V., & Tallon-Baudry, C. (2008). Unconscious associative memory affects visual processing before 100 ms. Journal of Vision, 8(3), 1–10.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Churchland, P. M. (1988). Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality: A reply to Jerry Fodor. Philosophy of Science, 55, 167–187.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Crouzet, S. M., Kirchner, H., & Thorpe, S. J. (2010). Fast saccades toward faces: Face detection in just 100 ms. Journal of Vision, 10(4), 1–17.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davis, M. (1995). Tacit knowledge and subdoxastic states. In C. MacDonald & G. Macdonald (Eds.), Philosophy of psychology: Debates on psychological explanation. Oxford: Blacwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Delmore, A., Rousselet, G. A., Mace, M. J.-M., & Fabre-Thorpe, M. (2004). Interaction of top-down and bottom up processing in the fast visual analysis of natural scenes. Cognitive Brain Research, 19, 103–113.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C. (1983). Styles of mental representation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 83, 213–226.

    Google Scholar 

  • Driver, J., & Baylis, G. S. (1996). Eye-assignment and figure-ground segregation in short-term visual matching. Cognitive Psychology, 31, 248–306.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fodor, J. (1983). The modularity of mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grill-Spector, K., Kushnir, T., Hendler, T., Edelman, S., Itzchak, Y., & Malach, R. (1998). A sequence of object-processing stages revealed by fMRI in the Human occipital lobe. Human Brain Mapping, 6, 316–328.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grill-Spector, K., Henson, R., & Martin, A. (2006). Repetition and the brain: Neural models of stimulus-specific effects. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10, 14–23.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hanson, N. R. (1958). Patterns of discovery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haugeland, J. (1998). Having thought. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hochberg, J., & Peterson, M. A. (1987). Piecemeal organization and cognitive components in object perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 116, 370–380.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Johnson, J. S., & Olshausen, B. A. (2005). The earliest EEG signatures of object recognition in a cued-target task are postesensory. Journal of Vision, 5, 299–312.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kirchner, H., & Thorpe, S. J. (2006). Ultra-rapid object detection with saccadic movements: Visual processing speed revisited. Vision Research, 46, 1762–1776.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kornmeier, J., Pfaffle, M., & Bach, M. (2011). Necker-cube: Stimulus-related (low-level) and percept-related (high-level) EEG signatures early in occipital cortex. Journal of Vision, 11(9), 1–11.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lamme, V. A. F., & Roelfsema, P. R. (2000). The distinct modes of vision offered by feedforward and recurrent processing. Trends in Neuroscience, 23, 571–579.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Liu, H., Agam, Y., Madsen, J., & Krelman, G. (2009). Timing, timing, timing: Fast decoding of object information from intracranial field potentials in human visual cortex. Neuron, 62, 281–290.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Macpherson, F. (2012). Cognitive penetration of colour experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84(1), 24–62.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Marr, D. (1982). Vision: A computational investigation into human representation and processing of visual information. San Francisco: Freeman.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nobre, A. C., Rohenkhol, G., & Stokes, M. G. (2012). Nervous anticipation: Top-down biasing across space and time. In M. Posner (Ed.), Cognitive neuroscience of attention (2\(^{\rm {nd}}\) ed.). New York, N.Y: The Guilford Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peterson, M. A., & Hochberg, J. (1983). Opposed set-measurements procedure: A quantitative analysis of the role of local cues and intention in form perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 9, 183–193.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peterson, M. A., & Gibson, B. S. (1994). Object recognition contributions to Figure-ground organization: Operations and outlines and subjective contours. Psychological Science, 5, 253–259.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peterson, M. A., & Enns, J. (2005). The edge complex: Implicit memory for figure assignment in shape perception. Perception and Psychophysics, 67(4), 727–740.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pitts, M., Nerger, J., & Davis, T. J. R. (2007). Electrophysiological correlates of perceptual reversals for three different types of multistable images. Journal of Vision, 7(1), 1–14.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pylyshyn, Z. (1999). Is vision continuous with cognition? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 341–365.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pylyshyn, Z. (2003). Seeing and visualizing: It’s not what you think. Cambridge, MA: The MIT press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Raftopoulos, A. (2001a). Is perception informationally encapsulated? The Issue of the Theory-Ladenness of Perception. Cognitive Science , 25, 423–451.

    Google Scholar 

  • Raftopoulos, A. (2001b). Reentrant pathways and the theory-ladenness of observation. Philosophy of Science, 68, 187–200.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Raftopoulos, A. (2006). Defending realism on the proper ground. Philosophical Psychology, 19(1), 1–31.

    Google Scholar 

  • Raftopoulos, A. (2009). Cognition and Perception. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Raftopoulos, A. (2013). The cognitive impenetrability of the content of early vision is a necessary and sufficient condition for purely nonconceptual content. Philosophical Psychology, 1–20. doi:10.1080/09515089.2012.729486.

  • Reynolds, J. H., & Chelazzi, L. (2004). Attentional modulation of visual processing. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 27, 611–47.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Searle, J. R. (1995). Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science. In C. MacDonald & G. Macdonald (Eds.), Philosophy of psychology: Debates on psychological explanation. Oxford: Blacwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sellars, W. (1956). Empiricism and the philosophy of mind. In H. Feigl & M. Scriven (Eds.), Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science (Vol. I). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shibata, K., Yamagishi, N., Naokazu, G., Yoshioka, T., Yamashita, O., Sato, M., et al. (2008). The effects of feature attention on prestimulus cortical activity in the human visual system. Cerebral Cortex, 18, 1644–1675.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Siegel, S. (2012). Cognitive penetrability and perceptual justification. Nous, 46, 201–222.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Spelke, E. S. (1988). Object perception, In A. I. Goldman (Ed.), Readings in philosophy and cognitive science (pp. 447–461). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stich, S. (1978). Beliefs and subdoxastic states. Philosophy of Science, 45, 499–518.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stokes, D. (2012). Perceiving and desiring: A new look at the cognitive penetrability of experience. Philosophical Studies, 158(3), 479–92.

    Google Scholar 

  • Torralba, A., & Oliva, A. (2003). Statistics of natural image categories. Network, 14, 391–412.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tye, M. (1995). Ten problems of consciousness. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ullman, S., Vidal-Naquet, M., & Sali, E. (2002). Visual features of intermediate complexity and their use in classification. Nature Neuroscience, 5(7), 682–687.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Psychology, University of Cyprus, P.O. Box 20537, 1678, Nicosia, Cyprus

    Athanassios Raftopoulos

Authors
  1. Athanassios Raftopoulos
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Athanassios Raftopoulos .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy and Computational Philosophy Laboratory, University of Pavia, Pavia, Italy

    Lorenzo Magnani

  2. Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China

    Ping Li

  3. School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon, Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

    Woosuk Park

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this paper

Cite this paper

Raftopoulos, A. (2015). Reframing the Problem of Cognitive Penetrability. In: Magnani, L., Li, P., Park, W. (eds) Philosophy and Cognitive Science II. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 20. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18479-1_1

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation