Making Quantified Truths True
In this paper, I present a novel way of meeting the challenge of grounding the truth of contingent quantified truths in positive, actual aspects of reality. My solution recovers the commonsensical intuition that what makes < all As are B > true (in a circumstance of evaluation w) is just the As (in w) being B (in w). The proposal is based on recognizing that the metaphysical relation that binds truths to their truth-makers is defeasible. Consequently, it is possible for a truth-maker to make a truth-bearer true in some circumstances of evaluation, but fail to do so in others, in those others where appropriate defeaters exist.
KeywordsTruth Condition Actual World Complete Explanation External Circumstance Epistemic Relation
This project was supported by PAPIIT grants IA400414 Anti-realismo modal and IA400412-2: Epistemología y metafísica de la modalidad.
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