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Making Quantified Truths True

  • Axel Arturo Barceló AspeitiaEmail author
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 373)

Abstract

In this paper, I present a novel way of meeting the challenge of grounding the truth of contingent quantified truths in positive, actual aspects of reality. My solution recovers the commonsensical intuition that what makes < all As are B > true (in a circumstance of evaluation w) is just the As (in w) being B (in w). The proposal is based on recognizing that the metaphysical relation that binds truths to their truth-makers is defeasible. Consequently, it is possible for a truth-maker to make a truth-bearer true in some circumstances of evaluation, but fail to do so in others, in those others where appropriate defeaters exist.

Keywords

Truth Condition Actual World Complete Explanation External Circumstance Epistemic Relation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgements

This project was supported by PAPIIT grants IA400414 Anti-realismo modal and IA400412-2: Epistemología y metafísica de la modalidad.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAMCircuito Mario de la Cueva, Ciudad UniversitariaMéxico D.F.Mexico

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