Qualifying Quantifying-in

  • Bjørn JespersenEmail author
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 373)


Quantifying-in is existential quantification into non-extensional contexts headed by a modal or attitudinal operator. The sense and sensibility of quantifying-in has often been challenged. This paper outlines a transparency-preserving semantics as a prerequisite for the logical validity of quantifying-in. The paper demonstrates how to formally validate quantifying into a non-factive, hyperintensional attitude context.


Ontological Commitment Definite Description Extensional Logic Doxastic Attitude Existential Quantification 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



The research reported herein was funded by FP7-PEOPLE-2013-IEF Project No. 628170 USHP: Unity of Structured Hyperpropositions, and VŠB-Technical University of Ostrava Project No. SP2014/157: Knowledge Modeling, Process Simulation and Design. Versions of this paper were read as an invited lecture at Munich Centre of Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig Maximilian University, 24 October 2013, and as an invited tutorial at the Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen, 7 February 2013. I am indebted to Marie Duží for precious comments; to Alessandro Torza for his kind invitation to contribute to this volume, and granting much-needed deadline extensions, as well as helpful comments on the penultimate draft; and to Iker for making the writing process so much longer and infinitely more pleasurable.


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© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.LOGOS, Departament de lògica, història i filosofia de la ciènciaUniversitat de BarcelonaBarcelonaSpain

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