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Artificial Intelligences and Karma: An Evaluation of Information Technology in Light of J.L. Shaw’s Concept of Moral Free Will

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Comparative Philosophy and J.L. Shaw

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Abstract

J.L. Shaw in his discussion on free will proposes that human beings are distinct from other animals since they possess knowledge and free will, guided by the concept of ‘ought’ and ‘ought not’. Drawing on both Western and Hindu philosophy he argues that humans realise their dignity in unselfish moral actions, which is karma. However neuroscience has demonstrated that human consciousness is a product of intricate physical processes in our bodies. Such biological processes have their counterparts in hardware and software of computers. This paper argues that this being the case, it is possible for Artificial Intelligences to also attain intelligence and consciousness equal, though obviously not identical, to that of human beings. If AIs attain such a state then they will automatically become responsible for their choice of actions and its consequences. If AIs become truly self-aware then the concept of karma must apply to them.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Surendranath College, Calcutta University, Kolkata, West Bengal, India

    Papia Mitra

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  1. Papia Mitra
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Correspondence to Papia Mitra .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of International and South Asia Studies, University of California, Berkeley, California, USA

    Purushottama Bilimoria

  2. Department of Philosophy, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada

    Michael Hemmingsen

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Mitra, P. (2016). Artificial Intelligences and Karma: An Evaluation of Information Technology in Light of J.L. Shaw’s Concept of Moral Free Will. In: Bilimoria, P., Hemmingsen, M. (eds) Comparative Philosophy and J.L. Shaw. Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures, vol 13. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17873-8_16

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