Abstract
In this paper I use the Naiyāyika distinction between determinate (conceptual or qualificative) and indeterminate (non-conceptual or nonqualificative) awareness to show why a causal-explanatory account of conceptual content in terms of non-conceptual content fails. The Naiyāyikas, like Peacocke and other contemporary philosophers, believe that non-conceptual content is a cause of conceptual content, but it is only a cause in the sense of being a necessary condition. This point is clearly brought out by J.L. Shaw in his paper on “Sources of Knowledge: Perception, Inference and Testimony: Some Contemporary problems and their Solutions from the Indian Perspective” (2005). Non-conceptual content is not a sufficient condition for conceptual content, according to the Naiyāyikas. Therefore, any attempt to offer a causal-explanatory account of conceptual content in terms of non-conceptual content is doomed to fail.
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Notes
- 1.
See, for example, Peacocke (1992a).
- 2.
- 3.
A similar position is defended by several recent theorists in philosophy of mind and perception including Frank Jackson (2004).
- 4.
It may be noted that this suggests that an indeterminate awareness is an instrumental cause of some but not all determinate perceptions, i.e., only those in which the qualifier is fed not from memory but an indeterminate awareness. See Phillips (2001). Phillips appeals to Gaṅgeśa’s definition of perception and clarifies that it is stricter than Chakrabarti’s rendering of it. For Phillips, properly translated the definition reads, “cognition that does not have a cognition as its chief instrumental cause [karaṇa or trigger]” (p. 107). It is not important for us to worry about the details of the debate or to decide who is right in this debate for our purposes here, but my views on this matter will become clear in the course of the discussion.
- 5.
See Chakrabarti (1995). Arindam Chakrabarti uses the term ‘individuals’ to encompass both particulars and universal instances. The use of term ‘individuals’ and ‘non-particular individuals’ follows Chakrabarti (1995). Chakrabarti’s use of direct perception signifies indeterminate awareness. Though he does not use the latter expression, he does make a distinction between direct perception and qualificatory perception. The latter term signifies determinate awareness.
- 6.
For the purposes of this discussion, I follow the Naiyāyikas, who regard the mind as distinct from the self or conscious agency. The mind, or ‘inner sense’ as they call it, is an instrument employed by conscious agent (self) for cognising external and internal sensory stimulations.
- 7.
I concede that we cannot make sense of indeterminate awareness of bare particulars, because we cannot cash out what it is for such a cognitive state to qualify as an intentional state. The argument for this claim is discussed in my paper (Chadha 2001).
- 8.
Someone may object that we can use the same strategy to establish what it would mean to regard an indeterminate awareness of a particular as an intentional awareness. I think this depends on what we mean by a ‘particular’. My argument in “Perceptual Cognition” was intended to target the Buddhist notion of real particulars (svalakṣaṇa). The Naiyāyika notion of particular is that of a substance qualified by universals and relations. I think my argument can be extended to show that we cannot explain what it is to be intentionally aware of substances in indeterminate cognition. I think we may be able to account for intentional awareness of particulars conceived of as bundles of qualities (including relations and universals). But this depends on prior cognition of qualities, the rest is construction. My suspicion is that such construction must be mediated by determinate awareness of propositional forms.
- 9.
Many influential Indian philosophers have argued for this, including Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti (1976).
- 10.
Many empirical studies on primates and other animals show that except the great apes who are very closely related to humans, most animals including monkeys lack the concept of self. Gallup did a comparative study on monkeys and apes. The apes succeeded in passing the mirror test after three weeks or so but the monkeys did not succeed at all. See Gallup (1970).
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Chadha, M. (2016). Contents of Experience: Revisited. In: Bilimoria, P., Hemmingsen, M. (eds) Comparative Philosophy and J.L. Shaw. Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures, vol 13. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17873-8_10
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