Abstract
The key to taking in Aristotle’s treatise on time is to approach it with the understanding that Aristotle was not a philosopher concerned with time —in questions about time or in delimiting the being of time.
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Notes
- 1.
Aquinas (1961, 2) seems to be making a similar claim, though not explicitly, when he writes that natural science “deals with those things which depend on matter not only for their own existence, but also for their definition.” According to Aquinas’s prior argument, subjects like number, magnitude, and figure depend on matter for their existence but not for their definition. By deduction, since time is a number for Aristotle, it would not be a proper subject qua itself for natural science.
- 2.
Roark calls Aristotle a philosophical optimist because Aristotle is willing to define time (Roark 2011, 11). Without intending to take anything away from Aristotle, I would disagree with Roark on this point. Aristotle is in fact not defining time as the abstract concept we have come to know in contemporary discourse. Aristotle’s naturalist account of time was not over-reaching; he had no motive for saying any more about time than his project warranted.
- 3.
The sense in which I intend demonstration here has to do with that which utilizes experience (apodeixis) instead of demonstration using only pure thinking, e.g., a demonstration by way of syllogism based on definition.
- 4.
According to Aquinas (1961), Physics i 1 is a preface to the rest of the work.
- 5.
Elsewhere, Aristotle explicitly distances himself from Platonic-style natural philosophy. See 203a16 and Meta 1001a12 on this point. As Ross points out, Pythagoreans and Plato were “thought of as being a priori theorists rather than genuine students of nature” (Ross 1936, 545).
- 6.
See Hussey (1983), Owen (1986), and Irwin (1988), all proponents of this view. Hussey explains that “endoxa” need not mean exclusively ideas commonly held: “His method is the method of dialectic, by which (in theory at least) the philosophical inquirer started from the accumulated material of common-sense intuitions, previous opinions of philosophers, and observed facts relevant to the subject, and ascended by a process of rational criticism and generalization to the correct account of the subject, which would usually be enshrined in a definition of the central term” (ix).
- 7.
See Bolton (in Judson 2003), for a very well argued take on this view. For Bolton, Physics i 1 is a parallel account to Posterior Analytics ii 19. According to these accounts, “the conclusion of our reasoning and our inquiry gives us a principle which explains (and gives us a firm delineation of) the perceptible phenomena which we use to reach it. But no rule of general dialectic or of any type of dialectic which Aristotle discusses is designed to guarantee conclusions of this sort. So if dialectic does reach conclusions of this type it is accidental and not due to the method of dialectic itself” (13).
- 8.
This is true of modern commentators, but as we will shortly see, Aquinas did comment at length on the importance of understanding Aristotle’s method.
- 9.
In an effort to laud the development of the scientific method in the sixteenth century, modern physicists oversimplify Aristotle’s project stating that he had no method of demonstration and relied entirely on dialectic to obtain conclusions about nature.
- 10.
Being a self-subsistent natural being herself, the natural scientist could be a subject to herself, but this is not likely what Aristotle had in mind.
- 11.
Aquinas (1961) explains the difference between knowable to us and knowable by nature/without qualification with an appeal to the fact that humans begin from potency and from a point of view of science and nature’s telos is something to be learned. I disagree with Aquinas on this point. It seems a Christianized reading of Aristotle here, separating humans from the natural order, and especially from God. Aquinas’s conclusions may be the first source of commentary reading Aristotle as part epistemology (studying what we can know) and part metaphysics (studying what is).
- 12.
This passage could be misread to suggest that Aristotle is differentiating what is possible for us to know, or an epistemology, and what is, a metaphysics. This is not the case. He is not insinuating that there is, to use a Kantian term, a noumenal aspect of nature that escapes our grasp. Instead, he is introducing his understanding of knowledge acquisition as (1) perception of particular instantiation of a genus (2) knowledge of universal (genera) from experience with the particular.
- 13.
Aquinas writes against Ibn Rushd’s claim that Aristotle meant, “composed” when he tells of confused first perceptions. Aquinas disagrees with this reading because, as he points out, genera are not composed of species.
- 14.
As Aquinas (1961, 5–6) points out, that Aristotle formerly said confused and not compound is significant, as he is using universal equivocally: integral sensible, universal intelligible, universal sensible.
- 15.
Aquinas (1961, 3) believes that already in the first line of the work we see Aristotle wedging a difference between understanding and science, disclosing the importance of both definitions and demonstrations to natural science.
- 16.
Aristotle made a quick switch from the hypothetical, announcing what is possible, to the actual, announcing how he will actually proceed, at the start of this work: “when the objects of an inquiry…have principles…it is through acquaintance with them that knowledge and understanding is attained” to “in the science of nature…our first task will be to try to determine what relates to its principles” (184a10–16).
- 17.
Bolton (in Judson 2003) argues that Aristotle’s use of endoxa here does not undermine his promised engagement with perceptibles in Physics i 1. I agree with his conclusion that engaging with the endoxa in Physics i 2 is complementary to his otherwise demonstrative methodology. Specifically, Bolton supposes Aristotle to be exercising the following point: “the natural scientist cannot use a scientific, that is a demonstrative, argument to refute someone who denies that the natural world of changing things exists. In natural science it is an indemonstrable first principle that the natural world of changing things exists…one can only refute this denial dialectically, or peirastically” (15).
- 18.
I will continue to highlight that Aristotle reserves his own thoughts on the various topics of natural science until after having contended with the endoxa. We will see this pattern in his subsequent discussions of nature, motion, the infinite, place, void, and time.
- 19.
See Ross (1936, 487) for evidence that Aristotle probably mistook what was said in Parmenides’s poem for Parmenides’s own views.
- 20.
See also Aristotle on this point at 189a30–35.
- 21.
διαφέρει δ’ οὐθὲν ἐπὶ ἁρμονίας εἰπεῖν ἢ τάξεως ἢ συνθέσεως· φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οἰκία καὶ ἀνδριὰς καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο γίγνεται ὁμοίως· ἥ τε γὰρ οἰκία γίγνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ συγκεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διῃρῆσθαι ταδὶ ὡδί, καὶ ὁ ἀνδριὰς καὶ τῶν ἐσχηματισμένων τι ἐξ ἀσχημοσύνης· καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων τὰ μὲν τάξις, τὰ δὲ σύνθεσίς τίς ἐστιν.
- 22.
This distinction may indicate Aristotle’s early thoughts on the difference he will make in Physics v between kinêsis, usually rendered “motion” but generally meaning accidental or predicative change, and metabole, which includes kinêsis but also substantial change, i.e., generation and corruption.
- 23.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου κατὰ τὸν λόγον γνώριμον, τὸ δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος τοῦ καθόλου, ἡ δ’ αἴσθησις τοῦ κατὰ μέρος.
- 24.
gignomenon in this chapter is ambiguous—in some cases, it is the thing becoming and, in other cases it is that which results from the becoming. See Ross’s translation of i 7 (1936, 345) and especially Wolfgang Wieland (1970, 113 fn 8 in “Introduction: The Study of Nature and the Nature of Time” and 14 in Chap. 3) who further explains the distinction: (1) ὂ γἰγνεται, “terminus ad quem” or “das Resultat des Werdens” (that which results from the process of becoming) and (2) γἰγνόμενον, “terminus a quo” or “dem Werdenden” (that which is becoming, that which will undergo the process) and explains that Aristotle’s reader must decide for herself which of these Aristotle intends in any given instance. In wrestling with the ambiguity, Aristotle’s intended meaning of “terminus a quo” is at stake. Aristotle’s point here is that there is something becoming which is persisting through the becoming even though there is another something, which does not persist (189b32).
- 25.
φαμὲν γὰρ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ ἄλλου ἄλλο καὶ ἐξ ἑτέρου ἕτερον ἢ τὰ ἁπλᾶ λέγοντες ἢ τὰ συγκείμενα. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὡδί. ἔστι γὰρ γίγνεσθαι ἄνθρωπον μουσικόν, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὴ μουσικὸν γίγνεσθαι μουσικὸν ἢ τὸν μὴ μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον μουσικόν. ἁπλοῦν μὲν οὖν λέγω τὸ γιγνόμενον τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸ μὴ μουσικόν, καὶ ὃ γίγνεται ἁπλοῦν, τὸ μουσικόν? συγκείμενον δὲ καὶ ὃ γίγνεται καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον, ὅταν τὸν μὴ μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον φῶμεν γίγνεσθαι μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον.
- 26.
ὅτι δὲ καὶ αἱ οὐσίαι καὶ ὅσα [ἄλλα] ἁπλῶς ὄντα ἐξ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς γίγνεται, ἐπισκοποῦντι γένοιτο ἂν φανερόν. ἀεὶ γὰρ ἔστι ὃ ὑπόκειται, ἐξ οὗ τὸ γιγνόμενον, οἷον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῷα ἐκ σπέρματος.
Spontaneous generation is also possible (cf. HA vi 15, 569a13–19, 25–26, HA vi 16, 570a3–10, GA iii 11, 763a24–763b5), but it is not discussed here.
- 27.
ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ὕλην καὶ στέρησιν ἕτερόν φαμεν εἶναι, καὶ τούτων τὸ μὲν οὐκ ὂν εἶναι κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τὴν ὕλην, τὴν δὲ στέρησιν καθ’ αὑτήν, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐγγὺς καὶ οὐσίαν πως, τὴν ὕλην, τὴν δὲ οὐδαμῶς οἱ δὲ τὸ μὴ ὂν τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν ὁμοίως, ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον ἢ τὸ χωρὶς ἑκάτερον. ὥστε παντελῶς ἕτερος ὁ τρόπος οὗτος τῆς τριάδος κἀκεῖνος. μέχρι μὲν γὰρ δεῦρο προῆλθον, ὅτι δεῖ τινὰ ὑποκεῖσθαι φύσιν, ταύτην μέντοι μίαν ποιοῦσιν καὶ γὰρ εἴ τις δυάδα ποιεῖ, λέγων μέγα καὶ μικρὸν αὐτήν, οὐθὲν ἧττον ταὐτὸ ποιεῖ τὴν γὰρ ἑτέραν παρεῖδεν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑπομένουσα συναιτία τῇ μορφῇ τῶν γιγνομένων ἐστίν, ὥσπερ μήτηρἡ δ’ ἑτέρα μοῖρα τῆς ἐναντιώσεως πολλάκις ἂν φαντασθείη τῷ πρὸς τὸ κακοποιὸν αὐτῆς ἀτενίζοντι τὴν διάνοιαν οὐδ’ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν.
- 28.
Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡ φύσις μέν ἐστιν ἀρχὴ κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς, ἡ δὲ μέθοδος ἡμῖν περὶ φύσεώς ἐστι, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν τί ἐστι κίνησις ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἀγνοουμένης αὐτῆς ἀγνοεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν φύσιν.
- 29.
See Aquinas’s commentary (paragraph 276) on the importance of this opening argument for an understanding of motion’s place in Aristotle’s natural philosophy: “Nature is the principle of motion and change, as is evident from the definition set down in Book II. (But how motion and change differ, will be shown in Book V.) And thus it is evident that if one does not know motion, one does not know nature, since the former [motion] is placed in the definition of the latter [nature]. Since, therefore, we intend to present the science of nature, we must make motion understood.” This is to say that knowledge of nature is impossible if we do not know motion. Or, put otherwise, we investigate motion because we aim to know about nature. I will emphasize this same argument as reason for the subsequent study of infinite, place, void, and time. We want to know them only because we want to know about nature.
- 30.
The sense of this passage is that Aristotle will attempt to deal with the things that come after kinêsis insofar as they become topics for physics because kinêsis is a topic for physics. “Terms,” as the ROT calls these things, is not a perfect way of talking about them. Nevertheless, for lack of a better name, I will refer to them as terms.
- 31.
A more literal translation here would be simply that without place, void, and time, motion is impossible (ἀδύνατον).
- 32.
According to the apparatus, τὸ δὲ δυνάμει does appear in the commentary tradition.
- 33.
οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κίνησις παρὰ τὰ πράγματα μεταβάλλει γὰρ ἀεὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον ἢ κατ’ οὐσίαν ἢ κατὰ ποσὸν ἢ κατὰ ποιὸν ἢ κατὰ τόπον.
- 34.
Broadie (1982), Hussey (1993), and Coope (2008) all defend this view as well.
- 35.
ἐπεὶ δ’ ἔνια ταὐτὰ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ ἐντελεχείᾳ ἐστίν, οὐχ ἅμα δὲ ἢ οὐ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλ’ οἷον θερμὸν μὲν ἐντελεχείᾳ ψυχρὸν δὲ δυνάμει.
- 36.
δῆλον δ’ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τὸ μὲν γὰρ δύνασθαι ὑγιαίνειν καὶ δύνασθαι κάμνειν ἕτερον-καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὸ κάμνειν καὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ταὐτὸν ἦν—τὸ δὲ ὑποκείμενον καὶ τὸ ὑγιαῖνον καὶ τὸ νοσοῦν, εἴθ’ ὑγρότης εἴθ’ αἷμα, ταὐτὸν καὶ ἕν.
- 37.
γὰρ ἕκαστον ὁτὲ μὲν ἐνεργεῖν ὁτὲ δὲ μή, οἷον τὸ οἰκοδομητόν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ οἰκοδομητοῦ ἐνέργεια, ᾗ οἰκοδομητόν, οἰκοδόμησίς ἐστιν (ἢ γὰρ οἰκοδόμησις ἡ ἐνέργεια [τοῦ οἰκοδομητοῦ] ἢ ἡ οἰκία ἀλλ’ ὅταν οἰκία ᾖ, οὐκέτ’ οἰκοδομητὸν ἔστιν οἰκοδομεῖται δὲ τὸ οἰκοδομητόν ἀνάγκη οὖν οἰκοδόμησιν τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι) ἡ δ’ οἰκοδόμησις κίνησίς τις. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ αὐτὸς ἐφαρμόσει λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων κινήσεων.
- 38.
καὶ τὸ ἄναντες καὶ τὸ κάταντες ταῦτα γὰρ ἓν μέν ἐστιν, ὁ μέντοι λόγος οὐχ εἷς ὁμοίως.
- 39.
σημεῖον δ’ ὅτι ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης οἰκεία ἡ θεωρία ἡ περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντες γὰρ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀξιολόγως ἧφθαι τῆς τοιαύτης φιλοσοφίας πεποίηνται λόγον περὶ τοῦ ἀπείρου, καὶ πάντες ὡς ἀρχήν τινα τιθέασι τῶν ὄντων.
- 40.
Heinemann (2012, 5) rightly suggests that Aristotle’s approach here follows Posterior Analytics ii 1, 89b24–5: “We seek four things: the fact, the reason why, if it is, what it is” (ζητοῦμεν δὲ τέτταρα, τὸ ὅτι, τὸ διότι, εἰ ἔστι, τί ἐστιν.). Heinemann writes, “Aristotle’s point in asking the question as to “if it is” is just to secure some subject matter of inquiry to exist.”.
- 41.
At the start of his discussion of kinêsis, we do not find this question. The question as to whether motion exists was not asked, since it had been previously established that the principle of nature was an inner principle of motion and rest (192b13–22). “Nature is a principle of motion and change, and it is the subject of our inquiry. We must therefore see that we understand what motion is; for if it were unknown, nature too would be unknown” (Ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡ φύσις μέν ἐστιν ἀρχὴ κινήσεως καὶ μετα βολῆς, ἡ δὲ μέθοδος ἡμῖν περὶ φύσεώς ἐστι, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν τί ἐστι κίνησις ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἀγνοουμένης αὐτῆς ἀγνοεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν φύσιν) (200b12–14). Thus, it was clear that motion exists. Aristotle needed then to establish in what way it existed.
- 42.
Χωριστὸν μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ ἄπειρον τῶν αἰσθητῶν, αὐτό τι ὂν ἄπειρον, οὐχ οἷόν τε. εἰ γὰρ μήτε μέγεθός ἐστιν μήτε πλῆθος, ἀλλ’ οὐσία αὐτό ἐστι τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ μὴ συμβεβη κός, ἀδιαίρετον ἔσται (τὸ γὰρ διαιρετὸν ἢ μέγεθος ἔσται ἢ πλῆθος) εἰ δὲ τοιοῦτον, οὐκ ἄπειρον, εἰ μὴ ὡς ἡ φωνὴ ἀόρατος. ἀλλ’ οὐχ οὕτως οὔτε φασὶν εἶναι οἱ φάσκοντες εἶναι τὸ ἄπειρον οὔτε ἡμεῖς ζητοῦμεν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀδιεξίτητον. εἰ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔστιν τὸ ἄπειρον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη στοιχεῖον τῶν ὄντων, ᾗ ἄπειρον, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀόρατον τῆς διαλέκτου, καίτοι ἡ φωνή ἐστιν ἀόρατος. ἔτι πῶς ἐνδέχεται εἶναί τι αὐτὸ ἄπειρον, εἴπερ μὴ καὶ ἀριθμὸν καὶ μέγεθος, ὧν ἐστι καθ’ αὑτὸ πάθος τι τὸ ἄπειρον; ἔτι γὰρ ἧττον ἀνάγκη ἢ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἢ τὸ μέγεθος. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τὸ ἄπειρον ὡς ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν καὶ ὡς οὐσίαν καὶ ἀρχήν ἔσται γὰρ ὁτιοῦν αὐτοῦ ἄπειρον τὸ λαμβανόμενον, εἰ μεριστόν (τὸ γὰρ ἀπείρῳ εἶναι καὶ ἄπειρον τὸ αὐτό, εἴπερ οὐσία τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ μὴ καθ’ ὑποκειμένου), ὥστ’ ἢ ἀδιαίρετον ἢ εἰς ἄπειρα διαιρετόν πολλὰ δ’ ἄπειρα εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἀδύνατον (ἀλλὰ μὴν ὥσπερ ἀέρος ἀὴρ μέρος, οὕτω καὶ ἄπειρον ἀπείρου, εἴ γε οὐσία ἐστὶ καὶ ἀρχή) ἀμέριστον ἄρα καὶ ἀδιαίρετον. ἀλλ’ ἀδύνατον τὸ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὂν ἄπειρον ποσὸν γάρ τι εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον.
- 43.
Note here that Aristotle states without argument that number is not a substance. This is one of the clear indications that he does not think about number as a self-subsistent being qua itself. This is a clue as to how to understand Aristotle’s definition of time, which classifies time as a number.
- 44.
ἀλλ’ εἰ οὕτως, εἴρηται ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται αὐτὸ λέγειν ἀρχήν, ἀλλ’ ᾧ συμβέβηκε, τὸν ἀέρα ἢ τὸ ἄρτιον.
- 45.
εἰ ἐνδέχεται ἄπειρον καὶ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς εἶναι καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ μηδὲν ἔχουσι μέγεθος.
- 46.
As Ross (1936, 541) notes, “When Aristotle says (Met. 987b27) that the Pythagoreans identified real things with numbers, it is not to be supposed that they reduced reality to an abstraction, but rather that they did not recognize the abstract nature of numbers. What they were doing was little more than to state that the characteristics of things depended, to a large extent, on the number and the numerical relations of their components.” Hussey (1983, 88) reminds us that Aristotle is only talking about positive integers here.
- 47.
οὔτε γὰρ σύνθετον οἷόν τε εἶναι οὔτε ἁπλοῦν. σύνθετον μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔσται τὸ ἄπειρον σῶμα, εἰ πεπερασμένα τῷ πλήθει τὰ στοιχεῖα. ἀνάγκη γὰρ πλείω εἶναι, καὶ ἰσάζειν ἀεὶ τἀναντία, καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἓν αὐτῶν ἄπειρον (εἰ γὰρ ὁποσῳοῦν λείπεται ἡ ἐν ἑνὶ σώματι δύναμις θατέρου, οἷον εἰ τὸ πῦρ πεπέρανται, ὁ δ’ ἀὴρ ἄπειρος, ἔστιν δὲ τὸ ἴσον πῦρ τοῦ ἴσου ἀέρος τῇ δυνάμει ὁποσαπλασιονοῦν, μόνον δὲ ἀριθμόν τινα ἔχον, ὅμως φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ ἄπειρον ὑπερβαλεῖ καὶ φθερεῖ τὸ πεπερασμένον) ἕκαστον δ’ ἄπειρον εἶναι ἀδύνατον σῶμα μὲν γάρ ἐστιν τὸ πάντῃ ἔχον διάστασιν, ἄπειρον δὲ τὸ ἀπεράντως διεστηκός, ὥστε τὸ ἄπειρον σῶμα πανταχῇ ἔσται διεστηκὸς εἰς ἄπειρον. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἓν καὶ ἁπλοῦν εἶναι σῶμα ἄπειρον ἐνδέχεται, οὔτε ὡς λέγουσί τινες τὸ παρὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ οὗ ταῦτα γεννῶσιν, οὔθ’ ἁπλῶς.
- 48.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐνεργείᾳ οὐκ ἔστι σῶμα ἄπειρον, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων.
- 49.
τοῦ τε γὰρ χρόνου ἔσται τις ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτή, καὶ τὰ μεγέθη οὐ διαιρετὰ εἰς μεγέθη, καὶ ἀριθμὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἄπειρος. ὅταν δὲ διωρισμένων οὕτως μηδετέρως φαίνηται ἐνδέχεσθαι, διαιτητοῦ δεῖ, καὶ δῆλον ὅτι πὼς μὲν ἔστιν πὼς δ’ οὔ.
- 50.
It is for this reason that one may say that for Aristotle there is a sense in which the infinite does not exist; see for example Heinemann (2012, 5).
- 51.
Οὐ δεῖ δὲ τὸ δυνάμει ὂν λαμβάνειν, ὥσπερ εἰ δυνατὸν τοῦτ’ ἀνδριάντα εἶναι, ὡς καὶ ἔσται τοῦτ’ ἀνδριάς, οὕτω καὶ ἄπειρον ὃ ἔσται ἐνεργείᾳ.
- 52.
Following Ross, 206a29–34 is bracketed in the ROT. Since Ross excises the bracketed sentence as an alternative version of 206a18–29 (ROT, 351), I refer to the sentence seemingly out of order to help explain what Aristotle is saying at 206a23–25.
- 53.
Ὅλως μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἔστιν τὸ ἄπειρον, τῷ ἀεὶ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο λαμβάνεσθαι, καὶ τὸ λαμβανόμενον μὲν ἀεὶ εἶναι πεπερασμένον, ἀλλ’ ἀεί γε ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον.
- 54.
Recall 200b33: “There is no such thing as motion over and above the things.”.
- 55.
As Hussey (1983, 105) remarks, this is a careless reading of Plato’s Timaeus 48e–52d. Aristotle seems to have left out sufficient differences between his idea of matter (hyle) and Plato’s receptacle (chóra), thus embellishing the similarities needed for a proper analogy. Hussey explains, “Aristotle interprets Plato’s receptacle as playing the same role as Aristotelian matter…the existence and whereabouts of a piece of Aristotelian matter are always dependent on those of the body of which it is the matter, whereas the Platonic receptacle seems to be an independent entity of which the parts cannot change their relative positions.”.
- 56.
Instead, recall that it is in some sense an attribute of motion and relation (200a3–4).
- 57.
καὶ ἔστιν ὁ τόπος καὶ πού, οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ δέ, ἀλλ’ ὡς τὸ πέρας ἐν τῷ πεπερασμένῳ. Οὐ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ὂν ἐν τόπῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ κινητὸν σῶμα.
- 58.
καὶ γὰρ τὸ μέρος, τὸ δὲ ἐν [τῷ] τόπῳ ὡς διαιρετὸν μέρος πρὸς ὅλον ἐστίν, οἷον ὅταν ὕδατος κινήσῃ τις μόριον ἢ ἀέρος. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἀὴρ ἔχει πρὸς ὕδωρ.
- 59.
οἷον ὕλη γάρ, τὸ δὲ εἶδος, τὸ μὲν ὕδωρ ὕλη ἀέρος, ὁ δ’ ἀὴρ οἷον ἐνέργειά τις ἐκείνου· τὸ γὰρ ὕδωρ δυνάμει ἀήρ ἐστιν, ὁ δ’ ἀὴρ δυνάμει ὕδωρ ἄλλον τρόπον…ἀσαφῶς δὲ νῦν ῥηθὲν τότ’ ἔσται σαφέστερον. εἰ οὖν τὸ αὐτὸ [ἡ] ὕλη καὶ ἐντελέχεια (ὕδωρ γὰρ ἄμφω, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν δυνάμει τὸ δ’ ἐντελεχείᾳ), ἔχοι ἂν ὡς μόριόν πως πρὸς ὅλον. διὸ καὶ τούτοις ἁφὴ ἔστιν· σύμφυσις δέ, ὅταν ἄμφω ἐνεργείᾳ ἓν γένωνται.
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(cf ἐκ δὴ τῶν εἰρημένων φανερὸν ὡς οὔτ’ ἀποκεκριμένον κενὸν ἔστιν, οὔθ’ ἁπλῶς οὔτ’ ἐν τῷ μανῷ, οὔτε δυνάμει, εἰ μή τις βούλεται πάντως καλεῖν κενὸν τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ φέρεσθαι).
- 61.
Coope (2008, 57 n22) does not seem to recognize the sense in which void can exist potentially. She asserts without argument that void does not exist for Aristotle and refers her reader to the treatise on void.
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Harry, C.C. (2015). Time in Context. In: Chronos in Aristotle’s Physics. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17834-9_1
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