Abstract
This chapter focuses on the curation of cognitive niches understood as the curation of eco-cognitive chances: as chances can be faked, it seems intuitive to think that the inhibition of chance-faking contexts is a good activity of chance curation. Yet, could this activity sometimes be counterproductive? The question will be answered positively considering the case of bullshit as a case of fake chances, but also as a fertile ground for learning and developing intuitions. Ultimately, this chapter will argue that the peculiar context, that is the cognitive niche supporting the (potentially) fake chances, is the discriminating factor: indeed, a rich cognitive niche may benefit from certain kind of fake chances—which should therefore not be inhibited—whereas a poorer niche might not benefit from this situation, and therefore the preclusion of fake chances is an act of chance curation in those contexts.
Parts of this chapter were originally published in L. Magnani, T. Bertolotti (2013). Selecting chance curation strategies: Is chance curation related to the richness of a cognitive niche? International Journal of Knowledge and Systems Science vol 4(1) (pp. 50–61). Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
This point is all the more interesting considering that Frankfurt ’s proposal was indeed received by curat ors of certain kind of cognitive niches as a curat ion manual (Perla and Carifio 2007).
- 2.
A full illustration of the various negative and positive cognitive role of fallacies is given in Magnani (2009, Chap. 7). Fallacies are a highly relevant topic in eco-cognitive epistemology and therefore mentioned several times along this book: in particular, they had a crucial theoretical role when exploring linguistic camouflage and those strategies aimed at its debunking (Sect. 2.4).
- 3.
Sustainers of the New Atheists, sociobiologists and cognitive scientists of religion will probably deem the last two paragraphs to be quite an oversimplification. It is probably so, but as I stated the intention here is not to exhaustively eviscerate the matter (which will be the object of a dedicated study in the near future), but just to point out how—as for chance discovery and chance curat ion—religion does pose a similar riddle to bullshit . A more complete analysis of religion, from an epistemological and pragmatic perspective, will be the object of Part III.
- 4.
As stated earlier, bullshit ing is not to be confused with intentional lying.
References
Abe A (2009) Cognitive chance discovery. In: Stephanidis C (ed) Universal access in HCI, part I, HCII2009. LNCS, vol 5614. Springer, Berlin, pp 315–323
Abe A (2010) Curation in chance discovery. In: 2010 IEEE international conference on data mining workshops. IEEE, pp 793–799
Adams R, Girard R (1993) Violence, difference, sacrifice: a conversation with René Girard. Relig Lit 25:9–33
Atran S (2002) In gods we trust: the evolutionary landscape of religion. Oxford University Press, Cambridge
Bulbulia J (2009) Religiosity as mental time-travel. In: Schloss J, Murray MJ (eds) The believing primate. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 44–75
Csikszentmihalyi M (1996) Creativity, flow and the psychology of discovery and invention. Harper-Collins, New York
Dawkins R (ed) (2006) The god delusion. Transworld Publishers, London
Dennett D (2006) Breaking the spell. Viking, New York
Frankfurt H (2005) On bullshit. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Jackson S (2008) Black box arguments. Argumentation 22:437–446
Magnani L (2005) Chance discovery and the disembodiment of mind. In: Oehlmann R, Abe A, Ohsawa Y (eds) Proceedings of the workshop on chance discovery: from data interaction to scenario creation, international conference on machine learning (ICML 2005), pp 53–59
Magnani L (2009) Abductive cognition: the epistemological and eco-cognitive dimensions of hypothetical reasoning. Springer, Berlin
Magnani L (2011) Understanding violence. Morality, religion and violence intertwined: a philosophical stance. Springer, Berlin
Magnani L, Bardone E (2008) Sharing representations and creating chances through cognitive niche construction. The role of affordances and abduction. In: Iwata S, Oshawa Y, Tsumoto S, Zhong N, Shi Y, Magnani L (eds) Communications and discoveries from multidisciplinary data. Springer, Berlin, pp 3–40
Magnani L, Bardone E (2010) Faking chance. Cognitive niche impoverishment. In: Setchi R, Jordanov I, Howlett RJ, Jain LC et al (eds) KES 2010, part III. Springer, Berlin
Misak C (2008) Pragmatism and solidarity, bullshit, and other deformities of truth. Midwest Stud Philoso 32:111–121
Oshawa Y, McBurney P (eds) (2003) Chance discovery. Springer, Berlin
Peirce CS (1931–1958) Collected papers of charles sanders peirce. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, vols. 1–6, Hartshorne, C. and Weiss, P., eds.; vols. 7–8, Burks, A. W., ed
Perla RJ, Carifio J (2007) Psychological, philosophical, and educational criticisms of Harry Frankfurt’s concept of and views about“bullshit”in human discourse, discussions, and exchanges. Interchange 38(2):119–136
Schunk D (2004) Learning theories: an educational perspective. Prentice-Hall, New York
Simon H (1993) Altruism and economics. Am Econ Rev 83(2):156–161
Thomas HJ (1999) Are theories of imagery theories of imagination? An active perception approach to conscious mental content. Cogn Sci 23(2):207–245
Thompson P (2007) Deception as a semantic attack. In: Kott A, McEneaney W (eds) Adversarial reasoning: computational approaches to reading the opponent’s mind. Chapman & Hall/CRC, pp 125–144
Vrij A (2008) Detecting lies and deceit pitfalls and opportunities. Wiley, New York
Wilson DS (2002) Darwin’s Cathedral. Chicago University Press, Chicago and London
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Bertolotti, T. (2015). Curating the Richness of Cognitive Niches. In: Patterns of Rationality. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 19. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17786-1_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17786-1_6
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-17785-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-17786-1
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)