Advertisement

Mind in Action and the Problem of Realism

  • Pentti Määttänen
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics book series (SAPERE, volume 18)

Abstract

Realism can roughly be defined as a view according to which we can get objective knowledge about the mind-independent real world, while antirealism maintains that we cannot have access to reality because all knowledge depends on internal conditions like conceptual resources. What this debate comes to concern depends, of course, on what one means by the central concepts like mind-independence . What it ultimately means depends, of course, on the definition of mind . Mind as a property of organism environment interaction leads to the notion of embodied epistemic truth as correspondence with an operational fit.

Keywords

Objective Knowledge Bodily Organ Everyday Object Epistemic Access Ideal Limit 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. Azzouni, J. (1997). Thick epistemic access: Distinguishing the mathematical from the empirical. The Journal of Philosophy, 94, 472–484.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Azzouni, J. (2004). Theory observation and scientific realism. The British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, 55, 371–392.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Baird, D. (2004). Thing knowledge: A philosophy of scientific instruments. London: University of California Press.Google Scholar
  4. Dewey, J. (LW 4) (1984). The quest for certainty. In J. A. Boydston (ed.), The later works 4. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University press.Google Scholar
  5. Ihde, D. (1979). Technics and Praxis. Dordrecht: Reidel.Google Scholar
  6. Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
  7. Niiniluoto, I. (1999). Critical scientific realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  8. Niiniluoto, I. (2014). Scientific realism: Independence, causation, and abduction. In K. R. Westphal (ed.), Realism, science, and pragmatism (pp. 159–172). New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  9. Psillos, S. (2000). The present state of the scientific realism debate. The British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, 51, 705–728.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Rosenthal, S. (2003). The pragmatic reconstruction of realism: A pathway for the future. In J. Shook (ed.) Pragmatic naturalism & realism (pp. 43–53). Aamherst: Prometheus Books.Google Scholar
  11. Shook, J. (2003). A pragmatically realist philosophy of science. In J. Shook (ed.), Pragmatic naturalism & realism (pp. 323–344). Aamherst: Prometheus Books.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art StudiesUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland

Personalised recommendations