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Experience and the Object of Knowledge

  • Pentti Määttänen
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics book series (SAPERE, volume 18)

Abstract

The Cartesian conception of mind is based on the dichotomy of external and internal, which, in its turn, is closely related to the classical conception of experience. Therefore, a consistent redefinition of mind in pragmatism requires a revision of the notion of experience formulated by early modern philosophers. The hidden causes of perceptions are replaced by the relation between two experienced situations mediated by habitual action or controlled operations.

Keywords

Objective Condition External World Classical Tradition Phenomenal Quality Classical View 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art StudiesUniversity of HelsinkiHelsinkiFinland

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