Skip to main content

Philosophical Naturalism

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Mind in Action

Part of the book series: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics ((SAPERE,volume 18))

  • 1305 Accesses

Abstract

The general philosophical framework of this book is philosophical naturalism. However, naturalism can be characterized in different ways that are not compatible with each other. It is argued that John Dewey’s soft naturalism, which maintains that culture is a product of nature, is to be preferred to hard naturalism, which appeals to natural science.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Bennett, M., & Hacker, P. (2003). Philosophical foundations of neuroscience. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cahoone, L. (2013). Orders of nature. Albany: SUNY Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dewey, J. (LW 4) (1984). The quest for certainty. In J. A. Boydston (ed.), The later works 4. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dewey, J. (LW 12) (1938/1986). Logic: The theory of inquiry. In J. A. Boydston (ed.), The later works 12. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dewey, J. (1988). Theory of valuation. In J. A. Boydston (ed.), The later works 13 (pp. 191–250). Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Donald, M. (2002). A mind so rare. The evolution of human consciousness. New York: Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hume, D. (1975). Enquiries concerning human understanding and concerning principles of morals. In L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hume, D. (1978). A treatise of human nature. In L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Knowles, J. (2014). Naturalism without metaphysics. In K. R. Westphal (ed.), Realism, science, and pragmatism (pp. 200–218). New York, London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Krueger, J. (2006). James on experience and the extended mind. In J. Shook & P. Ghiraldelli (eds.), Contemporary pragmatism 3:1 (pp. 165–176). Amsterdam: Rodopi.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lakoff, G., & Núñes, R. (2000). Where mathematics comes from how the embodied mind brings mathematics into being. New York: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Määttänen, P. (2006). Naturalism: Hard and soft. In H. J. Koskinen, S. Pihlström, R. Vilkko, & P. Lang (eds.), Science—a Challenge to Philosophy? Proceedings of the xv Internordic Philosophical Symposium, Helsinki, May 13–15, 2004 (pp. 227–236). Frankfurt am Main.

    Google Scholar 

  • Popp, J. (2007). Evolution’s first philosopher: John Dewey and the continuity of nature. Ithaca: SUNY Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V. O. (1960). Word and object. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V. O. (1969). Ontological relativity and other essays. New York: Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V. O. (1995). From stimulus to science. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rorty, R. (1980). Philosophy and the mirror of Nature. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rorty, R. (1997). Truth, politics and ‘post-modernism’. Assen: Van Gorcum.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rorty, R. (1999). Philosophy and social hope. London: Penguin Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenberg, A. (2014). Dissenchanted naturalism. In B. Bana & D. M. Hans (eds.), Contemporary philosophical naturalism and its implications (pp. 17–36). New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Solymosi, T. (2013). Neuropragmatism on the origins of conscious minding. In Swan (ed.), Origins of mind (pp. 273–287). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wittgenstein, L. (1956). Remarks on the foundations of mathematics. In G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees & G. E. M. Anscombe (eds.), Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Pentti Määttänen .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Määttänen, P. (2015). Philosophical Naturalism. In: Mind in Action. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 18. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17623-9_1

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics