Abstract
This epistemological introduction elucidates the methodological principles of mainstream economics, including new classical macroeconomics, as a special way of seeing the world. Its chosen and declared theoretical ground is the Crisis by Edmund Husserl. Starting from here, it is examined whether mainstream economics appearing as a pure theory can be considered as relevant to the real (economic) world (or, using Husserl’s term life-world). It is argued that the relationship of mainstream economics and reality as such has drawn a special trajectory. Neoclassical theory separated their Weberian ideal-typical models and reality, while the positivist program of Friedman did not even raise this issue. In the end, new classical macroeconomics completely merged these two spheres into each other. It is problematic that while new classical macroeconomics intended to give a realistic and comprehensive picture of the real world, it maintains the strategy of neoclassical theory that has built itself as a pure theory. Above this line of enquiry, considerable amount of attention is paid to the common methodological roots of mainstream economics and Newtonian physics, in the course of which Platonism gets identified as the intellectual foundation that governed modern natural sciences as well as economics.
Truth emerges more readily from error than from confusion.
(Sir Francis Bacon)
There is something unchangeable in every man that […] cannot be altered even by the milieu and the course of time. The idea that lives within, that makes them human beings and personalities and that never changes
(Sándor Márai)
From the intrinsic evidence of his creation, the Great Architect of the Universe now begins to appear as a pure mathematician.
(James Jeans: The Mysterious Universe)
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Notes
- 1.
Moreover, in the course of an attempt to interpret this account, we could not avoid facing the fact that Kuhn’s model was not able to overwhelm the rivalling theories either in Kuhn’s own times or later. Relativism of Feyerabend, logical positivism of the Vienna Circle, falsificationism of Popper or the theory of Lakatos (who opposed everyone and seemed to be a Popperian, while often corrected him) make together an intellectual environment in which Kuhn could hardly find supporters. For example, Bird (2009) highlights that there is and there was no characteristically Kuhnian school in scientific theory—mainly for Kuhn rejected the often radical theoretical developments joined his system.
- 2.
Broadly speaking, it well explains, firstly, why economics had been always constituted by a lot of competing theories and, secondly, why the emergence of a new theoretical account does not completely discredit the former systems. For example, economic developments in Japan during the 1990s could be clearly explained by the theory of Keynes (cf. e.g. Ozsvald and Pete 2003; Krugman 1998), while, at the same time, this theory and the economic policy recommendations made by Keynes somewhat faded away. It is also interesting that some authors wanted to base the after-2008 crisis management on the neoclassical paradigm founded by free market mechanisms (e.g. Erdős 2010), while international organizations urged a basically Keynesian solution (e.g. Blanchard 2008; Freedman et al. 2009; IMF 2009) and this reaction really seemed to be defendable on theoretical grounds (for further details see Galbács 2011a).
- 3.
At a point, Max Planck describes the paradigm shift as a special process (Planck 1933). According to him, a new paradigm does not gain ground so that the followers of the old framework gradually switch over—rather, a paradigm shift involves the exchange of the scientific elite; a new paradigm can only start reigning when believers of the prior framework gradually die off, in the literal sense. The emerging new generation is evidently open to a new conceptual system, to new theories and models. It has to be taken into account that mentioning Planck and the concept of paradigm side by side is anachronistic. Kuhn’s seminal work was published in 1962 for the first time and if the one and a half decades that were taken by the development of the Kuhnian conception are also considered, we are still a couple of years after Planck. Kuhn was only 11 years old when Planck talked about the scheme of succeeding scientific thoughts in his cited lecture.
- 4.
As Keynes (1936) stresses it at the head of his General theory, the failure of neoclassical economics was caused by the fact that its postulates do not hold in reality, so economists cannot realize those socio-economic problems (involuntary unemployment, partial equilibriums) that are ruled out of their theory on conceptual grounds. Keynes, as it seems, was aware of that neoclassical economics is a pure theory (the term “pure theory” was actually used by Keynes himself in the General theory), that is to say, its postulates are not false in themselves, but may not be relevant occasionally as far as economic reality is concerned. Keynes, I think, neglected to highlight it for he wanted to deal neoclassical theory an annihilating blow at a verbal level and in terms of operative economic policy, and any efforts to find excuses would have implied arguments for underpinning neoclassical economics. Of course, it does not invalidate the details that will be said in Chap. 7 about the complementing relation between Keynes and neoclassical economics.
- 5.
The list of the theories aimed at confronting neoclassical economics is far from being complete. In his specification, Prof. Móczár (2010) mentions a number of related developments–however, these are experimental achievements in part, so the complementing relation mentioned with regard to experimental economics above applies to them as well. Only DSM-theorem (referred to as SMD-theory sometimes) can be regarded as really disturbing, but it rather concentrates on the contradicting relationship between micro- and macroeconomics and not on the (micro-level) postulates of pure neoclassical economics to question them. However, it would be a huge mistake to play down the significance of the DSM-theorem (named after the elaborators, Gérard Debreu, Rolf Ricardo Mantel, and Hugo Freund Sonnenschein), since, eventually, it questions the justification of the microfoundations of macroeconomics. The fundamental problem was posed by the relationship between individual and aggregate excess demand functions. As aggregate-level excess demand functions are important for macroeconomics, huge efforts were made to ground these functions on a micro-level. The seminal papers on this topic (Sonnenschein 1972, 1973; Mantel 1973; Debreu 1974) called attention to the fact that however precise we are in specifying the micro-level characteristics, the excess demand function for an economy is not restricted at all by these features. A consequence of the mathematical demonstration of the DSM-theorem was that the general equilibrium of a multi-market macro-system is not necessarily unique (the lack of uniqueness), i.e., we can find multiple price vectors that guarantee equilibrium and the emerging equilibrium states may be unstable in dynamic terms (Giraud 2009). The critique formulized by the DSM-theorem did not lack precursors: for instance, Scarf (1960) reported prices oscillating without any convergence towards the equilibrating vector under various conditions in simple general equilibrium models. According to Móczár (2006), it seems as if DSM-theorem could have dealt mainstream economic theory a final and destroying blow. The relation of mainstream economics to DSM-theorem is portrayed well by the Handbook of Monetary Economics (B. Friedman and Hahn 1990), in which the achievements underlying the theorem were not mentioned even in the References. Mainstream economics disregarded DSM-theorem (Nachane 2010; Rizvi 1994) the same as the inconsistency from the quantity theory and Walras’ law (for further details see Chap. 3 below; cf. Patinkin 1989). Frank Hahn (1975) was one of the few who regarded DSM-theorem as the most dangerous critique of mainstream economics. It is understandable somehow, if we consider that the object of the critique, viz. mainstream economics, is an economic theory—while DSM-theorem (however impressive it is) is a mathematical demonstration. Even if we admit that the mathematical grounds of mainstream economic theory are wrong in some respects, the theory was still successful in resolving a lot of economic problems–while DSM-theorem could hardly support us in such a context. The prevailing paradigm is not required to be perfect at all but only to give solutions to several scientific problems. After all, mainstream theory performed well in these terms, and it is also sure that DSM-theorem is never going to help us (say) establish the theoretical grounds for the best operative monetary policy or finding the ultimate causes of cyclical fluctuations to found countercyclical economic policies. Moreover, it is not the possibility of multiple equilibriums that is highly problematic among the consequences of the DSM-theorem but the instability of these equilibrium states, since the latter can ruin the conviction of mainstream economics as to stable general equilibriums. As far as the possibility of multiple equilibriums is considered, it is worth remembering the mechanisms of ecological systems that can resist shocks within certain limits (equilibrium is stable), while, in case of a significant external impact, the ecosystem moves into another stable equilibrium with some changes in the main system-level characteristics (e.g. species composition, abundance—cf. e.g. Békés 2002; Bartha 2008; Mäler 2008). This feature is described by resilience, i.e. the capacity of flexible adaptation, extended recently to cover the functioning of socio-economic systems as well (e.g. Adger 2000; Noya and Clarence 2009). In the case of mainstream economics, the key doctrine is not the uniqueness but the stability of equilibrium.
- 6.
At a place, the complementing relation between experimental economics and mainstream theory is underlined by Vernon Smith (1991) as well.
- 7.
The Friedmanian wing of monetarism shall be referred to as orthodox monetarism below.
- 8.
This issue shall get special importance apropos of the orthodox monetarist and new classical interpretations of the Phillips curve, since, as we will see, economic policy can mainly decrease unemployment by deceiving employees. It is doubtful that if this is the only way of reducing unemployment then this economic policy action really serves the interest of market agents, and, moreover, there can be found a social group in society that is better off by this intervention. It can raise one’s doubts that an actual fall in real wages temporarily unknown to the employees is rather beneficial to the employers.
- 9.
For instance, Feinberg (1973), following in the Millian tradition, argues that paternalism is only justified when an actor not knowing anything about the consequences of his action would do harm to himself without a paternalist intervention–or the voluntariness of action should be questioned for some other reasons. A consequence almost naturally arises: an individual having a passion for hedonistic pleasures could hardly be prevented from gratifying these desires through legal measures if his decision is deliberate and voluntary and if his amusements do not concern others. However, Bretter (2004) demonstrates this seemingly loose interpretation to be underlain by a (perhaps too optimistic) view about individual’s awareness and responsibility. Mill dares leave men to free will for they internalized such social values through the socialisation process that protect them from extreme and self-destructing instincts. So, any paternalist tendencies in law should be highly restricted, since they are completely redundant in addition to individuals’ wisdom and awareness.
- 10.
Hayek (1988) discusses this realization in a very special way, viz. as the fact of the natural selection of societies relying on free market mechanisms.
- 11.
This finding almost directly echoes Mill’s standpoint as to the relation between individual rationality and paternalism.
- 12.
The notion of “high theory” is mentioned often in this work. We could attempt to give a direct definition, however, it seems better to put light on the very nature of this concept through an analogy. As an example from the literary history, the opposition of populist trash and high literature may be remembered. The only goal of trash going back even to verse-chronicles was always simple entertainment, so it was marked by a systematic and deliberate shallowing process—however, this cheapness and simplicity was not a result of an inability to create something better. Trash voluntarily does not want to reach higher regions (that is, to be of a higher level, more tasteful, complex and sophisticated). In this case, populism becomes a value in itself (cf. Gergő 1930). The relationship of high theory to its opponent can be characterized similarly–that can be labelled, say, as vulgarized theory. On this occasion, we must be satisfied only with a few characteristic features suggested. It seems that the goal of vulgarized theory is to be simple, popular and plain, while crowding out every other possible purposes (for example, the desire to get acquainted with reality). The textbook models can be mentioned as parts of a vulgarized theory that dominate higher education—however, nobody believes (nowadays) that they can give an accurate description of processes observed in reality. Their success should be explained on didactical grounds. Moreover, the ad hoc models and theories based on mere empirical experiences and tendencies are standing on the same side as well: researchers try to find a theoretical foundation for their equations specified in some way or other (perhaps, falsely). So, confusing the causal relations is an existing danger, and catching the right theoretical explanation can be completely missing. On this issue, there are views according to which applied economics remains intact by high theory researches (Horváth and Szilágyi 2004). The things said above cannot be regarded as an accurate definition–we just surveyed this issue in a hurry.
- 13.
This is the very reason why Wicksell’s theory is hot even today. For example, recent bank privatization makes a central bank control over the monetary base almost impossible. This development had serious consequences on the economic growth of Hungary and the other new EU member states of 2004. The lesson is not more than commercial banks in two-tier banking systems, getting out of the tight control of the central bank, can generate serious pressures by giving excessive amounts of credit to market agents. It seems that Wicksell was among the first economists warning us of its dangerous effects. On the distorted patterns of the growth of the new member states see Csaba (2008).
- 14.
It should be mentioned here that it is quite difficult to distinguish between the mechanisms of fiscal and monetary policy in the theory of Friedman. These problems become extremely concrete when monetary expansion is realized by creating money.
- 15.
Frank Hahn (1984) makes it unambiguous by dropping a few short hints that a strong relationship exists between neoclassical and mainstream economics.
- 16.
The two-volumed Hungarian edition of Husserl’s crisis essay was used when writing this methodological introduction. The first volume (Husserl 1998a) contains the main text, while the second (Husserl 1998b) includes the comments published in the first German edition (1962) plus an editorial epilogue to support the reader in interpreting the Crises and in reviewing the life-work of Husserl (Mezei 1998).
- 17.
For example, Bungard (1997) stresses that, during laboratory experiments, we can observe at most how individuals behave in an artificial environment; moreover, it also has to be taken into account that individuals make efforts to find out the purpose of the experiment and to behave accordingly (or even contrary, on purpose).
- 18.
Phenomenology as a theory of science should not be discussed in such an oversimplifying and brief way at all–this short and striking allusion is not intended to substitute for a systematic introduction.
- 19.
- 20.
In this context, two circumstances need to be suggested. Firstly, Husserl did not object abstract sciences in themselves, only when they replaced the directly experienced reality by the world they created. An axiomatic-deductive pure economic theory grounded in abstraction cannot be condemned even by Husserl himself as long as it clarifies its relation to directly experienced reality and refrains from merging these spheres into each other. Secondly, for Husserl, the right and effective answer to the objections against these trying-to-merge abstract sciences is not made by experimental disciplines (the laboratory environment of which is abstract and far from reality again) but by phenomenological sciences.
- 21.
Of course, this concept of motion is more abstract than motion in its mechanical sense. The philosophical thesis that motion is an inalienable feature of matter (that features all kinds of manifestations of matter) applies to both quantitative and qualitative changes of matter. All this does not alter the view that quality changes go back to quantitative modifications.
- 22.
At the quoted place Walras defines pure economics as “the theory of the determination of prices under a hypothetical régime of perfectly free competition.”
- 23.
The following rows are especially typical and squealing: “The concept of general equilibrium refers not to the existence of an unstable and instantaneous equilibrium, but to the abilities of an economy that plays of forces point towards an equilibrium state (as a resultant of individual actions, on parts of the market and in the entire economy) due to self-regulating mechanisms of market itself. Market relations are characterized by stability.” (Kopányi 2003)
- 24.
According to Walras “We have, perhaps, at last reached the place where we can see the importance of a scientific formulation of pure economics. From the viewpoint of pure science, all that we needed to do, and all that we actually have done up to the present, was to treat free competition as a datum, or rather as an hypothesis, for it did not matter whether or not we observed it in the real world, since, strictly speaking, it was sufficient that we should be able to form a conception of it. It was in this light that we studied the nature, causes and consequences of free competition.” Marshall highlights that “the laws of economics […] are statements as to the effects which will be produced by certain causes […] subject to the condition that other things are equal, and that the causes are able to work out their effects undisturbed. On this account it has been called a hypothetical science […]. […] Almost every scientific doctrine […] will be found to contain some proviso to the effect that other things are equal […]. […] These conditioning clauses are not continually repeated, but […] in economics it is necessary to repeat them oftener than elsewhere […].” (italics in original)
- 25.
As an outlying parallel, we can remember Italo Calvino’s allegory of the nonexistent knight (Calvino 1962), whose strange behaviour governed by ice-cold rationality is infinitely far from the contingencies of everyday life.
- 26.
Although sociology and psychology have different man concepts, they are not radically different after all. Sociology is ready to rely on the explanatory power of both social and individual psychological factors. It is highly characteristic for theories of deviance (cf. e.g. Andorka 1997).
- 27.
It is interesting that homo politicus can be found in the literature as well as in a completely different interpretation. According to this notion also having roots in political science and political philosophy, homo politicus concentrates on justice and social well-being (Faber et al. 2002). Man, being rational as a consumer, has a further utility function, that is determined by the state and conditions of society–accordingly, the utility realized by homo oeconomicus is dependent on his own, while that of homo politicus turns on social well-being (cf. Nyborg 2000). However, this reasoning definitely clarifies the fact that man concepts of different social sciences always try to grasp only certain aspects and not the totality of human behaviour.
- 28.
Simmel (1900) keeps listing scientific man concepts. Of course, these conceptions should not be confused with those trendy concepts proliferating in enormous quantities that, instead of idealization, summarize briefly some characteristics of human behaviour and translate them into Latin in order to appear as highly scientific. Recently, we could talk about homo cyber sapiens (that is, the man who can extend his biologically determined intelligence thanks to new technologies; cf. Steels 1995), or homo creativus (who is simply creative; cf. Inkinen 2009).
- 29.
Although it may seem that abstraction is a simple and obvious action, it is not true anyway. When a researcher looks for the essence of something and abstracts from all the inessential elements in order to find it, there exists a danger that he abstracts from something relevant as well (he throws out the baby with the bathwater). It looks that neoclassical economics also committed the same error sometimes. For example, Say’s law is based on a special concept of money, since it is needed to abstract from using money as a store of wealth in order to hold the law. This is one of the main weaknesses of the neoclassical theory that were highlighted by Keynes. If we start from money that can be stored as well and used not only for the transaction of current business, then the possibility of overproduction crises immediately emerges. An abstraction resulting in such a concept of money is questionable at least, since it is at stake that whether crises and considerable recessions should be regarded as minor and dysfunctional episodes, as occasional fluctuations or as fundamental characteristics of the capitalist socio-economic system. Grabbing the essence is not a simple and evident cognitive act at all and results in faiths that, though referring to reality, cannot be rationally confirmed (Polanyi 1964; 1966). This is the same controversy that has been held by equilibrium economists against their disequilibrium counterparts (and vice versa) on the elements and consequences of their theories for generations. Since their approaches as a whole are based on faiths in equilibrium-disequilibrium, this controversy remains desperately unwinnable. Probably this unwinnableness explains how these two schools (i.e. equilibrium and disequilibrium economics) could survive and even get closer to each other despite their antagonism between fundamental assumptions. So, it is a fairly ambitious and, perhaps, an evidently hopeless undertaking to find the objective substance. For example, Max Weber could totally evade the problem of the objectivity of abstraction, since, though he also applied this cognitive technique when creating his ideal-types, he did not attribute any real-objective existence to these theoretical constructs (we will return to this issue below).
- 30.
In connection with Lucas’ island models and agent-based models, we shall see that this abstraction technique is fraught with danger in the case of, say, creating a society from abstract agents presupposed to be infinitely far from reality. In such a case, economists examine the alleged social actions of dissocialized beings, so they may gain definitely distorted results and conclusions. Analyzing these results requires special caution and self-discipline from the researcher (at a place, it was also suggested by Galbraith 1973 in a quite implicit manner).
- 31.
Today, the consistency of assumptions with reality is not a predominant scientific requirement (cf. Hawking 1988). Moreover, one can read it at numerous places in the literature that dissecting this consistency is even a nonsense problem (Hawking 1993). Scientists often use the heuristic techniques (see Kahneman 2011) that the most simple assumption of the possible postulates is always the nearest to reality.
- 32.
Weber made an express criticism against neoclassical economics for its epistemological specialities (for a brilliant summary see Csontos 1993). However, this critique was ambiguous. While Weber could superbly grasp the main features (the essence) of the methodology of economic theory, his commentaries were confined to calling economics to account for the methodological aspirations of another discipline, i.e. his own sociology. Indeed, this is not a sharp critique as all similar critiques are so, since in such cases one confronts a discipline with the methodology and strategy of another science (that is preferred by him). Moreover, this demarcation can explain well why economics tends to forget about Weber who was regarded previously as an insider (cf. Tribe 2006). Probably, neither of the sides (i.e. Weber himself and mainstream economics then taking its form) realized that, in spite of evident and fundamental discrepancies, there are a lot of epistemological resemblances.
- 33.
Even if some authors comment his conceptualizing efforts ambiguously. At a place, Attila Molnár (1999), one of the leading researchers of Weber in Hungary, illustrates Weber’s ideal-types through the parable of the wheel (as a physical object) and the circle (as an Idea). This is not a wise choice at all, since the circle as an Idea is an objectively existing thing, and one can easily draw the conclusion from this (even if Molnár finds an excuse for his decision) that Weber tried to create such concepts through his methodology.
- 34.
Referring back to the critique of cardinal utility theory: actual people have the ability to link real numbers to consumption bundles in terms of the utility realized, they just do not necessarily do it (since, say, it is exhausting or boring). However, the law of diminishing marginal utility can be still explicated quite well by the abstraction based on it–so, cardinal utility theory is not more than an abstraction-based model.
- 35.
- 36.
In Walras’ terms, continuing the former part: “Hence free competition becomes a principle or a rule of practical significance, so that it only remains to extend the detailed application of this rule to agriculture, industry and trade. Thus the conclusions of pure science bring us to the very threshold of applied science.”
- 37.
This statement, however, seems to be dubious when one considers Lucas’ (1980) words, according to which “a ‘theory’ is not a collection of assertion about the behaviour of the actual economy but rather an explicit set of instructions for building a parallel or analogue system – a mechanical, imitation economy. A ‘good’ model, from this point of view, will not be exactly more ‘real’ than a poor one, but will provide better imitations.” As Morgan and Knuuttila (2012) emphasize, artificial world models of Lucas are constructed to represent the outputs and not the behaviour of a system. Although the aspect mentioned by Weeks (i.e. comparing new classical theory with reality) remains a relevant principle throughout this analysis, it is argued below that new classical models and REH are pure, idealization-based theoretical constructions which cannot be expected to give a comprehensive description of reality. Of course, it has to be noted here that new classical macroeconomics and REH are far more than the theory of Lucas (and Sargent, Wallace or Barro). For instance, the intention to specify the actual behaviour of market agents is attributed to Shaw (1984) by Weeks, rather then to Lucas. New classical macroeconomics is a populous and heterogeneous camp.
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Galbács, P. (2015). Methodological Principles and an Epistemological Introduction. In: The Theory of New Classical Macroeconomics. Contributions to Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17578-2_1
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