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Expanding an Operating System’s Working Space with a New Mode to Support Trust Measurement

  • Chenglong WeiEmail author
  • Wenchang Shi
  • Bo Qin
  • Bin Liang
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9065)

Abstract

Integrity measurement for Operating Systems (OS) is of practical significance. To make a measurement trustworthy, it is essential to protect the Integrity Measurement Mechanisms (IMM). However, much is still to be done to this end. This paper tries to take a step forward to shoot the target. Firstly, it puts forward the concept of trust mode, which expands the working space of an OS from two-mode, consisting of user mode and kernel mode, to tri-mode, consisting of user mode, kernel mode and trust mode. The trust mode is of the highest privilege level, in which the Core Measurement Mechanism (CMM) of an OS is executed. The CMM is in charge of measuring the IMM, which is running in kernel mode. Even if the OS kernel is compromised, the CMM would work normally without interference. Then, the paper proposes an approach to building the trust mode. It also develops a prototype to implement the trust mode by fully utilizing potentialities of modern hardware.

Keywords

Tri-mode Operating System Trust Mode Integrity Measurement Mechanism Protection Hardware Virtualization Code Measurement 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Chenglong Wei
    • 1
    Email author
  • Wenchang Shi
    • 1
  • Bo Qin
    • 1
  • Bin Liang
    • 1
  1. 1.School of InformationRenmin University of ChinaBeijingChina

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