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Unifying Leakage Classes: Simulatable Leakage and Pseudoentropy

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Information Theoretic Security (ICITS 2015)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9063))

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Abstract

Leakage resilient cryptography designs systems to withstand partial adversary knowledge of secret state. Ideally, leakage-resilient systems withstand current and future attacks; restoring confidence in the security of implemented cryptographic systems. Understanding the relation between classes of leakage functions is an important aspect.

In this work, we consider the memory leakage model, where the leakage class contains functions over the system’s entire secret state. Standard limitations include functions with bounded output length, functions that retain (pseudo) entropy in the secret, and functions that leave the secret computationally unpredictable.

Standaert, Pereira, and Yu (Crypto, 2013) introduced a new class of leakage functions they call simulatable leakage. A leakage function is simulatable if a simulator can produce indistinguishable leakage without access to the true secret state. We extend their notion to general applications and consider two versions. For weak simulatability: the simulated leakage must be indistinguishable from the true leakage in the presence of public information. For strong simulatability, this requirement must also hold when the distinguisher has access to the true secret state. We show the following:

  • Weakly simulatable functions retain computational unpredictability.

  • Strongly simulatability functions retain pseudoentropy.

  • There are bounded length functions that are not weakly simulatable.

  • There are weakly simulatable functions that remove pseudoentropy.

  • There are leakage functions that retain computational unpredictability are not weakly simulatable.

The Lincoln Laboratory portion of this work was sponsored by the Department of the Air Force under Air Force Contract #FA8721-05-C-0002. Opinions, interpretations, conclusions and recommendations are those of the author and are not necessarily endorsed by the United States Government.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Boston University, 244 Wood Street, Lexington, MA, 02420, USA

    Benjamin Fuller

  2. MIT Lincoln Laboratory, One Silber Way, Boston, MA, 02215, USA

    Benjamin Fuller & Ariel Hamlin

Authors
  1. Benjamin Fuller
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  2. Ariel Hamlin
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. IBM Research Zurich, Rüschlikon, Switzerland

    Anja Lehmann

  2. Università della Svizzera italiana (USI), Lugano, Switzerland

    Stefan Wolf

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Fuller, B., Hamlin, A. (2015). Unifying Leakage Classes: Simulatable Leakage and Pseudoentropy. In: Lehmann, A., Wolf, S. (eds) Information Theoretic Security. ICITS 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9063. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17470-9_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17470-9_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-17469-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-17470-9

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