Abstract
In Sect. 1.1 I discuss the main concepts and hypotheses introduced in Content and Consciousness. In Sect. 1.2 I sketch the context of interdisciplinary research surrounding Content and Consciousness’s birth. Finally, in Sect. 1.3, I introduce the chapters of this volume.
The very same tree that Tommy could not climb last year is climbed by him this year because his legs and arms are longer. So, not indeed the tree, but his task has changed. Thus too the thinker, the converser or the fencer is himself, in some measure, a once-only factor in his own once-only situations. It would be absurd to command him ‘Think again exactly what you thought last time’; ‘Repeat without any change at all your experiment of last time’. The command itself would be a fresh influence. To obey it would be disobey it.
-RYLE, G. 1969: 130-
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Notes
- 1.
Most references to C&C will be solely indicated with the page numbers from the 1986 edition (Dennett 1986). When context requires it the page numbers will appear following ‘C&C:’.
- 2.
Accordingly Dennett claimed: “The first step in finding solutions to the problems of mind is to set aside ontological predilections and consider instead the relation between the mode of discourse in which we speak of persons and the mode of discourse in which we speak of bodies and other physical objects” (189).
- 3.
“Non-referential words and phrases are then those which are highly dependent on certain restricted contexts, in particular cannot appear properly in identity contexts and concomitantly have no ontic force or significance. That is, their occurrence embedded in an asserted sentence never commits the asserter to the existence of any entities presumed denoted or named or referred to by the term” (14).
- 4.
For a detailed discussion of this view, see Uttal 2003.
- 5.
In this vein, Dennett claimed: “[f]or the super-abstemious behaviorist who will not permit himself to speak even of intelligence (that being too ‘mentalistic’ for him) we can say, with Hull, that a primary task of psychology ‘is to understand… why… behavior… is so generally adaptive, i.e., successful in the sense of reducing needs and facilitating survival…’ ” (Dennett 1981b: 72).
- 6.
For instance: ‘I believe in ghosts since I have seen them’, ‘she raised her arm because she wanted to ask a question’ and ‘his belief in the bogeyman prompted her to look at inside the closet.’
- 7.
Although “[i]ntentional explanations explain a bit of behavior, an action, or a stretch of inaction, by making it reasonable in the light of certain beliefs, intentions, desires ascribed to the agent” (Dennett 1981c: 236).
- 8.
An expression is ‘non-referential’ not due to its having non-existent referents, like some philosophers claim about ‘unicorn’. By contrast, an expression is non-referential in case of being semantically embedded in sentences it appears. See: fn. #3, and C&C: 13, fn. #1.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
According to the notion of ‘intentional stance,’ some artificial devices and organisms would count as intentional systems only if they make intelligent use of information and their activities are intentionally rationalized. “Intentional explanations have the actions of persons as their primary domain, but there are times when we find intentional explanations (and predictions based on them) not only useful but indispensable for accounting for the behavior of complex machines” (Dennett 1981c: 236–237). See: Dennett (1981b: 80 and ff).
- 12.
- 13.
- 14.
See: fn # 17.
- 15.
According to C&C, a functional structure is “any bit of matter (e.g., wiring, plumbing, ropes and pulleys) that can be counted on – because of the laws of nature – to operate in a certain way when operated upon in a certain way […] A functional structure can break down – not by breaking laws of nature but by obeying them – or operate normally” (48). This notion applies to the behavioral control system of natural as well as of artificial systems, like computer programs. Here, as in several places in C&C, “the strength of the analogy between human behaviour and computer behaviour is […] a critical point” (45). Moreover, functional structures are compound afferent-efferent informational patterns that are realized by a multitude of “switching elements” (e.g., neurons) which have the capacity to propagate and stabilize informational and physical pathways (52, 54).
- 16.
It is worth-mentioning that Hebb (1949) introduced, from a biopsychological standpoint and a neurological talk, associated hypotheses about the relations between structural-functional brain changes and learning processes. Ross (see: fn. #4 in Chap. 2 of this volume) claims that Dennett knew Hebb’s work when he wrote C&C.
- 17.
Dennett claims:
[…] creatures have two environments, the outer environment in which they live, and an “inner” environment they carry around with them […] it is environmental effects that are the measure of adaptivity and the mainspring of learning, but the environment can delegate its selective function to something in the organism (just as death had earlier delegated its selective function to pain), and if it occurs, a more intelligent, flexible, organism is the result. (Dennett 1981b: 77, 78)
- 18.
Forty years after C&C, Dennett claimed that “[o]nce you get your head around [this idea], you see that this really is the way – probably, in the end, the only way – to eliminate the middleman, the all-too-knowing librarian or clerk or homunculus who manipulates the ideas or mental representations, sorting them by content” (Dennett 2008).
- 19.
According to Dennett:
We should reserve the term ‘intelligent storage’ for storage of information that is for the system itself, and not merely for the system’s users or creators. For information to be for a system, the system must have some use for the information, and hence the system must have needs. The criterion for intelligent storage is then the appropriateness of the resultant behaviour to the system’s needs given the stimulus conditions of the initial input and the environment in which the behaviour occurs. (46–47)
- 20.
It is worth mentioning that in C&C the embodied brain is characterized as endowed with (genetically transmitted) overruling pre-wired functional structures (62–63) giving rise to tropisms (like food-seeking) and action reflexes (71), as well as with the capacity to produce compound afferent-efferent functional structures which “could be ‘rebuilt’ piecemeal under certain conditions” (56).
- 21.
In the Chap. 8 of this volume Fridland argues that C&C advances the articulation of a framework involving a strong conceptual link between learning and intelligent storage and use of information.
- 22.
Dennett later claimed: “[in C&C] I scorned theories that replaced the little man in the brain with a committee. This was a big mistake, for this is just how one gets to ‘pay back’ the ‘intelligence loans’ of intentionalist theories” (Dennett 1981b: 81).
- 23.
The implicit link between each bit of Intentional interpretation and its extensional foundation is a hypothesis or series of hypotheses describing the evolutionary source of the fortuitously propitious arrangement in virtue of which the system’s operation in this instance makes sense. These hypotheses are required in principle to account for the appropriateness which is presupposed by the Intentional interpretation, but which requires a genealogy from the standpoint of the extensional, physical theory. (80. Italics mine)
- 24.
In this way, Dennett claims: “I certainly am not aware of […] neural activities, while I am aware of my thoughts […] in any event the content of the [neural] activities is not at all a discriminable characteristic of them […] but merely an artificial determination made by some observing neurologist” (107).
- 25.
In C&C ‘centralism’ is the closest label indicating the systematic set of ideas that later became the pillar of Dennett’s teleofunctionalism (see: 83–86).
- 26.
Three decades after C&C, Dennett proclaimed himself as “the original teleofunctionalist (in Content and Consciousness)” holding that he didn’t make “the mistake of trying to define all salient mental differences in terms of biological functions. That would be to misread Darwin badly” (1991: 460). Here Dennett seems to be making reference to Millikan’s teleosemantics (Millikan 1984). For some remarks about the difference between Dennett’s and Millikan’s works, see: Ross (2000: 11–12).
- 27.
The personal/sub-personal distinction has been widely discussed (see: Elton 2000; Hornsby 2000; Bermúdez 2000; Davies 2000). There’s agreement with respect to the seminal role that the distinction (and its reformulations) has(ve) played in philosophy of mind, cognitive science, cognitive psychology, and related fields. For critical reviews, see: Skidelsky (2006) and Drayson (2014). In this volume Frankish, Wilkinson, and Roth (Chaps. 4, 6, and 7 respectively) develop detailed accounts about the distinction. Hornsby (2000) claims that during the 1970s Dennett re-formulated the distinction introduced in C&C. Roth grants a similar view. See: Dennett (1987).
- 28.
For instance, in the case of the AI researcher: he “starts with an intentionally characterized problem (e.g., how do I get the computer to recognize questions, distinguish subjects from predicates, ignore irrelevant parsings?) and then breaks these problems down still further until finally he reaches problem or task descriptions that are obviously mechanistic” (Dennett 1981b: 80).
- 29.
- 30.
“A particular machine T is in logical state A if, and only if, it performs what the machine table specifies for logical state A, regardless of the physical state it is in” (102). Dennett’s neurocomputational account was clearly influenced by Putnam’s Turing-machine functionalism (Putnam 1967).
- 31.
The pictorial doctrine was widely endorsed by Modern philosophers, like Descartes, Locke, Hume, Berkeley, Reid, and Kant, and also by contemporary philosophers, like Russell, Meinong, and C. Lewis. During the 1960s, in experimental psychology, the doctrine was defended, e.g. see: by Shepard (1966), Bahrick and Boucher (1968), and Bugelski (1968).
- 32.
“Kaninchen und Ente” (“Rabbit and Duck”). In Fliegende Blätter, (Oct. 23, 1892, 147). See: http://diglit.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/fb97/0147&ui_lang=eng
- 33.
See, e.g.: Gazzaniga and LeDoux (1978), Dretske (1981), Millikan (1984), Minsky (1986), Lycan (1987), Jackendoff (1987), Baars (1988), Penrose (1989), Edelman (1989), Dennett (1991), McGinn (1991), Humphrey (1992), Flanagan (1992), Churchland and Sejnowski (1992), Crick (1994), Pinker (1994, 1997), Clark (1997), Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1998), Block (2001), Llinas (2001), Prinz (2005), Gallagher (2005), Carruthers (2006), Tye (2009), Burge (2010), Damasio (2010), Tononi (2012). For a general view on the interdisciplinary debate on consciousness, See: Freeman (2003).
- 34.
- 35.
- 36.
- 37.
For instance, as presented by Brentano:
Psychognosy is different. It teaches nothing about the causes that give rise to human consciousness and which are responsible for the fact that a specific phenomenon does occur now, or does not occur now or disappears. Its aim is nothing other than to provide us with a general conception of the entire realm of human consciousness. It does this by listing fully the basic components out of which everything internally perceived by humans is composed, and by enumerating the ways in which these components can be connected. Psychognosy will therefore, even in its highest state of perfection, never mention a physico-chemical process in any of its doctrines [Lehrsatz]. (Brentano 2002: 3–4)
- 38.
- 39.
- 40.
E.g., information theory (see, e.g., Shannon 1948; von Neumann 1955), cybernetic theories (see, e.g., Rosenblueth et al. 1943; Wiener 1948; Ashby 1952, 1956) and artificial intelligence theories (see, e.g., McCulloch and Pitts 1943; von Neumann 1945, 1951, 1958; Shannon 1948, 1950a, b; Turing 1948, 1950; McCarthy et al. 1955; Newell and Simon 1963; Minsky 1967).
- 41.
- 42.
- 43.
- 44.
- 45.
I am grateful to Felipe De Brigard, Gualtiero Piccinini and John Horden for their comments and suggestions.
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Muñoz-Suárez, C. (2015). Introduction: Bringing Together Mind, Behavior, and Evolution. In: Muñoz-Suárez, C., De Brigard, F. (eds) Content and Consciousness Revisited. Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17374-0_1
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