Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The UNFCCC: A Necessary Ideal

  • Chapter
Procedural Justice in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

  • 1036 Accesses

Abstract

Chapters 2 and 3 made a case for fair procedures in the UNFCCC. Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 then determined several principles of procedural fairness that should guide the way that decisions are made in the UNFCCC. I this chapter, I argue that the UNFCCC has a fundamental role in coordinating action international action on climate change that cannot be provided through other multilateral institutions. This is important, because some have started to question the efficacy of the UNFCCC to address climate change. Given that a large proportion of the world’s emissions are caused by only a small number of countries, a limited agreement amongst a key group of likeminded states may all that’s needed for avoiding dangerous climate change. This book concludes by providing a response to this argument. It proposes that procedural fairness is necessary for an effective climate change regime. Further, based on the findings of Chaps. 4, 5, 6, and 7, it argues that the UNFCCC is the only forum in which procedural fairness is possible. Whilst smaller multilateral arrangements are important measures for coordinating action on climate change, these should be pursued alongside the comprehensive approach of the UNFCCC.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 79.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Barry Holden, for example, discusses this point: Holden 2002.

  2. 2.

    I take this suggestion from Bodansky and Rajamani (2013).

  3. 3.

    See for example: Gupta et al. 2007, p. 761; Bäckstrand 2008; Bulkeley and Newell 2010; Abbott 2013.

  4. 4.

    Keohane and Grant suggest that state-based arrangements therefore provide unique benefits in comparison to other modes of governance (Keohane and Grant 2005).

  5. 5.

    Stavins et al. 2014; For more on climate change initiatives outside of the UNFCCC, see: Pattberg and Stripple 2008; Biermann 2010; Keohane and Victor 2013; Bulkeley and Newell 2010.

  6. 6.

    See: The Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate 2013.

  7. 7.

    For more on regional partnerships, see: Höhne et al. 2008; Kulovesi and Gutiérrez 2009. For more on the Asia-Pacific Partnership, see: APP 2012.

  8. 8.

    See: UNEP 2012.

  9. 9.

    Robyn Eckersley argues that much of the disagreement that exists between states on a comprehensive scale also exists between the major emitting states (Eckersley 2012, p. 33).

  10. 10.

    For accounts of why it is necessary to incorporate all states, see: Hahn 2009, p. 569; van Vliet et al. 2012.

  11. 11.

    For a thorough account of the need for sustained action see: Dirix et al. 2013, p. 5.

  12. 12.

    For support of this, see: Keohane and Victor 2013, p. 106.

  13. 13.

    For example: Prins and Rayner 2007; Prins et al. 2010.

  14. 14.

    For more on carbon leakage, see: Droege 2009; Eckersley 2010.

  15. 15.

    For discussions of carbon leakage, see: Steininger et al. 2014; Roser and Tomlinson 2014. For an account of the amount of carbon embodied in global trade, see: Peters and Hertwich 2008.

  16. 16.

    For discussion, see: Bulkeley and Newell 2010.

  17. 17.

    The Cartagena Dialogue (Bowering 2011) the MEF, and the G8 (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and McGee 2013, p. 67) are closed to observers.

  18. 18.

    For example: Naím 2009.

  19. 19.

    For discussion: Eckersley 2012, p. 28.

References

  • Abbott, K. 2013. Strengthening the transnational regime for climate change. Transnational Environmental Law 3: 57–88.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • APP. 2012. Asia-Pacific partnership on clean development and energy. From: http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/english/default.aspx.

  • Bäckstrand, K. 2008. Accountability of networked climate governance: The rise of transnational climate partnerships. Global Environmental Politics 8(3): 74–102.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barrett, S., and R.N. Stavins. 2003. Increasing participation and compliance in international climate change agreement. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 3: 349–376.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Biermann, F. 2010. Beyond the intergovernmental regime: Recent trends in global carbon governance. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 2: 284–288.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Biermann, F., P. Pattberg, et al. 2010. Global climate governance beyond 2012: Architecture, agency and adaptation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Biermann, F., K. Abbott, et al. 2012. Navigating the Anthropocene: Improving earth system governance. Science 16.335(6074): 1306–1307.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bodansky, D. 2012. The Durban platform: Issues and options for a 2015 agreement. Centre for Climate and Energy Solutions.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bodansky, D., and E. Diringer. 2007. Towards an integrated multi-track framework. Arlington: Pew Center on Global Climate Change.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bodansky, D., and L. Rajamani. 2013. Evolution and governance architecture. In International relations and global climate change, ed. D. Sprinz and U. Luterbacher. Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bowering, E. 2011. After Kyoto: The Cartagena dialogue and the future of the international climate change regime. Prepared for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change COP17. www.globalvoices.org.au

  • Bulkeley, H., and P. Newell. 2010. Governing climate change. Abingdon/New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dirix, J., W. Peeters, et al. 2013. Strengthening bottom-up and top-down climate governance. Climate Policy 13(3): 363–383.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Droege, S. 2009. Tackling leakage in a world of unequal carbon prices. Report Climate Strategies.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dryzek, J., and H. Stevenson. 2012. Legitimacy of multilateral climate governance: A deliberative democratic approach. Critical Policy Studies 6(1): 1–18.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eckersley, R. 2010. The politics of carbon leakage and fairness of border measures. Ethics and International Affairs 24(4): 367–94.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eckersley, R. 2012. Moving forward in the climate negotiations: Multilateralism or minilateralism? Global Environmental Politics 12(2): 24–42.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ghosh, A. 2010. Making climate look like trade? Questions on incentives, flexibility and credibility, Policy brief for centre for policy research. New Delhi: Dharma Marg.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grasso, M., and J. Timmons Roberts. 2013. A fair compromise to break the climate impasse. Global Economy and Development at Brookings 2013–02.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gupta, S., D.A. Tirpak, et al. 2007. Policies, instruments and co-operative arrangements. In Climate change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of working group III to the fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. B. Metz, O.R. Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave and L.A. Meyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hahn, R.W. 2009. Climate policy: Separating fact from fantasy. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33: 557–591.

    Google Scholar 

  • Höhne, N., F. Yamin, et al. 2008. The history and status of the international negotiations on a future climate agreement. In Beyond bali: Strategic issues for the post-2012 climate change regime, ed. C. Egenhofer. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holden, B. 2002. Democracy and global warming. London: Continuum.

    Google Scholar 

  • IEA. 2011. World energy outlook 2011: Executive summary. International Energy Agency. http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2011/executive_summary.pdf.

  • Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, S.I., and J. McGee. 2013. Legitimacy in an era of fragmentation: The case of global climate governance. Global Environmental Politics 13(3): 56–78.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Keohane, R.O., and R.W. Grant. 2005. Accountability and abuses of power in world politics. American Political Science Review 99(1): 29–43.

    Google Scholar 

  • Keohane, R.O., and D.G. Victor. 2010. The regime complex for climate change. Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School.

    Google Scholar 

  • Keohane, R.O., and D.G. Victor. 2013. The transnational politics of energy. Dædalus, The Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences 141(1): 97–109.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuik, O., and M. Hofkes. 2010. Border adjustment for European emissions trading: Competitiveness and carbon leakage. Energy Policy 38(4): 1741–1748.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kulovesi, K., and M. Gutiérrez. 2009. Climate change negotiations update: Process and prospects for a Copenhagen agreed outcome in December 2009. Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 18(3): 229–243.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Levi, M.A., and K. Michonski. 2010. Harnessing international institutions to address climate change. Council of Foreign Relations Working Paper. New York: Council of Foreign Relations.

    Google Scholar 

  • MEF. 2013. Major economies forum on energy and climate. http://www.majoreconomiesforum.org/.

  • Monjon, S., and P. Quirion. 2011. A border adjustment for the EU ETS: Reconciling WTO rules and capacity to tackle carbon leakage. Climate Policy 11(5): 1212–1225.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Naím, M. 2009. Minilateralism: The magic number to get real international action. Foreign Policy 173: 135–136.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pattberg, P., and J. Stripple. 2008. Beyond the public and private divide: Remapping transnational climate governance in the 21st century. International Environmental Agreements 8(4): 367–388.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peters, G., and E.G. Hertwich. 2008. CO2 embodied in international trade with implications for global climate policy. Environmental Science and Technology 42(5): 1401–7.

    Article  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Prins, G., and S. Rayner. 2007. The wrong trousers: Radically rethinking climate policy. Joint Discussion Paper of the James Martin Institute for Science and Civilization, University of Oxford and the MacKinder Centre for the Study of Long-Wave Events, London School of Economics.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prins, G., I. Galiana, et al. 2010. The Hartwell paper: A new direction for climate policy after the crash of 2009. Oxford: Institute for Science, Innovation and Society, University of Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rogelj, J., et al. 2011. Emission pathways consistent with a 2 °C global temperature limit. Nature Climate Change 1: 413–418.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Roser, D., and L. Tomlinson. 2014. Trade policies and climate change: Border carbon adjustments as a tool for a just global climate regime. Ancilla Iuris, November 2014. http://anci.ch/_media/beitrag/ancilla2014_roser-tomlinson.pdf

  • Stavins R. et al. 2014. International cooperation: Agreements and instruments. In Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of climate change. Contribution of working group III to the fifth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. O. Edenhofer et al. Cambridge, UK/New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Steininger, K., et al. 2014. Justice and cost effectiveness of consumption-based versus production-based approaches in the case of unilateral climate policies. Global Environmental Change 24: 75.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Streck, C. 2008. Forests, carbon markets, and avoided deforestation: Legal implications. Carbon & Climate Law Review 3: 239–247.

    Google Scholar 

  • UNEP. 2012 All G8 countries back action on black carbon, methane and other short lived climate pollutants. United Nations Environment Programme Environment for Development News Centre, Press release. http://www.unep.org/newscentre/Default.aspx?DocumentID=2683&ArticleID=9134&l=en.

  • UNEP. 2013. Emissions gap report. Nairobi: UNEP.

    Google Scholar 

  • Urpelainen, J. 2013. A model of dynamic climate governance: Dream big, win small. International Environmental Agreements 13: 107–125.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • van Vliet, J., et al. 2012. Copenhagen accord pledges imply higher costs for staying below 2 °C warming. Climate Change 113: 551–561.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Victor, D. 2001. The collapse of the Kyoto protocol and the struggle to slow global warming. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Victor, D. 2010. Global warming policy after Copenhagen. Willard W. Cochrane lecture in public policy. University of Minnesota.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weischer, L., et al. 2012. Climate clubs: Can small groups of countries make a big difference in addressing climate change? RECIEL

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. London, UK

    Luke Tomlinson

Authors
  1. Luke Tomlinson
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Tomlinson, L. (2015). The UNFCCC: A Necessary Ideal. In: Procedural Justice in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17184-5_8

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation