Chapters  2 and  3 made a case for fair procedures in the UNFCCC. Chapters  4,  5,  6, and  7 then determined several principles of procedural fairness that should guide the way that decisions are made in the UNFCCC. I this chapter, I argue that the UNFCCC has a fundamental role in coordinating action international action on climate change that cannot be provided through other multilateral institutions. This is important, because some have started to question the efficacy of the UNFCCC to address climate change. Given that a large proportion of the world’s emissions are caused by only a small number of countries, a limited agreement amongst a key group of likeminded states may all that’s needed for avoiding dangerous climate change. This book concludes by providing a response to this argument. It proposes that procedural fairness is necessary for an effective climate change regime. Further, based on the findings of Chaps.  4,  5,  6, and  7, it argues that the UNFCCC is the only forum in which procedural fairness is possible. Whilst smaller multilateral arrangements are important measures for coordinating action on climate change, these should be pursued alongside the comprehensive approach of the UNFCCC.


Climate Change Procedural Justice Global Emission Procedural Fairness Mitigation Policy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Luke Tomlinson
    • 1
  1. 1.LondonUK

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