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Fair Bargaining; Voluntariness and Reciprocity

  • Luke Tomlinson

Abstract

Building on the concept of political equality outlined in Chap.  5, Chap.  6 considers how member states can bargain fairly in the UNFCCC. Bargaining is a fundamental part of multilateral negotiations, allowing actors to reach a compromise agreement on issues that they would otherwise disagree on. But power inequalities play a major role in determining how outcomes are reached in bargaining processes. This leaves serious doubts about the promise of arriving at a fair outcome through bargaining when there are large differences between actors. In this chapter, I identify the necessary conditions for fair bargaining. I argue that bargaining processes are fair provided that they meet some requirements of voluntariness and reciprocity. I then consider what can be done to make bargaining between states more fair. I argue that the UNFCCC should put certain constraints on permissible bargaining between states.

Keywords

World Trade Organisation Bargaining Power Clean Development Mechanism Procedural Justice Reservation Price 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Luke Tomlinson
    • 1
  1. 1.LondonUK

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