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Introduction

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Abstract

Multilateral efforts at the global level are yet to produce meaningful action on climate change. In light of this inaction, many have questioned whether the UNFCCC is an appropriate forum for coordinating action, and many alternative arrangements have arisen to fill the regulatory void. Part of this criticism suggests that there is a perceived lack of fairness in the UNFCCC. Whilst academic discussion has traditionally focused on the issue of distributive fairness in this context, very little has been said about procedural fairness. To this end, this book considers what is needed for fairness in the decisions of the UNFCCC. It analyses several principles of procedural fairness in order to develop practical policy measures for fair decision-making in the UNFCCC. This includes measures that determine who should have a right to participate in its decisions, how these decisions should take place, and what level of equality should exist between these actors. In doing so, it proposes that procedural fairness is a fundamental feature of a multilateral response to address climate change. By showing that procedural fairness is most likely to be achieved through the inclusive process of the UNFCCC, it also shows that global efforts to address climate change should continue in this forum.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The remainder of this book draws from the Assessment Reports of the IPCC, in particular: Banuri et al. 1995; Bashmakov et al. 2001; Toth et al. 2001; Gupta et al. 2007; Halsnæs et al. 2007; Stavins et al. 2014.

  2. 2.

    For further discussion, see: IPCC 2007; Caney 2009; OECD 2012.

  3. 3.

    Small island nations are particularly vulnerable to sea level rise. See: Yamano et al. 2007.

  4. 4.

    There is not complete consensus on this matter. Some argue that it would be better to pursue other policy options aside from mitigation. See, for example: Schelling 1997; Lomborg 2001; Nordhaus 2009.

  5. 5.

    For discussion: Bodansky 1993, 2001; Yamin and Depledge 2004; Depledge 2005.

  6. 6.

    For criticism of COP15, see: Dubash 2009, p. 8; IISD 2010; Winkler and Beaumont 2010, p. 640. For discussion of COP16, see: King et al. 2011. For commentary on the Durban Platform, see: Fu-Bertaux and Ochs 2012. For the outcomes of COP17, see: UNFCCC 2011.

  7. 7.

    For more on climate change initiatives outside of the UNFCCC, see: Jagers and Stripple 2003; Pattberg and Stripple 2008; Biermann 2010; Bulkeley and Newell 2010.

  8. 8.

    The MEF facilitates dialogue among 17 countries (MEF 2013).

  9. 9.

    For a description of public-private agreements, see: Gupta et al. 2007, p. 761. For discussion, see: Bulkeley and Newell 2010; Bäckstrand 2008.

  10. 10.

    This section draws on the discussions from: Höhne et al. 2002, p. 34; Aldy et al. 2003; Bodansky and Chou 2004; Aldy and Stavins 2007, 2010.

  11. 11.

    Gupta et al. refer to these as ‘desirable’ criteria (Gupta et al. 2007, p. 750). These are also referenced in other IPCC Assessment Reports (see: Bashmakov et al. 2001, p. 407). Other authors who refer to these criteria include: Aldy et al. 2003, p. 374; Aldy and Stavins 2010, p. 2–3; Winkler and Beaumont 2010, p. 642.

  12. 12.

    Here, I follow: Toth et al. 2001, p. 668, footnote 40.

  13. 13.

    Torvanger and Ringius 2002, p. 224; Höhne et al. 2002, p. 34; Ghosh 2010, p. 3.

  14. 14.

    Depledge and Yamin 2009.

  15. 15.

    Biermann et al. 2011.

  16. 16.

    Gupta et al. 2007; Harstad 2009. Arunabha Ghosh also discusses some features that may improve multilateral negotiation dynamics (Ghosh 2010, p. 4).

  17. 17.

    For example: Waldron 1999.

  18. 18.

    Exceptions include: Adger et al. 2006; Grasso 2010.

  19. 19.

    See: Dubash 2009, p. 8; Bäckstrand 2010, p. 1.

  20. 20.

    Those who argue that there is an intrinsic value to democracy include: Beitz 1989; Cohen 1997; Waldron 1999.

  21. 21.

    For the UNFCCC Rules of Procedure on voting, see: UNFCCC 1996, Rule 42.

  22. 22.

    Prominent accounts include: Shue 1992; Caney 2006; Miller 2008.

  23. 23.

    For the Aarhus Convention, see: UN 1969, 1998.

  24. 24.

    For example, see: Chimni 2004; Kingsbury et al. 2005; Habegger 2010.

  25. 25.

    See: Keohane 2003, p. 132; Held 2004, p. 66; Besson 2009, p. 64.

  26. 26.

    Zürn 2000; Nye 2001; Keohane 2006.

  27. 27.

    For an argument that climate change is a unique problem, see: Toth et al. 2001, p. 603.

  28. 28.

    Note that the reason for not using the most recent IPCC reports for citation is that many of the arguments referenced here are covered in earlier IPCC Reports and the authors of more recent reports cite these older publications.

  29. 29.

    For example: Banuri et al. 1995, p. 117; Paavola 2005.

  30. 30.

    Adger et al. 2003.

  31. 31.

    See: Cohen 1989, p. 91; Benhabib 1996, p. 68; Gutmann and Thompson 1996.

  32. 32.

    For studies on deliberative democracy in relation to climate change, see: Dryzek and Niemeyer 2006; Dryzek and Stevenson 2011, 2012a, 2012b; Stevenson 2011.

  33. 33.

    Bäckstrand et al. 2010.

  34. 34.

    Klinsky and Dowlatabadi 2009, p. 96.

  35. 35.

    The following account is based on the discussions in: Rawls 1971; Daniels 1996; McDermott 2008.

  36. 36.

    Daniels 1996, p. 103.

  37. 37.

    Buchanan 2004, p. 55; Mason 2004, p. 265; Ypi 2010, p. 538.

  38. 38.

    For more on this discussion, see: Mason 2004, p. 265; Swift 2008, p. 365; Hamlin and Stemplowska 2012, p. 51.

  39. 39.

    See Stephen Gardiner’s commentary on institutional inadequacy (Gardiner 2011, p. 28).

  40. 40.

    Chayes and Chayes 1995.

  41. 41.

    For more on this point, see Barrett 2003; Lawrence 2014.

  42. 42.

    See: Blake 2001; Griffin 2008.

  43. 43.

    Shue 1992; Miller 2005, p. 75.

  44. 44.

    Grasso 2010, p. 61; Müller 2010; Winkler and Beaumont 2010, p. 646.

  45. 45.

    Yamin and Depledge 2004, p. 443.

  46. 46.

    Dimitrov 2010; Biermann et al. 2011.

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Tomlinson, L. (2015). Introduction. In: Procedural Justice in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17184-5_1

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