Abstract
While in the early 2000’s lots of research was focused on Differential Power Analysis of first and second-order, it seems the recent trend is of even higher-order. As this order grows, countermeasures such as masking need to be designed in a more generic way. In this paper, we introduce a new constant weight implementation of the AES extending the idea of the software dual-rail countermeasure proposed by Hoogvorst et al. at COSADE 2011. Notably, we illustrate its practicality on 16-bit microcontroller in terms of speed and complexity. This countermeasure applies to all devices that leak a function of the Hamming weight of the internal variables. Under this assumption, our constant weight implementation is theoretically inherently resistant to side-channel attacks of any order. A security evaluation is conducted to analyze its resistance when the leakage slightly deviates from the Hamming weight assumption. It reveals that the countermeasure remains as good as several well-known masking countermeasures. Moreover, the proposed countermeasure offers the possibility to detect some classes of faults.
Nicolas Debande — Work done when the author was at SAFRAN Morpho.
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- 1.
For this implementation, the leakage corresponds to a bivariate attack, when the product combination is used by the adversary.
- 2.
This leakage function corresponds to a hardware implementation. To the best of our knowledge, the leakage squeezing countermeasure has never been adapted into a software implementation, therefore we only consider an univariate leakage in our simulation.
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Acknowledgments
This work has been partially funded by the ANR projects E-MATA HARI and SPACES.
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Servant, V., Debande, N., Maghrebi, H., Bringer, J. (2015). Study of a Novel Software Constant Weight Implementation. In: Joye, M., Moradi, A. (eds) Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications. CARDIS 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8968. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16763-3_3
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