Abstract
Several logical attacks against Java based smart card have been published recently. Most of them are based on the hypothesis that the type verification was not performed, thus allowing to obtain dynamically a type confusion. To mitigate such attacks, typed stack have been introduced on recent smart card. We propose here a new attack path for performing a type confusion even in presence of a typed stack. Then we propose using a Fault Tree Analysis a way to design efficiently counter measure in a top down approach. These counter measures are then evaluated on a Java Card virtual machine
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Notes
- 1.
Writing in EEPROM needs to erase which is time consuming.
- 2.
Memory encryption results in a logical read-out value which is random.
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Bouffard, G., Lackner, M., Lanet, JL., Loinig, J. (2015). Heap \(\ldots \) Hop! Heap Is Also Vulnerable. In: Joye, M., Moradi, A. (eds) Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications. CARDIS 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 8968. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16763-3_2
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