Abstract
Covert channels are a fundamental concept for cryptanalytic side-channel attacks. Covert timing channels use latency to carry data, and are the foundation for timing and cache-timing attacks. Covert storage channels instead utilize existing system bits to carry data, and are not historically used for cryptanalytic side-channel attacks. This paper introduces a new storage channel made available through cache debug facilities on some embedded microprocessors. This channel is then extended to a cryptanalytic side-channel attack on AES software.
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Brumley, B.B. (2015). Cache Storage Attacks. In: Nyberg, K. (eds) Topics in Cryptology –- CT-RSA 2015. CT-RSA 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9048. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16715-2_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16715-2_2
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