Abstract
In the preceding chapters, we have had the opportunity to see how we can avoid several key misunderstandings in the phenomenological thought of Husserl and Heidegger with regard to fundamental questions of doctrine and teaching. Hopefully, enough justice has been done to the original concerns of these two founding figures of this philosophy. We have discovered that despite various severe critiques (mutual, and from both within and without the phenomenological camp), these concerns can be made intelligible for phenomenologists of all particular persuasions—and, with some luck, not only for phenomenologists. The basics of the phenomenological methodology and research results restored in the previous chapters can thus be combined to constitute a well-standing teaching and way of philosophizing. This, then, may form part of the ground of a joint phenomenological program that could be called “Normalized Phenomenology.” Of course, it is not only Husserl’s and Heidegger’s Phenomenologies that could contribute to this endeavor, but also those of Scheler, Merleau-Ponty, Hannah Arendt, and many others.
What has been realized here can be saved for Phenomenology’s future—if not for philosophy as a whole. But this can be done only under a certain further condition. It is this additional condition that will be our main concern in this final chapter. After the analyses developed in what follows, a new beginning will have been prepared for Phenomenology.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
See Crisis, 189/192.
- 4.
See Seeburger 1975, 218ff. See also, e.g., Heidegger’s TDP, §19, and especially pp. 85/101, 87/103.
- 5.
For the disbeliever, I will only cite two self-testimonies from science’s history of discoveries. Poincare reports: “One morning, walking on the bluff, the idea came to me, with brevity, suddenness and immediate certainty. […] Most striking at first is this appearance of sudden illumination, a manifest sign of long, unconscious prior work.” (cited in Horvitz 2002, 1). Gauss, who struggled for four years on a mathematical problem, gives a similar description of his discovery of the solution: “As a sudden flash of light, the enigma was solved. […] For my part I am unable to name the nature of the thread which connected what I previously knew with that which made my success possible.” (ibid., 2). This account of a sudden flash, of an unexpected illumination, etc., is given in almost all cases of great scientific discoveries, from Archimedes to Planck.
- 6.
We will return, from another perspective, to this thematic of the origin of our ideas, mostly in Phenomenology, in §10.8 below. As for the reader who finds the idea of a priori discovery in science (especially in the empirical natural sciences) paradoxical, I will only refer him or her to Chaps. 2 and 3 of this book, in which the Kantian, Husserlian, and eventually Kuhnian views are presented, in condensed form. See also Theodorou 2010b, 2012b.
- 7.
Naturally, this may mean two things. Firstly, it may refer to the origin of solutions to given intriguing or problematic states of things. Secondly, it may refer to the origin of our very recognition of these states of things as intriguing or problematic.
- 8.
For a phenomenological account of this in science, see Theodorou 2010b.
- 9.
Borrowing the jargon from another philosophical field, one could put this matter in the following way: in order to have a clear sense of the meaning and value of some suggested truth, we should care equally about the context of discovery and the context of justification.
- 10.
This is not the place to argue for this point, though it does have many interesting phenomenological and ontological repercussions that would demand a full and separate treatment. This treatment must be postponed until another occasion.
- 11.
Husserl’s famous Fichte lectures are also extremely eloquent. We will refer to these again in the next section. Of course, for a complete and proper understanding of the problems underlying the latter points and this passage, Husserl’s unsurpassable directive on the grounding of our sound concepts from LI, 783–4/141, must be recalled here.
- 12.
It has been suggested that when, in his analyses concerning internal time consciousness, Husserl was forced to deal with the problem of the origin of the reell contents (or hyle), he realized that his classic content-interpretation constitution schema (that we saw in Chaps. 2 and 4) could no longer be followed. Representative and influential on this is Sokolowski 1964; see especially 110 ff., 162 ff., 177 ff., 204 ff. Allegedly, the reason is that there is some ‘constitution,’ that of hyle itself, which, on pain of an infinite regress, cannot be accounted for in terms of conformity to the classic schema. First of all, it is unfortunate that Husserl calls this hyle “object” (Gegenstand), a choice that passes uncontested by commentators (see, e.g., Sokolowski 1964, 178–9). As I see it, at least three more things must be said. Firstly, throughout his thought, Husserl’s deeper concern is not to let us think that hyletic data are given independently of or separately from any simultaneous accompanying, intentional apprehension (in the pregnant sense). Secondly, his discussions of the specific problem of the origin of the hyletic data remain basically aporetic rather than definitive and binding for Phenomenology. Thirdly, since hyletic data cannot actually be seen as objects in the pregnant sense, Phenomenology must realize that their so-called “constitution” is not necessarily a phenomenological-constitutive problem. We will say more on this in what follows. All of this means that in Husserl’s theory regarding genuinely objective constitution, e.g., in perception and judgment, nothing really changes. For a very similar recent view, see Williford 2013, especially 504 n. 10.
- 13.
- 14.
See Fink 1970, 135ff.
- 15.
See also Gadamer 1976, 147, 165, 168, 186. Husserl worked on this problem in his manuscripts concerning immanent time, but he announces nothing in the Ideas I (1913), and offers us some clues as to his views only as late as 1929 (FTL, 286ff/292ff; see also CM, §§18, 37, 38, 39, 46). On the passive self-constitution of the hyletic data in the monad, see also PITC, 115/110; Hua XXXIII, 158–9, 281–2, 351–2; APAS, 150/105; Hua Mat VIII, 99–100. Sometimes it is thought that Husserl actually considers sensory contents as the result of external stimulation of the senses. Evidence is sought in his Hua X, where we read that “Bewußtsein ist nichts ohne Impression.” (100), or, in EU, where we come across a description of an incident in which the barking of a dog strikes (reizt) one’s ears (61). However, it is clear that by “Impression” Husserl means “Ur-Impression” or “genesis spontanea” or “Urschöpfung,” a happening that is of course not a product of intentional synthesis proper, but a ‘singularity’ within consciousnesses’ time-field. For the transcendental idealist Husserl, whether we like it or not, the sound that is apprehended as the barking of a dog out there in the distance has arisen by such a ‘singularity.’
- 16.
Notoriously, Husserl claimed that the monad is immortal (see, e.g., APAS, 467).
- 17.
See, for instance, FI, 120–1/278-80; see also his Vienna lecture on “Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity” (Crisis, Appendix A.I) and his Kaizo papers (in Hua XXVII). In all of these, standard appeal is made to a logos (reason) and its historical unfolding in a way that safeguards progress. Husserl did not systematically suggest that the connection just made was crucial to the exposition of his thought, and he is not so well known for these views. This line of thought can however be extracted from his writings. As we will see in the next section, Heidegger was more systematic and persistent on these matters.
- 18.
I must say right away that I sympathize with Mertens (2000) and Kaehler (1995) in their serious objections to the possibility of assimilating monadology in Phenomenology; these objections are based on the specifications that Husserl himself prescribes for the monad on the basis of the monadological transcendental reduction (entire-world-inclusive but finitely-subjective). My objection, though, does not focus on the consistency of the specifications, but mostly on the final phenomenologizability (according to the “phenomenological principle of all principles”) of a being like the monad.
- 19.
A reference to the effect that the monad is Husserl’s attempt at solving such problems can be found in Kojima 2000, 184. See also Hopkins 2011, 150ff., 160ff.; Zahavi 2003, 74; Mertens 2000, 2, 14 n. 3—even if no mention is made of Husserl’s later self-criticism that in the Ideas I, this transcendentally functioning subjectivity was still conceived mundanely (as a part of the whole world).
- 20.
Smith (1977) offers us a nice juxtaposition of his rejection of Husserl’s theory of hyle with Sartre’s. The latter rejects it for reasons regarding theoretical coherence (Smith talks about “logical cogency”). For Sartre, “the hyle could neither be consciousness, nor derive its being from consciousness” and “if the hyle derives its being from itself alone,” having, thus, “the characteristics of a thing and the characteristics of consciousness” then hyle becomes “a hybrid being which consciousness rejects and which cannot be a part of the world” (see Smith 1977, Introduction). Smith argues quite convincingly that hyle does not stand also as a phenomenologically descriptive content. Indeed, hyle is not what appears as part of a perceptual object in the transcending apprehension of the perceptual act. (On this, cf. McKenna 2005, 148.) It is merely a lived-through reell content. As I see it, both are right, if we consider Phenomenology from the point of view of its absolutist demands. By means of critical re-adjustment, however, i.e., once we become aware of the limits and the ensuing change in epistemic modalities, phenomenologists can continue to theorize about it.
- 21.
There is also an extended background regarding the introduction of the concept of the monad, which relates it to the Judeo-Christian theological agenda of ex nihilo creation and with the possibility of our partaking in God’s knowledge of reality in its becoming. We simply cannot enter into these intricacies here.
- 22.
As Hill notes, “it was Karl Weierstrass who awakened Husserl’s interest in seeking radical foundations for knowledge. Weierstrass’ thoroughgoing, systematic treatment, ab initio, of the theory of analytic functions, the efforts he was making to transform analysis into a purely rational theory made a lasting impression on Husserl, who said that he had acquired the ethos of his intellectual strivings from Weierstrass and had sought to do for philosophy what his mentor had done for mathematics.” (Hill 2012, 95). Aristotle’s remark with respect to Plato’s aspirations appears to be the reply that is needed here: “[I]t belongs to an educated person to seek out precision in each genus to the extent that the nature of the matter allows.” (NE, 1094b23–25). “[O]ne must not seek out precision in all matters alike but rather in each thing in turn as accords with the subject matter in question and insofar as is appropriate to the inquiry. […] One ought to try to go in search of each in turn in the manner natural to them and to be serious about their being nobly defined.” (ibid., 1098a27–b7).
- 23.
See also BT, 58/62.
- 24.
See §8.8.1 of this book.
- 25.
In this case, Heidegger also has to face a problem analogous to that of the origin of the first material for the constitution of the beings in the world. On this, see §6.10.1. In the analyses of BT, the silent full monadologization of the Dasein also has to silently concord with German Idealism’s view regarding the self-affective production of the first material for the constitution of the worldly beings, e.g., of the sensory information inhering (one way or another) in the equipment. This has not yet been clearly understood in the Heideggerian literature. Heidegger’s ominous silence on these matters does not self-understandably support a “robust realism.” Cf. Dreyfus 1991, 251ff; Dreyfus and Spinosa 1999. For a successful critical answer and presentation of Heidegger as an idealist, see Blattner 1994a; see also Malpas 1999.
- 26.
Of course, Dasein is notorious for its definitive relation to death. So the question arises: is this a radical difference in comparison to Husserl’s immortal transcendental monad? The obvious answer is a simple “yes.” Interestingly, though, things are not that simple. Consider Heidegger’s remark from BT. “If death is defined as the ‘end’ of Dasein, that is, of being-in-the-world, no ontic decision has been made as to whether ‘after death’ another being is still possible, either higher or lower, whether Dasein ‘lives on’ or even, ‘outliving itself,’ is ‘immortal.’ […] But our analysis of death remains purely ‘this-worldly’ in that it interprets the phenomenon solely with respect to the question of how it enters into [this or that] actual Dasein as its possibility-of-being [wie es als Seinsmöglichkeit des jeweiligen Daseins in dieses Hereinsteht].” (BT, 230/247–8; emphasis on “actual” is mine). The scholars are somewhat puzzled by this passage. Llewelyn reports Edward and Russell’s view that there is finality to Dasein’s death and, not without expressing dissatisfaction with Heidegger’s ambiguity, declares his opposing view that the passage from BT reflects a Kierkegaardian abstention from the very meaningfulness of the question (Llewelyn 2001, 121–2). Blattner suggests that with reference to Dasein we cannot speak about stopping or cessation, because the latter appertain to mere things and processes, whereas Dasein, unlike the concrete living human being, is an ontological structure (Blattner 1994b, 65). The same view is expressed in Haugeland (2013, 210). To make this more specific, I would say that in BT, Heidegger is ambiguous on “Dasein.” This or that actual Dasein, i.e., this or that empirical human being, is mortal. In contrast, Dasein, as the supra-empirical condition for the possibility of the empirical Dasein, is immortal.
- 27.
Until some redemption and final salvation comes, which grows in the greatest danger, as Heidegger’s beloved poem “Patmos” of Hölderlin’s says. This is Heidegger’s salvatory reading of human history in the world.
- 28.
On that project and its failure, see Theodorou 2010a.
- 29.
See also, e.g., BT, 131 (neither of the English translations, however, adequately renders the corresponding point made on p. 139 of the original text: “Diese [die Empfindlichkeit] vermag, wie jede ontologische Interpretation überhaupt, nur vordem schon erschlossenes Seiendes auf sein Sein gleichsam abzuhören.”).
- 30.
The meaning and function of formal indication in Heidegger’s early thought has been a strongly debated issue in the relatively recent literature. I cannot enter this dialogue in further detail here. The reader who wishes to explore these issues further may consult Theodorou 2010a.
- 31.
The slight change of perspective signalled with this move should not escape our attention. Instead of actually tracing Being worlding around Dasein, it is again (as in 1919) sought around the objects of Dasein’s experience. Now, however, in BT, this is attempted in careful correlation of the beings with the historical Dasein’s own transformations of experience within its inherent dynamics.
- 32.
This is seen in the transition from the 1919 Kriegsnotsemester to the “Natorp-Bericht” and then in Heidegger’s treatment of Being as mere relation in BT. As I see it, Heidegger makes good points against the view that Husserl’s Formal Ontology could play the role of a Fundamental Ontology as he (Heidegger) conceived of it. See SZ, 10, 78, 159–60 and especially the marginal note a on page 160; TDP, 91; also Chap. 8, §8.5.2, 8.7.2 of the present book; and Theodorou 2010a. On this, I have to agree with Philipse 1998, 40, 100, 110. For a different estimation of this matter, see Hopkins 2001, 136. Of course, Heidegger’s Platonic endeavour did not after all reach an unambiguous and final answer to the ultimate problem regarding Being in general or Being as such.
- 33.
This is why I have to disagree with Sheehan’s thesis that “Heidegger remained a phenomenologist from beginning to end and that phenomenology is exclusively about meaningfulness and its source” (2014, Abstract; emphasis added). Phenomenology may be about a priori sense or meaning, but not about mere sense or meaning; it is also about the source of this meaning, as Sheehan nicely remarks. It is not about simply conceivable meaningfulness, but about sound meaningfulness ‘confirmed’ by intuitional phenomena. And at this point, no such accessible source appears to be available that would bring Heidegger’s endeavour to phenomenological completion.
- 34.
I believe that Heidegger toyed with another possibility, without making it explicit and without adopting it as his ultimate suggestion. There might be a concrete Being as sense or truth that has been disclosed within human history from its very start, but which afterwards became concealed under its privative and derogative self-modifications. This may be considered as the universal, whole, or complete Being, whereas the rest of its privative versions may be considered as the series of its subsequent historical essencings. Zuhandenheit or Existenz/Sorge may be considered as candidates for the role of such Being. Again, however, at least two serious phenomenological problems would lift any hope that this could provide a final answer to the Seinsfrage. On the one hand, it would indeed be difficult if not totally impossible to show that all the kinds of Being are such modifications of Zuhandenheit or Existenz/Sorge. On the other hand, we would again be clueless as to the internal ‘logic’ and coherence or unifiability of such modificatory process.
- 35.
For a quick reference, see the citations in note 22. From the phenomenological camp, Arendt and Taminiaux become prominently relevant here. For the time being, see also Theodorou 2014b.
- 36.
- 37.
The latest realizations in the history and philosophy of science, to be sure, instruct us to consider this knowledge only as valid in the sense of accepted paradigms. In addition, there is a dispute between philosophical traditions as to the kind of knowledge that is possible, especially in the natural sciences. Is it inductive, apodictic, or a sum of both? From the phenomenological point of view, we are prepared to accept a combined view. On the one hand, I suggest that we accept a version of Kant’s position (i.e., that scientific principles are synthetic a priori, whereas scientific laws are inductive generalizations). See also §§2.6.1 (especially n. 53), 2.7.1 and 3.4.1 (especially n. 18). On the other hand, we should also accept the findings of historicist epistemology. A kind of measured phenomenological perspectivism would thus ensue.
- 38.
See Theodorou 2012a, n. 18.
- 39.
A certain scent of “philosophy of life” is simply not accidental. I have the term “life” in mind in a way that opposes the brutish “titanic individual overman” or “blond beast” Klagesean version of Nietzsche’s prototype (I take the quoted expressions from Polanyi 1933) but also differs from the—one way or another—complacent tone it has in Aristotle, Dilthey, Jonas, pre-Stellung Scheler, and Varela and Maturana. A few more remarks toward the ‘discontentful’ direction hinted at here will be offered in the following sections. Further development of the point must be reserved for another occasion.
- 40.
Cf. Crowell (2002b), where various views regarding Phenomenology’s possibility or entitlement of containing metaphysical knowledge are examined. However, the perspective of these concerns and our own is somewhat different. The question there is basically whether the method of reduction and eidetic description means that Phenomenology is ontologically neutral, or whether it also contains claims regarding, e.g., the meaning of “being,” a classification of perfection among the possible and actual beings, an onto-theological agenda (as in Sokolowski’s et al. appropriation of Phenomenology), etc. The remarks made above in the main text of the present work are not, however, intended only to show the limits of the strictly phenomenologizable and simply reject what goes further (cf. Crowell 2002b, 438). They also want to make some room for metaphysical hypotheses explicitly so acknowledged.
- 41.
Chalmers’ colourful pen presents us with an incident from science’s history that can immediately give us a clear idea of how the dispute develops in such cases. “Having carefully observed the moon through his newly invented telescope, Galileo was able to report that the moon was not a smooth sphere but that its surface abounded in mountains and craters. His Aristotelian adversary had to admit that things did appear that way when he repeated the observations for himself. But the observations threatened a notion fundamental for many Aristotelians, namely that all celestial bodies are perfect spheres. Galileo’s rival defended his theory in the face of the apparent falsification in a way that was blatantly ad hoc. He suggested that there was an invisible substance on the moon filling the craters and covering the mountains in such a way that the moon’s shape was perfectly spherical. When Galileo inquired how the presence of the invisible substance might be detected, the reply was that there was no way in which it could be detected. […] An exasperated Galileo was able to show up the inadequacy of his rival’s position in a characteristically witty way. He announced that he was prepared to admit that the invisible, undetectable substance existed on the moon, but insisted that it was not distributed in the way suggested by his rival but in fact was piled up on top of the mountains so that they were many times higher than they appeared through the telescope.” (Chalmers 1999, 76).
- 42.
With this, Arendt in fact repeats Kant’s notions of subremption, that stands at the centre of the latter’s critical project, and the (closely connected) tendency of reason to surpass its own limits of application and unjustifiably raise claims to knowledge beyond the sphere of the phenomena.
- 43.
- 44.
To be sure, no relativist view will be promoted here. Given the non-reductivist and non-single-principled basis of the approach that is (programmatically) being delineated here, not relativism but perspectivism would be the appropriate term. Objective truth can be claimed only at a formal level. Factic richness, noetic natality and historical fluidity point to perspectivism as regards content (of senses, meaningfulness, principles, etc.).
- 45.
- 46.
We have already seen the fertility of this idea, first introduced in a systematic way by Husserl, in the case of the phenomenology of perception and judgment. This is already solid ground for further research. See, for example, Theodorou 2014b.
- 47.
I have developed the prerequisites of this approach in Theodorou 2006. On the very notion of eidetic variation, see Chap. 2, §2.6.1. With regard to “hermeneutic success,” what I basically have in mind here is an approach along the lines defined by Gadamer’s (1987) ideas concerning the possibility of criteria for objective (or, rather, successful) interpretation, and Makkreel’s (1990) attempt to approach Kant’s reflective judgment in terms of hermeneutics (albeit, on my part, not quite by relying on common sense to such a great extent). Understandably, these issues are still strongly debated, as shown in the dispute between Gadamer and Habermas and, on other grounds, between the former and Emilio Betti and E. D. Hirsch.
- 48.
Let me add here, in the most approving tone, a citation from Crowell 2002b. “[The so-called] conceptual analysis contains an ineradicable moment of eidetic ‘intuition.’ It appears that only ignorance informs the view that Phenomenology’s results are nothing but conceptual analysis. One might more justly say that there is conceptual analysis only because there is phenomenology, even though its practitioners don’t recognize themselves as phenomenologists.” (2002b, 441). Thus, Crowell’s later suggestion is, to summarize it here somewhat clumsily, that Phenomenology would be justified as a philosophical research program even if it were to be taken into account just for the fact that it is an a priori inquiry into intuitionally appearing phenomena, which is actually presupposed by analytic philosophy. However, by going deeper than the latter, Phenomenology also shows that philosophy at large retains its tasks and dignity, becoming (after all) immune to the recent threats of reductive/eliminative naturalization.
- 49.
I extrapolate on a description of the incident cited in Spiegelberg 1994, 484–5.
- 50.
As Heidegger says, in his well-known remark from BT, 34.
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Theodorou, P. (2015). Hence and Thence Phenomenology’s Borderline. In: Husserl and Heidegger on Reduction, Primordiality, and the Categorial. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 83. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16622-3_10
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