Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Long-Term Electricity Supply Contracts

  • Chapter
EU Electricity Trade Law

  • 1314 Accesses

Abstract

Electricity supply contracts can be (1) standardised, mainly short-term, and traded in an organised way; or (2) not standardised, rather long-term, and agreed bilaterally. Standardised contracts are more likely to be traded on an exchange or a regulated marketplace. They can be simple contracts traded in the spot market (Sect. 4.5). Standardised contracts are used even in the market for balance energy and control reserves (Sect. 4.10). In this case, trading or auctions are organised by the TSO. Contracts that are not standardised can have a longer duration. OTC contracts can be relatively simple bilateral long-term contracts or more complex structured contracts.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 119.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 159.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    See, for example, Ofgem (2009), paras 1.15–1.18.

  2. 2.

    Varholy J and Fuhr T (2009), § 28, number 6 on the deregulation of the North American gas market.

  3. 3.

    DG Competition report on energy sector inquiry, SEC(2006) 1724 (2007), pp. 232–244 and 283–294. See Glachant JM and de Hauteclocque A (2009).

  4. 4.

    Article 9(1) of Directive 2009/72/EC (Third Electricity Directive).

  5. 5.

    Industrial organisation theories focus on such issues. For an example of this type of approach, see Aghion P and Bolton P (1987).

  6. 6.

    Putzka F (2009), p. 26.

  7. 7.

    See, for example, The Economist, Tilting at the windmills (16 June 2011). In June 2011, the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) had to produce lots of hydropower because of melting snows. For this reason, it had to take all its regions wind turbines offline for a few hours daily, give electricity away for free, and pay the transmission costs of utilities willing to take it.

  8. 8.

    Putzka F (2009), p. 26.

  9. 9.

    See, for example, de Hauteclocque (2009a).

  10. 10.

    Finon D and Perez Y (2008) and Glachant JM and de Hauteclocque A (2009). For gas, see Talus K (2010), p. 128.

  11. 11.

    Putzka F (2009), p. 19.

  12. 12.

    Putzka F (2009), p. 26.

  13. 13.

    Opportunistic behaviour is studied in new institutional economics.

  14. 14.

    Neuhoff K and von Hirschhaussen C (2005).

  15. 15.

    For an example of the economic literature on long-term contracts, see Neuhoff K and von Hirschhaussen C (2005).

  16. 16.

    See, for example, Wurmnest W (2008). For gas, see Talus K (2010), p. 15.

  17. 17.

    Arowolo O (2005). For gas, see Talus K (2010), p. 16.

  18. 18.

    Green (2006) and Finon D and Perez Y (2008).

  19. 19.

    See already recital 6 of Directive 2004/39/EC (MiFID). See, for example, Hünerwadel A (2007), p. 62.

  20. 20.

    Recital 112 of Directive 2014/65/EU (MiFID II).

  21. 21.

    Point 21 of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU (MiFID II).

  22. 22.

    Article 4(1) of Regulation 648/2012 (EMIR).

  23. 23.

    Varholy J and Fuhr T (2009), § 28, number 1.

  24. 24.

    Deng SJ and Oren SS (2006), pp. 946–948.

  25. 25.

    For counterparty corporate risk and counterparty commercial risk, see Mäntysaari P (2010b), sections 6.2 and 6.3.

  26. 26.

    Ofgem (2009), section 1.18.

  27. 27.

    See also Finon D and Perez Y (2008).

  28. 28.

    Joined Cases T-80/06 and T-182/09 Budapesti Erőmű Zrt v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2012:65, para 83.

  29. 29.

    Borchert J and Hasenbeck M (2009), p. 116.

  30. 30.

    Generally, see Mäntysaari P (2010a, b).

  31. 31.

    For system operators, see Article 13 of Directive 2009/72/EC.

  32. 32.

    For the Finnish market, see Midttun A et al. (2001), p. 31.

  33. 33.

    Putzka F (2009), p. 32.

  34. 34.

    For the function of shareholders, see Mäntysaari P (2010a), section 8.7.2; Mäntysaari P (2012), section 7.9.

  35. 35.

    Mäntysaari P (2010a), p. 275.

  36. 36.

    For the function of the board, see Mäntysaari P (2010a), sections 8.3 and 9.2.11; Mäntysaari P (2012), section 7.8.

  37. 37.

    KHO 1963 I 5 and KHO 1968 B II 521. A company called Oy Mankala Ab was party to one of the cases.

  38. 38.

    See, for example, OECD/IEA (2005), pp. 129–130.

  39. 39.

    In German: Handelskraftwerk.

  40. 40.

    In German: Lohnverstromung.

  41. 41.

    In German: Kraftwerksscheibe.

  42. 42.

    In German: Virtuelle Kraftwerksscheibe.

  43. 43.

    For the basic assumptions behind this model economics, see Finon D and Perez Y (2008).

  44. 44.

    Spence DB and Prentice R (2012), p. 146.

  45. 45.

    Articles 15(3) and 25(4) of Directive 2009/72/EC (Third Electricity Directive).

  46. 46.

    Hunt S and Shuttleworth G (1996), p. 119.

  47. 47.

    Deng SJ and Oren SS (2006), pp. 942–943.

  48. 48.

    Mäntysaari P (2010b), section 5.5.

  49. 49.

    See Fried J (2010), p. 290, point 512.

  50. 50.

    Hunt S and Shuttleworth G (1996), p. 119.

  51. 51.

    In the UK, the term power purchase agreement refers to other kinds of contracts. Section 50(3) of the Energy Bill: “For the purposes of this section and section 51—(a) a power purchase agreement scheme is a scheme established by supply licence conditions and regulations under section 51 for promoting the availability to electricity generators of power purchase agreements, and (b) ‘power purchase agreement’ means an arrangement under which a licensed supplier agrees to purchase electricity generated by an electricity generator at a discount to a prevailing market price”.

  52. 52.

    Hunt S and Shuttleworth G (1996), p. 109.

  53. 53.

    In Joined Cases T-80/06 and T-182/09 Budapesti Erőmű Zrt v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2012:65, the buyer was a Hungarian State-owned public undertaking that undertook, as a single buyer, to buy a fixed quantity of electricity at a fixed price. This raised questions of state aid.

  54. 54.

    Section 4(a) of the sample Power Purchase Agreement developed by United States Department of Energy and Bonneville Power Administration.

  55. 55.

    Ibid, Sections 1(h) and 6(a).

  56. 56.

    Ibid, Sections 6(b) and 1(c).

  57. 57.

    Case COMP/M.1853—EDF/EnBW.

  58. 58.

    Varholy J and Fuhr T (2009), § 28, number 4.

  59. 59.

    Putzka F (2009), pp. 29–30.

  60. 60.

    DG Competition Report on Energy Sector inquiry, 10 January 2007, SEC(2006) 1724, para 431.

  61. 61.

    Joined Cases T-80/06 and T-182/09 Budapesti Erőmű Zrt v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2012:65, paras 75 and 78.

  62. 62.

    Deng SJ and Oren SS (2006), p. 946.

  63. 63.

    Hsu M (1998), pp. 35–36.

  64. 64.

    Putzka F (2009), pp. 29–30.

  65. 65.

    Borchert J and Hasenbeck M (2009), p. 115.

  66. 66.

    Putzka F (2009), pp. 29–30.

  67. 67.

    For the concept of asset investors in the context of corporate finance law, see Mäntysaari P (2010c), pp. 23 and 325–327.

  68. 68.

    Putzka F (2009), pp. 29–30.

  69. 69.

    Case COMP/M.1853—EDF/EnBW, para 98.

  70. 70.

    OECD/IEA (2005), pp. 64–65.

  71. 71.

    OECD/IEA (2005), p. 64.

  72. 72.

    OECD/IEA (2005), p. 64.

  73. 73.

    Putzka F (2009), p. 30.

  74. 74.

    Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Stromrechnung zahlen andere, 16 October 2013, p. 12.

  75. 75.

    For instance, the sawmill industry is a consumer of electricity. However, it can also generate electricity by using its raw material as fuel. A high feed-in tariff increases electricity generation’s share of the turnover of sawmills. There are major differences in the feed-in tariffs for electricity generated by sawmills in Finland, Sweden, and Germany according to a study commissioned by the Finnish Ministry for Employment and the Economy. Pöyry Management Consulting Oy (2013).

  76. 76.

    Recital 37 of Directive 2009/72/EC (Third Electricity Directive).

  77. 77.

    Case COMP/M.1853—EDF/EnBW, para 93.

  78. 78.

    Case COMP/M.1853—EDF/EnBW, para 95.

  79. 79.

    Case COMP/M.1853—EDF/EnBW, para 94.

  80. 80.

    Case COMP/M.1853—EDF/EnBW, para 97.

  81. 81.

    Case COMP/M.1853—EDF/EnBW, para 97.

  82. 82.

    Case COMP/M.1853—EDF/EnBW, para 98.

  83. 83.

    See, for example, EEX Contract Specifications (0041a, 22 November 2014), section 2.1.3. “Base” is defined as “00:00 until 24:00 for all days of the week”. “Peak” is defined as “08:00 until 20:00 for all days Monday through Friday (Peak) and 08:00 until 20:00 for the days Saturday and Sunday (Peak Weekend) respectively”. “Off-Peak” is defined as “00:00 until 08:00 and 20:00 until 24:00 Uhr for all days Monday through Friday as well as the hours between 00:00 and 24:00 at weekends (Off-Peak)”. For US terminology, see Deng SJ and Oren SS (2006), p. 943.

  84. 84.

    Hünerwadel A (2007), p. 57.

  85. 85.

    Spicker J (2010), p. 93, number 132, and p. 102, point 158.

  86. 86.

    Deng SJ and Oren SS (2006), p. 947.

  87. 87.

    Spicker J (2010), p. 103, number 159.

  88. 88.

    Spicker J (2010), p. 103, numbers 160–161.

  89. 89.

    Neveling S and Schönrock KP (2009), § 29, number 56.

  90. 90.

    Neveling S and Schönrock KP (2009), § 29, number 64.

  91. 91.

    Spicker J (2010), p. 93, number 134.

  92. 92.

    Spicker J (2010), pp. 93–94, number 135.

  93. 93.

    Neveling S and Schönrock KP (2009), § 29, number 64.

  94. 94.

    Spicker J (2010), p. 94, number 136.

  95. 95.

    See Mäntysaari P (2010a), section 9.7. See also Ofgem (2009), para 3.14.

  96. 96.

    § 37(2) EEG 2012.

  97. 97.

    § 37(3) EEG 2012.

  98. 98.

    § 60(1) EEG 2014 and § 61 EEG 2014.

  99. 99.

    See § 64 EEG 2014 and Annex 4 to EEG 2014.

  100. 100.

    § 61(2) EEG 2014 and § 61(3) EEG 2014.

  101. 101.

    They include, for example, § 1 StromNEV, § 9(3) KWKG, § 19(2) StromNEV, § 18 AbLaV, § 17f(5) EnWG, and § 9(1) StromStG. See Bardt H et al. (2014a), pp. 5–19; Bardt H et al. (2014b).

  102. 102.

    Mikešić I et al. (2012), section 1.

  103. 103.

    Mikešić I et al. (2012), footnote 6.

  104. 104.

    Ofgem (2009), para 3.13.

  105. 105.

    See, for example, de Hauteclocque A (2009b), pp. 93 and 96.

  106. 106.

    For entry barriers generally, see Aghion P and Bolton P (1987).

  107. 107.

    For an analysis of the economics of long-term supply contracts, see Glachant JM and de Hauteclocque A (2009).

  108. 108.

    Regulation 330/2010 (Block Exemption Regulation for vertical agreements); Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, Official Journal C 130, 19.05.2010, pp. 1–46.

  109. 109.

    Communication from the Commission, Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the European gas and electricity sectors, 10.1.2007, COM(2006) 851 final, para 20.

  110. 110.

    DG Competition report on energy sector inquiry, SEC(2006)1724 (10 January 2007), pp. 284–285, para 989.

  111. 111.

    See also Case C-17/03 VEMW and others [2005] ECR I-4983.

  112. 112.

    See Bellantuono G (2008).

  113. 113.

    Point (d) of Article 1(1) of Regulation 330/2010 (Block Exemption Regulation for vertical agreements).

  114. 114.

    Commission, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (2010/C 130/01), para 129.

  115. 115.

    Article 2(1) of Regulation 330/2010 (Block Exemption Regulation for vertical agreements).

  116. 116.

    Article 3(1) of Regulation 330/2010 (Block Exemption Regulation for vertical agreements).

  117. 117.

    Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation 330/2010 (Block Exemption Regulation for vertical agreements).

  118. 118.

    Commission, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (2010/C 130/01), para 131.

  119. 119.

    Talus K (2010), p. 154.

  120. 120.

    See, for example, de Hauteclocque A (2009b), p. 95.

  121. 121.

    Electricidade de Portugal/Pego Project [1993] OJ C265/3.

  122. 122.

    REN/Turbogas [1996] OJ C118/7.

  123. 123.

    Commission Decision REN/Turbogas, OJ C 118/7, 1996.

  124. 124.

    Talus K (2010), p. 154.

  125. 125.

    Joined Cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-388/94, European Night Services Ltd (ENS) and Others v Commission [1998] ECR II-3141.

  126. 126.

    Ibid, para 230. See also Talus K (2010), pp. 155–156.

  127. 127.

    Case COMP/37.966—Distrigaz.

  128. 128.

    Case COMP/39.386—Long Term Electricity Contracts France.

  129. 129.

    Case COMP/39.387—Long Term Electricity Contracts Belgium.

  130. 130.

    BKartA v E.ON Ruhrgas, decision of 13 January 2006 (B8-113/03), upheld by BGH, judgment of 10 February 2009—KVR 67/07.

  131. 131.

    Case COMP/39.386—Long Term Electricity Contracts France.

  132. 132.

    Case COMP/39.387—Long Term Electricity Contracts Belgium.

  133. 133.

    Summary of Commission Decision of 17 March 2010 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/39.386—Long Term Electricity Contracts France).

  134. 134.

    See also Commission, Competition: Commission confirms sending Statement of Objections to Distrigaz concerning Belgian gas supply market, MEMO/06/197, 16 May 2006; Commission, Notice published pursuant to Article 27(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in Case COMP/B-1/37966—Distrigaz [2007] OJ C77/14; Commission, Antitrust: Commission increases competition in the Belgian gas market—frequently asked questions, MEMO/07/407, 11 October 2007; Scholz U and Purps S (2010).

  135. 135.

    See Scholz U and Purps S (2010).

  136. 136.

    BKartA v E.ON Ruhrgas, decision of 13 January 2006 (B8-113/03), upheld by BGH, judgment of 10 February 2009—KVR 67/07.

  137. 137.

    See Talus K (2010), pp. 160–161.

  138. 138.

    Talus K (2010), p. 163.

  139. 139.

    For platforms generally, see Mäntysaari P (2010b), section 2.2. For an example, see Fried J (2010), pp. 182–183, point 296.

  140. 140.

    EFET Allowances Appendix (Power); Form of Part [7] to the Schedule to an ISDA Master Agreement for EU Emissions Allowance Transactions (incorporating options) (Version 5: May 2012) (Modified for Phase 3 delivery). See Fried J (2010), pp. 265–267, points 448–449.

  141. 141.

    Varholy J and Fuhr T (2009), § 28, number 3.

  142. 142.

    Varholy J and Fuhr T (2009), § 28, number 5.

  143. 143.

    Varholy J and Fuhr T (2009), § 28, numbers 7 and 9.

  144. 144.

    Varholy J and Fuhr T (2009), § 28, number 10.

  145. 145.

    Varholy J and Fuhr T (2009), § 28, number 11.

  146. 146.

    Varholy J and Fuhr T (2009), § 28, number 12.

  147. 147.

    Varholy J and Fuhr T (2009), § 28, number 13.

  148. 148.

    Varholy J and Fuhr T (2009), § 28, number 15.

  149. 149.

    Varholy J and Fuhr T (2009), § 28, number 17.

  150. 150.

    Varholy J and Fuhr T (2009), § 28, number 17.

  151. 151.

    Varholy J and Fuhr T (2009), § 28, number 18.

  152. 152.

    Ofgem (2009), para 3.74.

  153. 153.

    Varholy J and Fuhr T (2009), § 28, number 19.

  154. 154.

    Varholy J and Fuhr T (2009), § 28, number 20.

  155. 155.

    Varholy J and Fuhr T (2009), § 28, number 21.

  156. 156.

    The IETA Emissions Trading Master Agreement for the EU Scheme is governed by English law unless the parties agree otherwise. Section 14.7 of the IETA Master Agreement (Version 3.0, 2008).

  157. 157.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 1.1.

  158. 158.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 1.2.

  159. 159.

    Varholy J and Fuhr T (2009), § 28, number 28.

  160. 160.

    The EEI Agreement (Version 2.1), Section 2.2.

  161. 161.

    See also Varholy J and Fuhr T (2009), § 28, number 28.

  162. 162.

    Generally, see Mäntysaari P (2010b), section 2.2.

  163. 163.

    Varholy J and Fuhr T (2009), § 28, number 23.

  164. 164.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 22.1. The exclusion of the CISG is not necessary, because the CISG does not apply to the sale of electricity. CISG Article 2(f).

  165. 165.

    Article 1 of Regulation 593/2008 (Rome I).

  166. 166.

    For the governing law, see Article 4(1) of Regulation 1346/2000 (Insolvency Regulation).

  167. 167.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 1.1.

  168. 168.

    The EEI Agreement (Version 2.1), Section 10.6.

  169. 169.

    Varholy J and Fuhr T (2009), § 28, number 25.

  170. 170.

    The EEI Agreement (Version 2.1), Section 1.2 and Cover Sheet.

  171. 171.

    Harding PC (2010), pp. 12–13 and 23.

  172. 172.

    Fried J (2010), pp. 184–185, point 301.

  173. 173.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 3.1.

  174. 174.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 3.4.

  175. 175.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 3.2.

  176. 176.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 1.1.

  177. 177.

    Varholy J and Fuhr T (2009), § 28, number 30.

  178. 178.

    The EEI Agreement (Version 2.1), Section 2.2.

  179. 179.

    Varholy J and Fuhr T (2009), § 28, number 31.

  180. 180.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 13.1.

  181. 181.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 13.2. See also EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 8.3.

  182. 182.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 13.4.

  183. 183.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 13.1, § 13.2 and § 5.2.

  184. 184.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 13.5.

  185. 185.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 13.6.

  186. 186.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 13.1 and § 13.3.

  187. 187.

    See Principal Agreement Annex. See also Fried J (2010), p. 239, point 385a.

  188. 188.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 14.4.

  189. 189.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 14.1.

  190. 190.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 14.2.

  191. 191.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 14.3.

  192. 192.

    For credit enhancements in general, see Mäntysaari P (2010b), section 11.6. For electricity trading, see Fried J (2010), pp. 290–307, points 512–551.

  193. 193.

    Fried J (2010), p. 291, point 516.

  194. 194.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 16.

  195. 195.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 17.1.

  196. 196.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 17.2(a).

  197. 197.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 17.2.

  198. 198.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 17.2.

  199. 199.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 10.1.

  200. 200.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 4.2.

  201. 201.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 10.2.

  202. 202.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 11.1.

  203. 203.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 13.3.

  204. 204.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 19.1.

  205. 205.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 19.2.

  206. 206.

    Fried J (2010), p. 247, point 402.

  207. 207.

    For representations and warranties, see EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 21.

  208. 208.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 17.2.

  209. 209.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 17.1.

  210. 210.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 15.1.

  211. 211.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 15.2, § 15.3, and § 15.4.

  212. 212.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 14.3(b).

  213. 213.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 7.2.

  214. 214.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 7.4.

  215. 215.

    The EEI Agreement (Version 2.1), Section 3.3.

  216. 216.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 7.1.

  217. 217.

    The EEI Agreement (Version 2.1), section 1.23.

  218. 218.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 7.1.

  219. 219.

    The EEI Agreement (Version 2.1), section 1.23.

  220. 220.

    ACER, Framework Guidelines on Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management for Electricity (29 July 2011), section 6.2.

  221. 221.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 10.2.

  222. 222.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 10.2.

  223. 223.

    The EEI Agreement (Version 2.1), section 10.1.

  224. 224.

    § 314(1) BGB.

  225. 225.

    The EEI Agreement (Version 2.1), section 5.1.

  226. 226.

    The EEI Agreement (Version 2.1), section 5.2.

  227. 227.

    The EEI Agreement (Version 2.1), section 5.6.

  228. 228.

    Fried J (2010), p. 210, point 358; Section 5(a)(vi) of the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement. The ISDA Master Agreement’s cross default clause does not apply unless parties choose it in the Schedule.

  229. 229.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 10.5.

  230. 230.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 10.3.

  231. 231.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 10.4.

  232. 232.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 10.5(c)(ii). See Fried J (2010), p. 214, point 361b; Harding PC (2010), p. 253 (on Section 6(a) of the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement).

  233. 233.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 10.5(c)(iv). See Fried J (2010), p. 213, point 361. The grace period would be 15 days according to Section 5(a)(vii) of the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement.

  234. 234.

    Fried J (2010), p. 215, point 361c.

  235. 235.

    See Section 6(a) and Section 5(a)(vii)(4) of the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement.

  236. 236.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 11.1.

  237. 237.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 11.2.

  238. 238.

    For German law, § 103 InsO and § 119 InsO. § 104 InsO provides for an exemption.

  239. 239.

    Varholy J and Fuhr T (2009), § 28, numbers 31–33; Mäntysaari P (2010b), section 9.6.5.

  240. 240.

    Article 3(1) of Directive 98/26/EC (Directive on settlement finality). For German law, see § 104 InsO.

  241. 241.

    Fried J (2010), pp. 312–313, point 560.

  242. 242.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 13.3.

  243. 243.

    The EEI Agreement (Version 2.1), section 6.4.

  244. 244.

    See § 307 BGB.

  245. 245.

    See Fried J (2010), p. 233, point 376.

  246. 246.

    See Fried J (2010), p. 202, point 335. For different legal doctrines, see, for example, Mäntysaari P (2010b), section 5.5.3.

  247. 247.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 12.1 and § 12.2.

  248. 248.

    Mäntysaari P (2010b), section 2.4.3.

  249. 249.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 12.1 and § 12.2.

  250. 250.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 12.3.

  251. 251.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 12.3.

  252. 252.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 7.2.

  253. 253.

    See Fried J (2010), p. 202, point 337.

  254. 254.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 12.4.

  255. 255.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 12.4.

  256. 256.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 8.1.

  257. 257.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 8.2.

  258. 258.

    Fried J (2010), p. 204, point 339.

  259. 259.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 13.5. For EU law, see Directive 2011/7/EU on combating late payment in commercial transactions (recast).

  260. 260.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 13.2.

  261. 261.

    § 288(2) BGB.

  262. 262.

    Compare CISG Article 71.

  263. 263.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 9.

  264. 264.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 10.5.

  265. 265.

    Article 2(2) of ENTSO-E Network Code on Operational Planning and Scheduling (24 September 2013).

  266. 266.

    The EEI Agreement (Version 2.1), section 1.54.

  267. 267.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 4.2.

  268. 268.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 4.1.

  269. 269.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 6.1.

  270. 270.

    The EEI Agreement (Version 2.1), section 3.1.

  271. 271.

    The EEI Agreement (Version 2.1), section 3.2.

  272. 272.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 6.7.

  273. 273.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 5.1.

  274. 274.

    See Fried J (2010), p. 198, point 327.

  275. 275.

    For options, EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 13.1.

  276. 276.

    For options, EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 13.2. See also EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 8.3.

  277. 277.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 5.2.

  278. 278.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 5.3.

  279. 279.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 5.4.

  280. 280.

    Generally, see Mäntysaari P (2010a, 2012).

  281. 281.

    See, for example, EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 6(1) on the current, frequency and voltage.

  282. 282.

    See Neveling S and Schönrock KP (2009), § 29, number 73.

  283. 283.

    See, for example, Balthasar M (2007), pp. 34–35.

  284. 284.

    Neveling S and Schönrock KP (2009), § 29, number 65.

  285. 285.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 6.7; The EEI Agreement (Version 2.1), section 3.2.

  286. 286.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 6.1.

  287. 287.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 6.2.

  288. 288.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 4.1.

  289. 289.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 6.7.

  290. 290.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 4.2.

  291. 291.

    The EEI Agreement (Version 2.1), section 3.2.

  292. 292.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 6.7.

  293. 293.

    For the role of the delivery point of oil, see, for example, The Economist, Wide-spread confusion. What exactly, is the price of oil? (16 June 2011): “The contracts for WTI stipulate ‘for delivery’ to windswept Cushing, Oklahoma … which is strategically situated to serve the refineries of the Gulf of Mexico … This gave oil firms lots of incentive to build pipelines to Cushing: in recent months oil has poured into Cushing’s growing and labyrinthine storage facilities”.

  294. 294.

    Neveling S and Schönrock KP (2009), § 29, number 66.

  295. 295.

    Annex 1 to the EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)) for the definition of “Contract Quantity”. The EEI Agreement (Version 2.1), section 1.49.

  296. 296.

    See, for example, Neveling S and Schönrock KP (2009), § 29, number 4.

  297. 297.

    Hunt S and Shuttleworth G (1996), pp. 128–129.

  298. 298.

    Hunt S and Shuttleworth G (1996), p. 129.

  299. 299.

    Neveling S and Schönrock KP (2009), § 29, number 62.

  300. 300.

    Neveling S and Schönrock KP (2009), § 29, number 61.

  301. 301.

    Neveling S and Schönrock KP (2009), § 29, number 64.

  302. 302.

    Neveling S and Schönrock KP (2009), § 29, number 64.

  303. 303.

    See, for example, EEX Contract Specifications (0041a, 22 November 2014), section 2.1.3. For US terminology, see Deng SJ and Oren SS (2006), p. 943.

  304. 304.

    Neveling S and Schönrock KP (2009), § 29, number 56.

  305. 305.

    For German law, see § 4 StromNZV. See also Neveling S and Schönrock KP (2009), § 29, number 57.

  306. 306.

    Deng SJ and Oren SS (2006), p. 947.

  307. 307.

    Ibid.

  308. 308.

    Neveling S and Schönrock KP (2009), § 29, number 63.

  309. 309.

    See, for example, Wegerich C and Seiferth C (2009).

  310. 310.

    Hunt S and Shuttleworth G (1996), p. 111.

  311. 311.

    Neveling S and Schönrock KP (2009), § 29, number 54.

  312. 312.

    For the definition of (delivery) schedule, see EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 4.2.

  313. 313.

    See also Neveling S and Schönrock KP (2009), § 29, number 55.

  314. 314.

    BGH, judgment of 24 March 2010—VIII ZR 178/08. The BGH argued: “Da die Vertragsparteien nach dem im bürgerlichen Recht geltenden Grundsatz der Vertragsfreiheit Leistung und Gegenleistung grundsätzlich frei regeln können, sind allerdings formularmäßige Abreden, die Art und Umfang der Hauptleistung oder der hierfür zu erbringenden Vergütung unmittelbar bestimmen, von der gesetzlichen Inhaltskontrolle nach §§ 307 ff. BGB ausgenommen … Ihre Festlegung ist grundsätzlich Sache der Vertragsparteien, denn es gibt vielfach keine gesetzliche Preisreglung, die bei Unwirksamkeit der vertraglichen Abrede gemäß § 306 Abs. 2 BGB an deren Stelle treten könnte … Zu den einer richterlichen Inhaltskontrolle nach §§ 307 ff. BGB entzogenen Preisbestimmungen zählen auch solche Klauseln, die den Preis bei Vertragsschluss zwar nicht unmittelbar beziffern, jedoch die für die Ermittlung des Preises maßgeblichen Bewertungsfaktoren und das hierbei einzuhaltende Verfahren festlegen … Denn auch die vertragliche Festlegung preisbildender Faktoren gehört zum Kernbereich privatautonomer Vertragsgestaltung …”

  315. 315.

    For gas, see Talus K (2010), p. 15.

  316. 316.

    Finnerty J (1996), pp. 59–60.

  317. 317.

    Arowolo O (2005). For gas, see Talus K (2010), p. 16.

  318. 318.

    Putzka F (2009), pp. 31–32.

  319. 319.

    Generally, see Cameron P (2007).

  320. 320.

    DG Competition report on energy sector inquiry, SEC(2006)1724 (10 January 2007), pp. 284–285, para 989.

  321. 321.

    Recital 20 of Directive 2009/72/EC (Third Electricity Directive).

  322. 322.

    Article 37(1)(k) of Directive 2009/72/EC (Third Electricity Directive).

  323. 323.

    Joined Cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-388/94, European Night Services Ltd (ENS) and Others v Commission [1998] ECR II-3141, para 230. See also Talus K (2010), pp. 155–156.

  324. 324.

    Scottish Nuclear, Nuclear Energy Agreement (Case IV/33.473) Commission Decision 91/329/EEC [1991] OJ L178/31.

  325. 325.

    Talus K (2010), p. 154.

  326. 326.

    Transgás/Turbogás, XXVIth Report on Competition Policy (1996), pp. 133–135.

  327. 327.

    Talus K (2010), p. 155.

  328. 328.

    Recital 13 of the First Gas Market Directive; recitals 7–8 and recital 25 of the Second Gas Market Directive; Talus K (2010), p. 121.

  329. 329.

    Directive 2009/73/EC (Third Gas Market Directive).

  330. 330.

    Recital 42 of Directive 2009/73/EC (Third Gas Market Directive).

  331. 331.

    See, for example, recital 37 of Directive 2009/73/EC (Third Gas Market Directive).

  332. 332.

    Recital 37 of Directive 2004/67/EC.

  333. 333.

    DG Competition report on energy sector inquiry, SEC(2006)1724 (10 January 2007), p. 209, para 639.

  334. 334.

    Ibid, p. 236, para 775.

  335. 335.

    Article 35(1) of Directive 2009/73/EC (Third Gas Directive). See also Article 48(1) on temporary derogations from Article 32 in the event of serious economic and financial difficulties because of take-or-pay commitments.

  336. 336.

    Article 48(3) of Directive 2009/73/EC (Third Gas Directive).

  337. 337.

    See Articles 21(1), 27(1), and 27(3) of Directive 2003/55/EC (Second Gas Directive). See also Talus K (2010), pp. 122–125.

  338. 338.

    Talus K (2010), p. 122.

  339. 339.

    Neveling S and Schönrock KP (2009), § 29, number 69.

  340. 340.

    DG Competition report on energy sector inquiry, SEC(2006)1724 (10 January 2007), pp. 284–285, para 929.

  341. 341.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 7.2 and § 7.4.

  342. 342.

    See Articles 16(7) and 37(6) of Directive 2009/72/EC (Third Electricity Directive).

  343. 343.

    Hunt S and Shuttleworth G (1996), p. 142.

  344. 344.

    Generally, see Gross G and Galiana FD (1987) and Alfares HK and Nazeeruddin M (2002).

  345. 345.

    Hunt S and Shuttleworth G (1996), p. 148.

  346. 346.

    Neveling S and Schönrock KP (2009), § 29, number 58.

  347. 347.

    See, for example, Mäntysaari P (2010b), Chapters 8–11.

  348. 348.

    Neveling S and Schönrock KP (2009), § 29, number 72.

  349. 349.

    See, for example, Neveling S and Schönrock KP (2009), § 29, number 67.

  350. 350.

    Deng SJ and Oren SS (2006), p. 943.

  351. 351.

    Kristiansen T (2004).

  352. 352.

    Neveling S and Schönrock KP (2009), § 29, number 71.

  353. 353.

    See Lokau B and Ritzau M (2009), § 5, number 22.

  354. 354.

    For gas, see Däuper O and Lokau B (2009), § 4, number 7.

  355. 355.

    Hunt S and Shuttleworth G (1996), p. 110.

  356. 356.

    Deng SJ and Oren SS (2006), p. 947.

  357. 357.

    Neveling S and Schönrock KP (2009), § 29, numbers 68 and 71.

  358. 358.

    Deng SJ and Oren SS (2006), p. 947.

  359. 359.

    Neveling S and Schönrock KP (2009), § 29, number 69.

  360. 360.

    Hunt S and Shuttleworth G (1996), pp. 111–112.

  361. 361.

    Neveling S and Schönrock KP (2009), § 29, number 70.

  362. 362.

    Hunt S and Shuttleworth G (1996), p. 110.

  363. 363.

    Lokau B and Ritzau M (2009), § 5, number 36; Fried J (2010), p. 285, point 500.

  364. 364.

    Däuper O and Lokau B (2009), § 4, number 7.

  365. 365.

    BGH, judgment of 24 March 2010—VIII ZR 178/08.

  366. 366.

    Ofgem (2009), para 3.81.

  367. 367.

    BGH, judgment of 24 March 2010—VIII ZR 178/08. The BGH argued: “Daher hat die höchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung Preisänderungsklauseln nicht generell für unwirksam erachtet. Sie stellen vielmehr ein geeignetes und anerkanntes Instrument zur Bewahrung des Gleichgewichts von Preis und Leistung bei langfristigen Verträgen dar. Denn sie dienen dazu, einerseits dem Verwender das Risiko langfristiger Kalkulation abzunehmen und ihm seine Gewinnspanne trotz nachträglicher ihn belastender Kostensteigerungen zu sichern, und andererseits den Vertragspartner davor zu bewahren, dass der Verwender mögliche künftige Kostenerhöhungen vorsorglich schon bei Vertragsschluss durch Risikozuschläge aufzufangen versucht …”

  368. 368.

    For variable terms in long-term contracts in general, see Mäntysaari P (2010b), section 5.5.4.

  369. 369.

    Putzka F (2009), p. 133.

  370. 370.

    See, for example, Commission decision (2004/271/EC) in Case COMP/M.2947—Verbund/EnergieAllianz, para 86.

  371. 371.

    Putzka F (2009), p. 133.

  372. 372.

    Putzka F (2009), p. 28.

  373. 373.

    Däuper O and Lokau B (2009), § 4, number 4:

  374. 374.

    Däuper O and Lokau B (2009), § 4, number 4.

  375. 375.

    Däuper O and Lokau B (2009), § 4, number 5.

  376. 376.

    Däuper O and Lokau B (2009), § 4, number 4.

  377. 377.

    Däuper O and Lokau B (2009), § 4, number 5.

  378. 378.

    Article 107(1) TFEU.

  379. 379.

    See Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I-2099, para 58.

  380. 380.

    Joined Cases T-80/06 and T-182/09 Budapesti Erőmű Zrt v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2012:65, paras 65–69.

  381. 381.

    Commission, press release IP/91/642, 3 July 1991. The companies were Allied Signal, EKA Nobel, and Stracel/UPM. The Commission also referred to previous contracts with Pechiney, Usinor Sacilor, and Exxon Chemicals.

  382. 382.

    Case C 38/1992 Alumix, Decision of 4 December 2006, OJ C 288, 1.10.1996, p. 4.

  383. 383.

    Cases Nos C 38/a/2004 and 36/b/2006 Alcoa, OJ L 227, 28.8.2010, pp. 62–94.

  384. 384.

    Case No C36/A/2006 Terni, OJ L 144, 4.6.2008, pp. 37–54. Appeals dismissed in Joined cases C-448/10 P to C-450/10 P ThyssenKrupp Acciai Speciali Terni and Others v Commission [2011] ECR I-00147.

  385. 385.

    For counterparty risk generally, see Mäntysaari P (2010b), Chapter 6.

  386. 386.

    See Lokau B and Ritzau M (2009), § 5, number 23.

  387. 387.

    For credit enhancement methods generally, see Mäntysaari P (2010b), section 11.6.

  388. 388.

    Articles 12 and 15 of Directive 2009/72/EC (Third Electricity Directive).

  389. 389.

    The parties must manage: (1) grid access, delivery point, and voltage level; (2) volume; (3) transmission and distribution capacity; (4) balance; (5) measurement; (6) separation of physical rights, service rights, and financial rights; (7) settlement; and (8) price volatility.

  390. 390.

    See, for example, EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 6.2 (according to which electricity shall be delivered according to the delivery schedules specified in each individual contract) and § 4.2 (defining the schedule).

  391. 391.

    See, for example, EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 4.1 (referring to the contract quantity at the delivery point).

  392. 392.

    Article 12(d, g) of Directive 2009/72/EC (Third Electricity Directive). For DSOs, see Articles 25(1) and 25(3).

  393. 393.

    See also EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 6.4.

  394. 394.

    EFET General Agreement (Version 2.1(a)), § 6.5.

  395. 395.

    For the German model, see Monopolkommission (2013).

  396. 396.

    See Toke D (2010), pp. 29–30.

References

  • Aghion P, Bolton P (1987) Contracts as a barrier to entry. Am Econ Rev 77(3):388–401. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1804102

  • Alfares HK, Nazeeruddin M (2002) Electric load forecasting: literature survey and classification of methods. Int J Syst Sci 33(1):23–34. doi:10.1080/00207720110067421

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Arowolo O (2005) Abolition of long-term contracts: what are the implications and options for bankability in energy projects financing? CAR (CEPMLP Annual Review) 8. Available at CEPMLP website. http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/

  • Balthasar M (2007) Elektrizitätslieferungsverträge im Hinblick auf die Strommarktöffnung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des schweizerischen und europäischen Wettbewerbsrechts. Schulthess, Zürich

    Google Scholar 

  • Bardt H, Chrischilles E, Growitsch C et al (2014a) Gutachten. Eigenerzeugung und Selbstverbrauch von Strom. Stand, Potentiale und Trends. Im Auftrag des BDEW Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft e. V. Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln (IW), Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universität zu Köln (EWI), Cologne, 4 April

    Google Scholar 

  • Bardt H, Chrischilles E, Growitsch C et al (2014b) Eigenerzeugung und Selbstverbrauch von Strom – Stand, Potentiale und Trends. Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft 38(2):83–99. doi:10.1007/s12398-014-0133-0

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bellantuono G (2008) Long term contracts in US and EU: where are we going? EU Energy Policy Blog

    Google Scholar 

  • Borchert J, Hasenbeck M (2009) Bewertung und Steuerung von Kraftwerksscheiben. Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft 33(2):115–126. doi:10.1007/s12398-009-0014-0

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cameron P (2007) Competition in the energy markets: law and regulation in the European Union. OUP, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Commission, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (2010/C 130/01)

    Google Scholar 

  • Däuper O, Lokau B (2009) Der Markt für Gas (empirische Darstellung). In: Zenke I, Schäfer R (eds) Energiehandel in Europa. Öl, Gas, Strom, Derivate, Zertifikate, 2nd edn. C.H. Beck, München, § 4, pp 37–59

    Google Scholar 

  • de Hauteclocque A (2009a) Efficiency, competition and long term contracts in electricity markets. Summary and conclusions. Presented at the workshop organized by the Loyola de Palacio Program of the European University Institute and Gis Larsen, Florence, 15–16 January 2009

    Google Scholar 

  • de Hauteclocque A (2009b) Legal uncertainty and competition policy in European deregulated electricity markets: the case of long-term exclusive supply contracts. World Competition 32(1):91–112

    Google Scholar 

  • Deng SJ, Oren SS (2006) Electricity derivatives and risk management. Energy 31(6–7):940–953. doi:10.1016/j.energy.2005.02.015

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • DG Competition Report on Energy Sector inquiry, 10 January 2007, SEC(2006) 1724

    Google Scholar 

  • Finnerty J (1996) Project financing: assets-based financial engineering. Wiley, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Finon D, Perez Y (2008) Investment risk allocation in restructured electricity markets. The need of vertical arrangements. LARSEN Working Paper no 12

    Google Scholar 

  • Fried J (2010) B. Rechtliche Bewältigung des OTC-Handels. In: Schwintowski HP (ed) Handbuch Energiehandel, 2nd edn. Erich Schmidt Verlag, Berlin, pp 153–336

    Google Scholar 

  • Glachant JM, de Hauteclocque A (2009) Long-term energy supply contracts in European competition policy: Fuzzy not crazy. Energy Policy 37(12):5399–5407. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2009.07.054

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Green R (2006) Investment and generation capacity. In: Lévêque F (ed) Competitive electricity markets and sustainability. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp 21–53. doi:10.4337/9781847204356.00011

    Google Scholar 

  • Gross G, Galiana FD (1987) Short-term load forecasting. Proc IEEE 75(12):1558–1573. doi:10.1109/PROC.1987.13927

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harding PC (2010) Mastering the ISDA master agreements: a practical guide for negotiation, 3rd edn. Pearson Education Limited, Harlow

    Google Scholar 

  • Hsu M (1998) Spark spread options are hot. Electr J 11(2):28–39

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hünerwadel A (2007) Arten und Formen des Stromhandels, insbesondere Börsen- und Derivathandel. In: Weber RH (ed) Stromhandel. Schulthess, Zürich, pp 49–64

    Google Scholar 

  • Hunt S, Shuttleworth G (1996) Competition and choice in electricity. Wiley, Chichester

    Google Scholar 

  • Kristiansen T (2004) Pricing of contracts for difference in the Nordic market. Energy Policy 32(9):1075–1085

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lokau B, Ritzau M (2009) Der Markt für Strom (empirische Darstellung). In: Zenke I, Schäfer R (eds) Energiehandel in Europa. Öl, Gas, Strom, Derivate, Zertifikate, 2nd edn. C.H. Beck, München, § 5

    Google Scholar 

  • Mäntysaari P (2010a) The law of corporate finance. General principles and EU law, vol I: Cash flow, risk, agency, information. Springer, Heidelberg

    Google Scholar 

  • Mäntysaari P (2010b) The law of corporate finance. General principles and EU law, vol II: Contracts I General. Springer, Heidelberg

    Google Scholar 

  • Mäntysaari P (2010c) The law of corporate finance. General principles and EU law, vol III: Funding, exit, takeovers. Springer, Heidelberg

    Google Scholar 

  • Mäntysaari P (2012) Organising the firm: theories of commercial law, corporate governance and corporate law. Springer, Heidelberg

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Midttun A, Handeland J, Henriksen JT et al (2001) Nordic business strategies. In: Midttun A (ed) European energy industry business strategies. Elsevier Global Energy Policy and Economics Series. Elsevier, the Netherlands, pp 23–74

    Google Scholar 

  • Mikešić I, Thieme H, Strauch B (Salans LLP) (2012) Juristische Prüfung der Befreiung der Eigenerzeugung von der EEG-Umlage nach § 37 Absatz 1 und 3 EEG – Kurzgutachten – Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, 27 August

    Google Scholar 

  • Monopolkommission (2013) Sondergutachten 65. Energie 2013: Wettbewerb in Zeiten der Energiewende. Sondergutachten der Monopolkommission gemäß § 62 Abs. 1 EnWG. Bonn

    Google Scholar 

  • Neuhoff K, von Hirschhaussen C (2005) Long-term vs. short-term contracts: a European perspective on natural gas. CWPE 0539 and EPRG 0505. Available at EPRG website. http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/

  • Neveling S, Schönrock KP (2009) Nicht standardisierte Liefer- und Handelsverträge sowie vertragliche Voraussetzungen auf der Netzzugangsseite. In: Zenke I, Schäfer R (eds) Energiehandel in Europa. Öl, Gas, Strom, Derivate, Zertifikate, 2nd edn. C.H. Beck, München, § 29

    Google Scholar 

  • OECD/IEA (2005) Lessons from liberalised electricity markets. IEA, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Ofgem (2009) Liquidity in the GB wholesale energy markets, 8 June 2009

    Google Scholar 

  • Pöyry Management Consulting Oy (2013) Suomalaisen saha- ja puutuoteteollisuuden toimiympäristön vertailu keskeisimpiin kilpailijamaihin nähden. Loppuraportti. Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö, 3 September

    Google Scholar 

  • Putzka F (2009) Die Anwendbarkeit der AGB-rechtlichen Inhaltskontrolle auf Leistungsvorhaltungs- und Stromlieferverträge zwischen Erzeuger und Weiterverkäufer. Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Energierecht an der Universität zu Köln, Band 151. Nomos, Baden-Baden

    Google Scholar 

  • Scholz U, Purps S (2010) The application of EC competition law in the energy sector. J Eur Competition Law Pract 1(1):37–51

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Spence DB, Prentice R (2012) The transformation of American energy markets and the problem of market power. B C Law Rev 53(1):131–202

    Google Scholar 

  • Spicker J (2010) A. Formen des OTC-Handels. In: Schwintowski HP (ed) Handbuch Energiehandel, 2nd edn. Erich Schmidt Verlag, Berlin, pp 31–152

    Google Scholar 

  • Toke D (2010) Wind-power outcomes: myths and reality. In: Strachan PA, Toke D, Lal D (eds) Wind power and power politics: international perspectives. Routledge studies in science, technology, and society 9. Routledge, New York, pp 18–36

    Google Scholar 

  • Talus K (2010) Vertical natural gas transportation capacity, upstream commodity contracts and EU competition law. Dissertation, University of Helsinki

    Google Scholar 

  • Varholy J, Fuhr T (2009) The evolution of master agreements for the forward trading of wholesale, physical energy commodities in Europe. In: Zenke I, Schäfer R (eds) Energiehandel in Europa. Öl, Gas, Strom, Derivate, Zertifikate, 2nd edn. C.H. Beck, München, § 28

    Google Scholar 

  • Wegerich C, Seiferth C (2009) Zur kartell- und zivilrechtlichen Zulässigkeit von Take-or-Pay-Klauseln in Gaslieferverträgen mit Weiterverteilern. Recht der Energiewirtschaft 2/2009, pp 48–54

    Google Scholar 

  • Wurmnest W (2008) Windige Geschäfte? Zur Bestellung von Sicherungsrechten an Offshore-Windkraftanlagen. Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 72(2):236–263

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Accounting and Commercial Law, Hanken School of Economics, Vaasa, Finland

    Petri Mäntysaari

Authors
  1. Petri Mäntysaari
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Mäntysaari, P. (2015). Long-Term Electricity Supply Contracts. In: EU Electricity Trade Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16513-4_8

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation