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The Evolution of China’s Role in Peacekeeping and Atrocity Crime Prevention

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Perspectives on Peacekeeping and Atrocity Prevention

Part of the book series: Humanitarian Solutions in the 21st Century ((HSIC))

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Abstract

All aspects of the global landscape are changing; in particular, international geopolitical power balances are shifting. In the wake of interventions in Libya, Afghanistan, and Iraq, Western states’ moral and ethical authority, based on Liberal ideals, is increasingly being challenged by rising (or re-emerging) powers’ with pragmatic approaches to international peace and security.

This chapter examines how the pursuit of more pragmatic or instrumental approaches to international peace and security pursued, particularly by China, are shaping UN peacekeeping and atrocity crime prevention. Specifically, this chapter explores how China’s position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, combined with its increasing contributions to peacekeeping forces, provides China with the potential to have agency in and impact on UN peacekeeping policy and practice.

This chapter presents the argument that the pejorative rhetoric of irresponsibility that has been increasingly invoked since China’s use of the veto regarding operations in Syria in 2013 is unhelpful and overlooks many of the opportunities that China presents for achieving positive outcomes in peacekeeping and atrocity crime response. This argument has a number of policy implications, including highlighting the potential for the emergence of an alternative pattern for the development and practice of peace-operations.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The ICISS document stated that “sovereignty is now understood as embracing this dual responsibility” suggesting that even in 2001 there was acceptance of a new interpretation of the norm of sovereignty (ICISS 2001, p. 8). For discussions of R2P as a norm, see also: (Stahn 2007; Welsh et al. 2002; Thakur and Weiss 2009).

  2. 2.

    William Hague (UK Foreign Minister) was reported by the Guardian as saying “How many more need to die before Russia and China allow the UN security council to act?” in the same report Hilary Clinton (US Secretary of State) was quoted as saying: “To block this resolution is to bear responsibility for the horrors that are occurring on the ground in Syria” (Harris et al. 2012).

  3. 3.

    It is worth noting that Security Council Resolution 2118 (27 September 2013) was unanimously passed by the Security Council.

  4. 4.

    Woodhouse and Ramsbotham highlight the need for the training and development of civil society actors to contribute to ensuring that peacekeeping has a “local ownership” to make it more successful. Day and Freeman also highlight the need for well-trained “Police Keeping” forces as they may be more important for ensuring successful outcomes to operations (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham 2006, p. 144; Day and Freeman 2005). At present China has a well-respected UN Police Training centre north of Beijing which engages with a number of countries to develop capacity and skills of forces. It is also in the top ten countries that contribute Police to UN actions (Gill and Huang 2009); and for detailed information on contributions of UN peacekeeping personnel, see UN (2014a, b, c).

  5. 5.

    China’s UN police training centre has produced high quality and effective UN police keepers, who are recognized as excellent internationally. Moreover this centre has engaged with the training of troops from other states—even the other P5—for example it has worked collaboratively with the UK. Personal Communication with Author, Beijing Academic.

  6. 6.

    For example, see discussions of the Brazilian concept of Responsibility while Protecting, A/66/551-S/2011/701 11 November 2011, para. 11(h) see also para. 11(g); also Evans (2012); in addition, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping noted the importance of host government consent for the success of peacekeeping operations (Special Committee on Peacekeeping 2014, p. 15).

  7. 7.

    Significantly, the Chinese White Paper on UN reform has two paragraphs on R2P, wherein it restates the statements in the World Summit Outcome Document, but also highlights the need for related actions to be in accordance with the UN Charter—suggesting a concern about the application of R2P see FMPRC (2005).

  8. 8.

    Importantly in one workshop on the responsibility to protect one of the contributors openly stated that: “I don’t want to let this progress to be abused, or let something like legal interventions become something which has no strict, legal, moral and political limitations” (Yinhong 2012, p. 87).

  9. 9.

    China National Knowledge Institute shows that prior to the Libyan situation in China there were few articles published in China on the “Responsibility to Protect” however after Libya there was a spike in these articles. Suggesting that there is a certain amount of “fire-fighting” in terms of research that is done into these types of issues. For a fuller analysis of the discourse on R2P in China, see Liu 2014.

  10. 10.

    According to the QS world University rankings China has two Beijing universities and three Hong Kong Universities in the top 50 for more information see (QS 2013).

  11. 11.

    A recent background paper shows the importance of ensuring that UN committees have documents translated into the working languages of that committee but also the costs of doing so and the potential savings that could be made: “Background paper to the President of the General Assembly to support the inter-governmental process on treaty body strengthening” A/68/606 of 19 November 2013 (General Assembly 2013).

  12. 12.

    For 2000–2011 the veto was used on 15 occasions, only three times was China one of the vetoing powers and on none of those occasions did it veto alone. For more detailed discussions of the Veto, see: (UN 2010; also Cooper and Fues 2008; Wuthnow 2010).

  13. 13.

    “…China’s increasingly global ‘charm offensive’ requires China to take a sophisticated approach to the principle of sovereignty of host states that are engaged in civil wars” (Hirono 2011, p. 339).

  14. 14.

    For discussions of China and authorization of peacekeeping, see: (Lanteigne 2011; Large 2009; Lee et al. 2011).

  15. 15.

    Indeed the Convention leaves room for interpretation of what counts as the act committed “with the intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group,” (General Assembly 1951).

  16. 16.

    The most notable enquiries have related to intelligence gathering and the Chilcot Enquiry, (Richard Aldrich 2005; also Iraq Inquiry 2014).

  17. 17.

    China is number 14 in the table of troop contributing countries, for more details see UN (2014b); for a breakdown of all the troops China’s contributes, see: UN (2014a).

  18. 18.

    As of January 2014 China doesn’t contribute to UNMIK (Kosovo) and it abstained on the resolution (1244, 10th June 1999); UNISFA (voted in favour of Resolution 1990 adopted June 2011); UNMOGIP (mission started before PRC joined the Council); UNDOF (China did not participate in voting for resolution 350 adopted 1974); MINUSTAH, voted in favour of resolution 1542, 2004; UNAMA voted in favour of 1833 September 2008.

  19. 19.

    Currently China contributes to ten missions, MINURO, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNFICYP, UNIFIL, UNMIL, UNMISS, UNOCI, UNTSO; for details of missions, see UN (2014c).

  20. 20.

    In particular, in advance of the UNSC debate on this issue it was clear that both Russia and China have and continue to have specific concerns surrounding how the objectives and methods of implementation would be limited and/or achieved (particularly in light of Libya), however, these concerns were not incorporated into the final draft of the resolution.

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Correspondence to Catherine Jones .

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Jones, C. (2015). The Evolution of China’s Role in Peacekeeping and Atrocity Crime Prevention. In: Curran, D., Fraser, T., Roeder, L., Zuber, R. (eds) Perspectives on Peacekeeping and Atrocity Prevention. Humanitarian Solutions in the 21st Century. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16372-7_8

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