Abstract
We are interested in how preference correlations can impact policy-maker productivity and their satisfaction with resultant policy. We applied a simulated annealing process as a model of revising draft legislation in peer and committee reviews before submission to a floor vote. Results indicate that having exogenous, common issue priorities is required for productivity but that some structures inhibit productivity, particularly where preference schedules are uncorrelated. Our model also demonstrates lower system efficiency, and lower overall satisfaction, as policy is negotiated through compromise to achieve higher production.
We wish to thank Maksim Tsvetovat who introduced us to applications of simulated annealing to Organizational Theory and inspired us to extend it, adapt it, and to think about organizations and processes where it seems to fit especially well. We also thank an anonymous reviewer for helpful feedback provided on a previous draft of this paper.
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Atherley, S., Dillon, C., Kane, V. (2015). A Model of Policy Formation Through Simulated Annealing: The Impact of Preference Alignment on Productivity and Satisfaction. In: Agarwal, N., Xu, K., Osgood, N. (eds) Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural Modeling, and Prediction. SBP 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9021. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16268-3_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16268-3_10
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