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Argumentation from Reasonableness in the Justification of Judicial Decisions

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Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 112))

Abstract

In legal decision-making reasonableness plays an important role. In the literature, generally speaking, there is a consensus that reasonableness as a norm for judges in the application of law implies that they take into account a combination of different considerations of a normative and factual nature with the aim of reconciling the requirements of abstract formal justice and justice and fairness in the concrete case. Although reasonableness is considered to be an important reason for making an exception to a legal rule, in the legal literature little attention has been paid to the kind of arguments that can constitute a sound justification of such a decision.

The central question I answer in this contribution is what an adequate justification based on argumentation from reasonableness with the function of correcting a legal rule for the concrete case exactly amounts to. My aim is to develop an argumentation model for the rational reconstruction that enables the analyst to make explicit the different considerations underlying a decision that is based on reasonableness so that they can be submitted to rational critique. To do justice to the context-dependency of the concept of reasonableness in the context of legal justification, I will concentrate on the role of reasonableness in a specific domain, civil law in the Netherlands. In civil law in the Netherlands reasonableness plays a central role as a mechanism for the correction of outcomes that would be unacceptable from the perspective of justice in a concrete case.

In this contribution I proceed as follows. First, in (2), I discuss the role of arguments from reasonableness in legal justification: I go into the nature of the argument and I will discuss the content and structure of the complex argumentation underlying a justification based on the correction of a legal rule referring to reasonableness. Then, in (3), I develop an argumentation model for the rational reconstruction of legal arguments from reasonableness. I explain the conditions under which arguments from reasonableness can be correctly used in legal justification. In (4) I concentrate on the role of reasonableness in Dutch Civil Law where it is recognized explicitly as a reason for making an exception. To demonstrate how the argumentation model can be used in the rational reconstruction, in (5) I apply it to an example from Dutch civil law in which this form of argumentation is used. On the basis of an exemplary analysis I explain how the model can be used to establish in what respects argumentation from reasonableness used in this case can be considered as an acceptable contribution to a rational legal discussion.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For the relevant parts of the decisions in this case see A at the end of this contribution. For an analysis of the argumentation in this case see Feteris (2012).

  2. 2.

    See for example Hesselink (1999: 410–411) who discusses the strategic use of reasonableness as a cover for the creation of new law. See also Adinolfi (2009: 383) who points at the fact that argumentation from reasonableness is often used to cover a solution that has been chosen for other reasons that judges do not want to make explicit. See also MacCormick (2005: 170–171) about the question whether the judge acts as a standin-legislator when he creates new law.

  3. 3.

    See Hesselink (1999) for an overview of the use of reasonableness and fairness in European Law. See Bongiovanni et al. (2009) for a discussion of different aspects of the norm of reasonableness in the law.

  4. 4.

    See Aristotle (1980), Ethica Nicomachea (Book V, x). See also Perelman (1979) who argues that the requirement of reasonableness is a requirement for the judge to apply the law in a just way, that is the requirement to treat like cases alike and unlike cases differently.

  5. 5.

    As Hesselink (1999: 59) states, there is a limit to the exertion of a legal right, he who comes to court should have ‘clean hands’, which implies that in certain circumstances it can be reasonable not to apply a rule if the exertion would be unreasonable.

  6. 6.

    Another context where reasonableness is applied is when the conditions of a legal rule are not fulfilled but the judge is of the opinion that not-applying the rule would be unacceptable from the perspective of reasonableness. In such a case he can ‘supplement’ the rule by making an exception that extends the range of application of the rule for the circumstances of the concrete case. This form of using arguments from reasonableness is less problematic from the perspective of legal certainty and predictability because the judge does not limit but extends a particular right. For a discussion of such arguments see Feteris (2005).

  7. 7.

    See for example Alexy (2009: 2007), Bongiovanni et al. (2009: xi–xiv), MacCormick (2005: 162ff).

  8. 8.

    See for example Bongiovanni et al. (2009: xi).

  9. 9.

    See for example Hesselink (1999: 37). See also Alexy (2009).

  10. 10.

    There are also authors who contend that reasonableness is also a principle in its own right, an autonomous principle, that carries its own legal import or status. See for example della Cananea (2009: 306–307).

  11. 11.

    See for example article 3:12 of the Dutch Civil Code that will be discussed in Sect. 11.4 of this contribution.

  12. 12.

    For a discussion of the balancing of arguments in relation to reasonableness see Alexy (2009) and MacCormick (2005: 178–188).

  13. 13.

    As MacCormick (2005: 178–179) argues, reasonableness itself is not a first order value, but a higher-order value which we exemplify in considering a balance of first order, or anyway lower-order values and coming to a conclusion about their application. The task of interpretation of reasonableness in a given context is that of identifying values, interests and the like that are relevant to the given focus of attention. This in turn depends on the types of situation or relationship that are in issue, and on a view of the governing principle or rationale of the branch of law concerned.

  14. 14.

    In the German legal literature such rules of exception are considered as ‘Fallgruppen’ that constitute groups of cases that can be considered as specifications of the open norm, and as such, can function as examples for similar cases. See Hesselink (1999: 48).

  15. 15.

    See also Alexy’s (1989: pp. 223 ff.) principle of universalizability with respect to legal argumentation as expressed in the rules J.2.1 (At least one universal norm must be adduced in the justification of a legal judgement), J.2.2 (whenever it is open to doubt whether a is a T or an Mi, a rule must be put forward which settles this question).

  16. 16.

    Cf. MacCormick (2005: 176) who contends that arguments from reasonableness can be considered as an example of consequentialist reasoning in which consequentialist grounds for an interpretation are given. The consequentialist grounds imply that the judge points to the inexpedient and unjust consequences of adopting a particular standard. These consequentialist arguments can be backed up by arguments from coherence and consistency.

  17. 17.

    See various authors in MacCormick and Summers (1991) for different countries: Aarnio (1991: 152–163) for Finland, La Torre et al. (1991: 221–222) for Italy, Bankowski and MacCormick (1991: 371–373) for the UK and Peczenik and Bergholz (1991: 312) for Sweden.

  18. 18.

    For a discussion of the use of a reference to the ratio legis in legal argumentation see Canale and Tuzet (2009).

  19. 19.

    See MacCormick (2005: 114) about the role of values as the grounds for evaluating judicial consequences.

  20. 20.

    See MacCormick and Summers (1991: 537 ff.) for the different argumentation structures involved in the use of the different forms of argument. Legal systems differ with respect to the question which arguments can be independent fundamental grounds of argumentation or grounds which are dependent upon explicit or implicit principles of a system. See also Alexy (2009: 7–11) about the relation between reasonableness and the weighing of diverse criteria. See also MacCormick (2005: 132 ff.) and MacCormick and Summers (1991: 524 ff.) about the role of objective-teleological arguments and their function in cancelling other arguments. For a more detailed description of the requirements of a justification in the context of teleological-evaluative arguments see Feteris (2007).

  21. 21.

    For a discussion of the rational reconstruction of different forms of legal argumentation see MacCormick and Summers (1991, chapter 13).

  22. 22.

    According to the annotator, ARB (A.R. Bloembergen) the decisions about the term of limitation of which this decision forms part constitute the most important application of article 6:2, 2. According to him this decision is a clear example of the fact that the Dutch Supreme Court wants to limit autonomous elements in the judicial application of law. For an overview of the law regarding the consequences of asbestos cancer in other countries see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asbestos_and_the_law.

  23. 23.

    This case of the Scheldegroep differs from other examples (of the Unworthy Spouse I discussed in the introduction and the Unworthy Grandson that I will discuss in the next section). In this case the Supreme Court does not refer to the goal of the rule or the intention of the legislator to justify an exception: from the legislative history it is clear that the legislator explicitly wanted to include also asbestos cases in the legal rules regarding the term of limitation.

  24. 24.

    For the relevant parts of the decision of the District Court of Haarlem see B at the end of this contribution. For the relevant articles of the Dutch Civil Code see C at the end of this contribution.

  25. 25.

    In appeal, the Court of Appeals (Court of Appeals Amsterdam, August 15, 2002, nr. 1304/01, NJ 2003, 53) rejects the appeal and confirms the decision of the district court. The Court of Appeals adds in 4.3 that the district court, all the more so because the grandson would inherit his father’s part in the inheritance by way of replacement because he has killed his father, is of the opinion that it would be an unacceptable legal consequence that the grandson would have a right to the inheritance according to the standards of reasonableness and fairness.

  26. 26.

    In 2003 the Dutch law of inheritance has been changed, now the relevant articles are 4.3 and 4.12 of the Dutch Civil Code.

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Appendices

A. The Case of the ‘Unworthy Spouse’

DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS NJ 1989/369, 24-11-1989

  • (…)

  • 5.13 Since the district court has assumed that Mrs. van Wylick intended with the marriage - that also according to L was a marriage of convenience- a financial benefit for L, the district court has rightly stressed that to the factual situation described in the foregoing the general legal principle is applicable that he, who has deliberately caused the death of someone else, who has favoured him, should not profit from the this favour.

  • (…)

  • 5.16 In this context it is also important to mention that the aforementioned legal principle is closely related to another legal principle, i.e. that one should not profit form the deliberately caused death of someone else, which principle has among others been expressed in article 885 under 1 book 3 CC. (…)

  • 5.17 Application of the mentioned legal principles leads under the aforementioned facts and circumstances to the conclusion that L is not entitled to the benefit that is the consequence of the community of property created by the marriage without a marriage settlement with mrs. van Wylick.

  • 5.18 Also an examination of the claims of L in light of the requirements of reasonableness and fairness according to which he is supposed to behave in the community of property that is created by the marriage, as is stated by Brouwers c.s., leads to the conclusion that L should not profit from the marital community of property. In this case the court applies a strict standard because the appeal to reasonableness and fairness is aimed at preventing the claims of L completely. Also when applying such a strict standard the court is of the opinion that the claims of L must be considered as so unreasonable and unfair, in the aforementioned special circumstances of this case and also considered in light of the mentioned general legal principles, that the exertion of the claimed rights must be denied to him completely.

B. Articles from the Dutch Civil Code Applied in the Case of the Unworthy Spouse

  • Article 1:100 of the Old Dutch Civil Code

  1. 1.

    The spouses have an equal share in this divided community of property, unless a different division is established by means of a marriage settlement (…).

  • Article 4.3 of the New Dutch Civil Code (introduced after 1990)

  1. 1.

    Legally unworthy to profit from an inheritance are: He who has been condemned irrevocably because he has killed the deceased, he who has tried to kill the deceased or he who has prepared to kill the deceased or has participated in preparing to kill the deceased.

  • Article 6:248, 2 of the Dutch Civil Code

An arrangement that is valid between the creditor and the debtor on the basis of the law, a custom or a legal act, does not apply if this is unacceptable from the perspective of the standards of reasonableness and fairness.

  • Article 3:12 of the Dutch Civil Code

When establishing what reasonableness and fairness require, generally accepted legal principles, legal convictions that are generally accepted in the Netherlands, and social and personal interests in a particular case, should be taken into account.

C. The Case of the ‘Unworthy Grandson’

  • District Court Haarlem, July 24, 2001, nr. 68989

  • 5.7 The exceptional situation of this case has not been foreseen by the legislator. But even if it would have been foreseen, this does not exclude that in certain circumstances the judge can appeal to the ‘derogating’ function of reasonableness and fairness if application of the law would lead to an unacceptable result.

  • 5.8 The Court is of the opinion that in this case such circumstances obtain. The Court holds that the defendant acts in this special case as inheritor and statutory heir of his grandmother because he has killed his father, the inheritor in the first line.

  • (…)

  • 5.10 The rules regarding unworthiness in the law of inheritance make explicit the underlying general legal principle to which the decision of the Supreme Court of December 7 1990 also refers, i.e. that someone should not profit form the intentionally caused death of someone else. In the light of this principle the right of the defendant to exercise his right to his legal share of the inheritance on the basis of clause 4:889 of the Dutch Civil Code would, according to the standards of reasonableness and fairness in the circumstances of this concrete case, lead to an unacceptable result.

  • 5.11 The Court holds that in the present circumstances it is important also that the testatrix, who had suffered a great deal from what the grandson had done to her, had explicitly stated in her will that she did not want that the grandson would get a share of her inheritance. Although it is true that a testator cannot disinherit someone from his legitimate share to the inheritance, the right to the legitimate share is not absolute. In the present circumstances disobeying the will of the testatrix would conflict with the sense of justice in such a serious way that exertion of this right cannot be accepted.

D. Relevant Articles Used in the Case of the Unworthy Grandson

  • Article 4:889 of the Dutch Civil Code (now article 4.12):

  1. 1.

    Replacement in the direct downward line takes place infinitively.

    • Article 4:885 of the Dutch Civil Coce (now article 4.3):

The following persons can considered to be unworthy to be an inheritor and can, for this reason be excluded from the inheritance:

  1. 1.

    He who has been convicted of killing of trying to kill the deceased;

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Feteris, E.T. (2015). Argumentation from Reasonableness in the Justification of Judicial Decisions. In: Bustamante, T., Dahlman, C. (eds) Argument Types and Fallacies in Legal Argumentation. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 112. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16148-8_11

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