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Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 112))

Abstract

In this chapter, we offer a Bayesian model for evaluating expert testimony in the court room. Statements from a putative expert are difficult for a legal decision maker to assess, as the legal decision maker – who lacks expert knowledge on the subject issue – must distinguish between experts that are highly reliable and experts that are less reliable. A methodology for the assessment of the expert testimony has been suggested previously, in the works of Walton and Goldman, and we develop this methodology further, using a Bayesian approach to reliability assessment. The reliability of an expert can be questioned on different grounds (lack of competence, bias and lack of motivation), and we clarify different effects that these grounds can have on the expert’s reliability.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    A much discussed problem is how to calculate the probability that a statement is true when there is no evidence whatsoever. We will not try to solve this problem here but submit that, in a legal context, legal norms can be useful to solve this problem. For example, in a criminal case, the presumption of innocence requires us to set the prior probability close to zero.

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Acknowledgments

Research financed by the Swedish Research Council (Vetenskapsrådet) and Ragnar Söderbergs Stiftelse. Thanks to Thomas Bustamte, Roberta Colonna Dahlman, Ulrike Hahn, Farhan Sarwar and Frank Zenker.

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Correspondence to Christian Dahlman .

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Dahlman, C., Wahlberg, L. (2015). Appeal to Expert Testimony – A Bayesian Approach. In: Bustamante, T., Dahlman, C. (eds) Argument Types and Fallacies in Legal Argumentation. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 112. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16148-8_1

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