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Past and Present Interactions in Legal Reasoning and Logic pp 31–48Cite as

Disjunctive Statements in Roman Legal Arguments

Two Examples by Julian and Quintilian

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Part of the book series: Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning ((LARI,volume 7))

Abstract

So far, modern scholars of Roman law interested in the methodology employed by individual jurists have treated logic with different emphasis. Taking a bottom-up approach, one can search for specific texts containing explicit references to logical instruments. Their interpretation may benefit from logical concepts. Taking a top-down approach, one may look for different ways to integrate logic with the traditional picture of Roman casuistry. This contribution intends to exemplify both approaches. First, it illustrates how the Roman jurist Julian deals with an explicit disjunctive statement lying at the heart of a simple case where a debtor made an erroneous performance under an obligation. Secondly, a link is proposed to Roman procedural formulae, interpreted as conditional statements. Given Julian’s bare text, various missing elements from Roman legal practice have to be added to establish this link. A second example taken from Quintilian’s Lesser Declamations shows how these missing elements may have looked like in actual practice. Incidentally, the second text offers an illustration for an alternative, implicit use of disjunctive statements in legal argumentation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The origin of this interest can be seen in [30]. For a summary overview on the literature since then, see [13, p. 286] and [25, p. 1], in particular [26].

  2. 2.

    See for example [8, 17, 32]. A general perspective on the theme can be found in [11].

  3. 3.

    See [25, p. 4] and [10].

  4. 4.

    See also Waldstein [31], who saw a considerable potential for the use of logic in law.

  5. 5.

    See K. Hülser’s contribution to this volume.

  6. 6.

    Various authors have since demonstrated that there is no real need for proposing emendations [1, 9, 33, 34, 35].

  7. 7.

    I am proposing a broader and more stringent investigation on logic and elementary mathematics as techniques in Julian’s digest in my dissertation at the University of Zurich.

  8. 8.

    For a precise presentation of the not always one-to-one relationship between logic and dialectic, see the overview in [6] and [12, p. 139].

  9. 9.

    The concept as such was known to Aristotle, see e.g. Metaphysics V, 29 (1024b).

  10. 10.

    Whether negation can be looked at as a connective in Stoic parlance is a debatable point. For more background see [12, p. 160]. In fact, the key prerequisite for any logical analysis of legal texts is the appropriate identification of the relevant truth-bearers. For the Roman period, this relates to the question whether today’s idea of a “proposition” is equivalent to the Stoic concept of axioma. This topic shall not be further discussed here. Suffice to say that axiomata seem reasonably close to propositions to justify such analysis. See [12, p. 139] or [2, p. 45].

  11. 11.

    For Aristotle’s logic see e.g. [23]; for Stoic logic see [5].

  12. 12.

    See footnote 6 for references to the relevant literature.

  13. 13.

    See [8]: “Weg des Denkens, der zur gerechten Entscheidung führt”.

  14. 14.

    This ideal will be pursued by Spinoza with respect to ethics and by Wolff and Thomasius with respect to Jurisprudence.

  15. 15.

    A legal system includes not only the relevant legal texts like statutes but also decisions and professional practice (“Rechtsbetrieb”).

  16. 16.

    When distinguishing verum, utile and benignum, Giaro [10, p. 427; 429] refers to solutions that are consistent with or in contradiction to the legal system. He goes on to describe legal fictions as turning into “pillars for the systematic coherence” of Roman law.

  17. 17.

    Unlike the Stoics, who discussed the nature of the conditional at length, Aristotle’s interest for the conditional seems to have been limited to this capacity, which is evidenced in Prior Analytic II, 2 (53b).

  18. 18.

    See Giaro [10, p. 205] on the issue of normality of rules and maxims as well as the monograph by [25] and the critical comments by [21].

  19. 19.

    Giaro [10, p. 255] speaks of a “purely integrative” function of the Edict with respect to the civil law.

  20. 20.

    If not specified otherwise, the translations are mine.

  21. 21.

    The formulation is certainly no less explicit than modern versions like Art. 641 Abs. 1 ZGB or § 985 BGB.

  22. 22.

    See Gai. 4,119: Omnes autem exceptiones in contrarium concipiuntur, quam adfirmat is cum quo agitur.

  23. 23.

    See Gai. 4,126: Interdum evenit, ut exceptio, quae prima facie iusta videatur, inique noceat actori. quod cum accidat, alia adiectione opus est adiuvandi actoris gratia; quae adiectio replicatio vocatur [..].

  24. 24.

    See e.g. the complex of Iul. Pal. 520, 522, 464 und 465 on combinations of legacies with manumissions.

  25. 25.

    In other words, the second function described above seems the most promising one to investigate.

  26. 26.

    Assuming a temporal use, “cum” can be rendered as “when”, “if”, “while”, “whenever”. Scott translates by “where” which matches similar formulations used in the CFR. The use of “whenever” and to a lesser degree of “where” suggests a general rule, a meaning which is at least doubtful in the Latin original.

  27. 27.

    Literally “cease to exist in nature”.

  28. 28.

    The third version described by Proculus corresponds to the Sheffer-symbol A/B = “0111”. It does not play a role in the arguments of Julian’s Digest but appears as underlying structure in Quintilian’s declamation Nr. 318.

  29. 29.

    The precise formulation of the condictio is not known. The formula quoted here is the version reconstructed by Lenel. See [16, p. 232] and in particular [16, p. 239] for additional comments on the sources and their interpretation. These uncertainties should not affect this paper’s main line of arguments, however.

  30. 30.

    Translation reproduced from [27, p. 169].

  31. 31.

    Some scholars question Quintilian’s authorship. The collection might just be the notes by an unknown person of Quintilian’s courses in rhetoric. See the introductory notes in [27, p. 1].

  32. 32.

    See Gai. 2,274: Item mulier, quae ab eo, qui centum milia aeris census est, per legem Voconiam heres institui non potest, tamen fideicommisso relictam sibi hereditatem capere potest.

  33. 33.

    On this characteristic of the collection, see [7, p. 84; 131].

  34. 34.

    This representation sidelines the question whether normative texts can serve as truth-bearers in propositional logic at all or whether a form of deontic logic would have to be used.

  35. 35.

    Translation reproduced from [27, p. 171].

  36. 36.

    Using the hereditatis petitio as single action with regards to the entire estate.

  37. 37.

    [27, p. 171]: “The words of the will, the text, cannot admit of any quibble”. The stress should lie here on the clarity of the testator’s will. The clarity of the law comes next.

  38. 38.

    Peritissimi (periti) are practitioners rather than scholars (see [10, p. 237]).

  39. 39.

    Translation reproduced from [27, p. 173].

  40. 40.

    Translation reproduced from [27, p. 175].

  41. 41.

    See Giaro [10, p. 424] who lists several examples for the use of ratio iuris in the Digest before contrasting ratio with Ulpian’s and others concept of utilitas, and [15, p. 793]. In particular, see the latter’s explanations in § 221 on the syllogistic argument and its application to interpreting laws.

  42. 42.

    Translation reproduced from [27, p. 173].

  43. 43.

    Within Quintilian’s collection, Declamations 250 and 263 also contain a logical background. Three out of 145 preserved declamations are admittedly a small number.

  44. 44.

    In my view, the term “axiomatic thinking” evokes the example of Euclidian geometry, a comparison that is not well-suited to Roman jurisprudence but refers to later developments during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (see for instance Christian Wolff).

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Acknowledgments

This research was supported by a Forschungskredit of the University of Zurich, grant no. FK-13-011. I presented the results at a workshop held in Zurich on June 28, 2013 dedicated to “Argumentationsstrukturen im talmudischen und römischen Recht”.

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  1. Rechtswissenschaftliches Institut, Universität Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland

    Markus Winkler

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Correspondence to Markus Winkler .

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  1. Universität Konstanz, Konstanz, Baden-Württemberg, Germany

    Matthias Armgardt

  2. UMR 8163 Savoirs, Textes, Langage, Université Lille UFR Humanités Département Philosophie, Villeneuve d'Ascq, France

    Patrice Canivez

  3. Equipe René Demogue (CRD&P, EA 4487), Université de Lille (UDSL), Lille, France

    Sandrine Chassagnard-Pinet

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Winkler, M. (2015). Disjunctive Statements in Roman Legal Arguments. In: Armgardt, M., Canivez, P., Chassagnard-Pinet, S. (eds) Past and Present Interactions in Legal Reasoning and Logic. Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, vol 7. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16021-4_3

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