Abstract
This chapter studies one particular property of voting rules in applications in which the choice set is one-dimensional: whether the median alternative is chosen. Our results suggest that with three or more alternatives, it is difficult to rule out non-median outcomes, even if all voters have linear Euclidean preferences.
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Notes
- 1.
The median party is the party which is the ideal party of the median voter.
References
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Acknowledgements
We thank Steve Brams and Peter Hammond for their interest and comments.
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Eguia, J.X., Giovannoni, F. (2015). A Comment on Choice Rules and Median Outcomes. In: Schofield, N., Caballero, G. (eds) The Political Economy of Governance. Studies in Political Economy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15551-7_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15551-7_14
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-15550-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-15551-7
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