Abstract
This chapter presents a model in which the party that loses the general elections can still try to capture the majority in Parliament by convincing members of the majority faction to switch sides. These attempts are not successful in equilibrium. Nonetheless, the results of the general elections are partly determined by this additional stage of political conflict. Larger majorities are shown to lead to lower rent payments and some voters therefore face a trade-off between lowering rent payments by supporting the party that wins the elections or supporting their preferred party. Multiple equilibria in the general elections with either party winning are possible. Moreover, the size of the equilibrium majority is larger than when no bribes after the elections are possible.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
For a general overview of political economy models of elections, see Persson and Tabellini (2002).
- 2.
- 3.
The standard result that minimal coalitions or majorities are optimal is also known as Riker’s “size principle” because it was introduced to the literature by Riker (1962).
- 4.
Only for simplification, I assume in the model section that after the election of the Prime Minister no more bribing attempts will be possible.
- 5.
Implemented policy is likely to play a role for a voter’s utility. However, only in elections that are decided by just one vote this can make a difference. Thus, I assume there is no utility from implemented policy to simplify the model without much loss of generality.
- 6.
To simplify the model the bribes b i do not show up in any utility function. However, if the minority cannot take over the Government by bribing majority MPs in the most cost-efficient way because it lacks the necessary funds to do so, it is obvious that more costly ways cannot be a feasible alternative.
- 7.
Because the rent payments in equilibrium reduce the utility of the minority leader he would actually be better off if he could commit not to attempt any briberies before the majority leader announces his rent offers. No rent payments to Government MPs would be necessary in this case.
- 8.
Depending on parameter values there can be more equilibria. The reason is that m is discrete.
- 9.
If the supporters of the party that has not the support of the median voter, have stronger preferences for their party than the other voters this “bad” equilibrium can actually be welfare improving if voters care about the implemented policy.
References
Alesina, A. (1988). Credibility and policy convergence in a two-party system with rational voters. The American Economic Review, 78, 796–805.
Brennan, G, & Hamlin, A. (1998). Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium. Public Choice, 95, 149–175.
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper & Row.
Groseclose, T. & Snyder, J. M. (1996). Buying supermajorities. American Political Science Review, 90, 303–315.
Hillman, A. L. (2010). Expressive behavior in economics and politics. European Journal of Political Economy, 26, 403–418.
Persson, T. & Tabellini, G. (2002). Political economics - explaining economic policy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Riker, W. H. (1962). The theory of political coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2015 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Klingelhöfer, J. (2015). Rent Seeking and the Size of Parliamentary Majorities. In: Schofield, N., Caballero, G. (eds) The Political Economy of Governance. Studies in Political Economy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15551-7_13
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15551-7_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-15550-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-15551-7
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)