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Software-Based Relay Attacks on Existing Applications

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Security Issues in Mobile NFC Devices

Part of the book series: T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services ((TLABS))

Abstract

This chapter provides an analysis of Google Wallet and shows how the software-based relay attack scenario can been applied to it.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    http://forum.xda-developers.com/showthread.php?t=1365360.

  2. 2.

    https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.google.android.apps.walletnfcrel.

  3. 3.

    Since host-based card emulation was introduced to Android, recent versions of the wallet can use a cloud-based secure element in combination with host-based card emulation instead of an on-device secure element.

  4. 4.

    An installation with version 1.5-R79-v5 of the Google Wallet app and version 1.6 of the on-card component installed in September 2012 reports the second credit card AID as A000000004  1010  AA539648FFFF00FFFF.

  5. 5.

    AIDs A000000004 1010 and A000000004 1010 AA539648FFFF00FFFF.

References

  1. Drake, J.J., Oliva Fora, P., Lanier, Z., Mulliner, C., Ridley, S.A., Wicherski, G.: Android Hacker’s Handbook. Wiley, New York (2014)

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  7. Google: Google Wallet. https://www.google.com/wallet/ (2012). Accessed Sept 2012

  8. Google: Google Wallet—how it works—in-store. http://www.google.com/wallet/how-it-works/in-store.html (2012). Accessed Sept 2012

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  11. Mostowski, W., Pan, J., Akkiraju, S., de Vink, E., Poll, E., den Hartog, J.: A comparison of Java Cards: state-of-affairs 2006. CS-Report CSR 07–06, Technische Universiteit Eindhoven (2007)

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  12. Planck, S.: Google Wallet statistics roundup. NFC rumors. http://www.nfcrumors.com/05-27-2011/google-wallet-statistics-roundup/ (2011)

  13. Roland, M.: Google Wallet relay attack. http://youtu.be/_R2JVPJzufg

  14. Roland, M.: Google Wallet relay attack (low quality). http://youtu.be/hx5nbkDy6tc

  15. Roland, M.: Applying recent secure element relay attack scenarios to the real world: Google Wallet relay attack. Comput. Res. Repository (CoRR), arXiv:1209.0875 (cs.CR) (2012). http://arxiv.org/abs/1209.0875

  16. Roland, M.: Software card emulation in NFC-enabled mobile phones: great advantage or security nightmare? In: 4th International Workshop on Security and Privacy in Spontaneous Interaction and Mobile Phone Use. Newcastle, UK. http://www.medien.ifi.lmu.de/iwssi2012/papers/iwssi-spmu2012-roland.pdf (2012)

  17. Roland, M., Langer, J., Scharinger, J.: Applying relay attacks to Google Wallet. In: Proceedings of the Fifth International Workshop on Near Field Communication (NFC 2013). IEEE, Zurich, Switzerland (2013). doi:10.1109/NFC.2013.6482441

  18. Rubin, J.: Google wallet PIN vulnerability, post #5 on 9 Feb 2012 12:45 AM by J. Rubin (alias “miasma”). Thread on XDA Developers forum. http://forum.xda-developers.com/showpost.php?p=22327658&postcount=5 (2012). Accessed Sept 2012

  19. Rubin, J.: Google Wallet security: about that rooted device requirement... zveloBLOG. https://zvelo.com/blog/entry/google-wallet-security-about-that-rooted-device-requirement (2012)

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Roland, M. (2015). Software-Based Relay Attacks on Existing Applications. In: Security Issues in Mobile NFC Devices. T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15488-6_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15488-6_7

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-15487-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-15488-6

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