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  • Michael RolandEmail author
Chapter
Part of the T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services book series (TLABS)

Abstract

There have been several research activities focused on the security and privacy of Near Field Communication (NFC) and its underlying Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technologies during the last couple of years. As a first step towards assessing the current status of NFC security and privacy, this chapter collects preceding research results and analyzes the issues and solutions identified in them.

Keywords

Mobile Phone Near Field Communication Attack Scenario Uniform Resource Identifier Secure Element 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Informatics/Communications/MediaUniversity of Applied Sciences Upper AustriaHagenbergAustria

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