Abstract
In this chapter we will see that, when uncertainty arises from lack of information about both the state of the world and the agents’ behavior, a remedy to a lack of experience cannot be bought. We will introduce, then, a more complex trap model assuming that innovation (a way out of the trap) can occur through a process that is unsure and made up of small steps, by way of experiment. Some indications emerge regarding the policy design required to get out of the trap of under-valorized local resources. Intervention should not entail direct public involvement in starting and managing productive activities, nor should it entail providing boundless grants and incentives to private agents. Wage reduction is not a good approach neither. Intervention should be designed with the goal of increasing the difference between the net return of new risky activities and the safe return of traditional ones. The ability to choose the most promising project, however, is not very realistic. The outcome of any new project is uncertain. If this were not the case, there would be no traps to deal with. This leads to the use of cost as a lever rather than selection. Policy makers should provide public goods and services selected from those best able with certainty to reduce costs to those actors who are engaging in new activities.
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Notes
- 1.
In the financial field, «until recently, the general consensus among policy makers and researchers has been that market power gives banks proper incentives to behave prudently. […] In recent years, however, several theoretical and empirical studies have challenged the view that monopoly power mitigates bank risk taking, instead arguing that higher competition among banks leads to lower levels of bank risk. […]. The competition-bank risk taking nexus has been extensively analyzed in the theoretical banking literature. The predictions emerging from the theoretical models are ambiguous, however» (Kick and Prieto 2013, 1).
- 2.
This explanation seems much better than the traditional hypothesis of diminishing marginal utility of wealth (Rabin 2000).
- 3.
This term we use taking it from the Republic of Venice history. The “Serenissima” adopted this strategy continuously for centuries (from the fourteenth century to the end of the eighteenth) in regimentation of waters, constant threat to the lagoon always not completely understood despite continuous studies, and coined this expression. By way of experiment assumes the significance of tentative suspension of interpretations established to allow something new, even if apparently senseless, being made very clear by “La Magistratura delle Acque” (waters’ Authority) that these rules and interpretation were by no means abolished nor superseded (Bevilacqua 1998, 42–44).
- 4.
There exist even an international triple helix association. «The Triple Helix Association intends to promote analyses and studies on the interaction between universities, firms and government aimed at translating academic models into practical achievements also by supporting international exchange of scholars, organizing international symposia of relevant scientific interest and assisting the education of students, scholars and practitioners in its areas of interest». (http://tha2013.org/tha/index.php/tha/index/pages/view/triplehelix).
- 5.
Some contributions (Kemmerling and Stephan 2002, 2008; Psycharis et al. 2012), find, indeed, a positive relationship between general public investment and growth of local production activities. «Several key empirical findings emerge from our analysis using a panel of large German cities for the years 1980, 1986, and 1988: public capital is a significant input for local production […], evidence of an endogeneity bias of [public] capital estimates in a production function framework as well as evidence of reverse causality running from output to [public] investments is weak» (Kemmerling and Stephan 2002, 422). «We study the determinants and productivity effects of regional transportation infrastructure investment in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. […]. The evidence shows that road infrastructure positively contributes to regional production» (Kemmerling and Stephan 2008, 1). «Using a new database of public expenditure per region for the period 1978–2007, it proposes a model which captures not just the impact of public investment in Greek prefectures, but also the spillover effects related to the existence of externalities from neighboring regions. The results point to a positive long-run impact of public investment per capita on regional economic growth—but not on convergence—which also generates considerable spillover effects» (Psycharis et al. 2012, 1).
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Seravalli, G. (2015). Dealing with Uncertainty. In: An Introduction to Place-Based Development Economics and Policy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15377-3_5
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