Abstract
“Method and Structure in Plato’s Alcibiades Major” evaluates Jaakko Hintikka’s claim that the interrogative model is compatible with the Socratic elenchos. After explaining the function of the interrogative model, I argue that Hintikka’s claim that Socrates lacks any sort of factual knowledge about a dialogue’s interlocutor or its subject matter is blatantly false. Using Plato’s Alcibiades Major, I show that the dialogues are contrived in such a way that Socrates is always in possession of pertinent, factual information about an interlocutor and a dialogue’s subject matter. Contrary to Hintikka’s claim, such information, “presuppositions,” motivates the dramatic and philosophical movement within the dialogues and anchors the propositions introduced by Socrates in elenctic exchanges. Consequently, Socrates’ strategic knowledge is shown to be derived from his comprehensive factual knowledge.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
See Harold Tarrant’s insightful book, Plato’s First Interpreters (2000, pp. 1–26; pp. 44–52).
- 2.
One example of what I have in mind is the belief that a human being is a rational soul, and that the body is merely an instrument that is utilized by the soul.
- 3.
The modern concept of frames has been underappreciated by Plato scholars. In addition to the dialogues’ promoting of philosophical discourse, they illustrate the importance of framing questions to enhance the chances of achieving a desired end. Framing effects occur in decision making when the decision maker’s preferences are affected by variations of a relevant cue or cues in options or outcomes. Socrates’ decision to speak to Alcibiades is determined by his preference for productive conversations. Socrates would have failed if he had tried to have a conversation with Alcibiades prematurely. Alcibiades’ decision to answer Socrates’ questions is determined by his preference for power. The success Socrates promises Alcibiades outweighs Alcibiades’ impatience with difficult and tedious questions. On frames and their significance, see Simon 1986, p. 26.
- 4.
That Socrates is primarily concerned with the type of life entailed by an interlocutor’s character is attested by Nicias’ comments to Lysimachus in the Laches:
You don’t appear to me to know that whoever comes into close contact with Socrates and associates with him in conversation must necessarily, even if he began by conversing about something quite different in the first place, keep on being led about by the man’s arguments until he submits to answering questions about himself concerning both his present manner of life and the life he has lived hitherto (187e6–188a, Sprague translation in Cooper, 665–686).
The passage under discussion is not commented upon in Stokes’ short treatment of the Laches (65). Unfortunately, Stokes’ omission is symptomatic of his interpretive assumption that Socrates’ role in the dialogues is merely procedural. Accordingly, Socrates has no stake in the conversation other than to formulate questions based upon the interlocutor’s currently held beliefs. If Nicias’ comments are an accurate portrayal of Socrates’ questions, which I think they are, then Stokes’ treatment of the dialogues tells only half the story.
- 5.
These interpretive assumptions are also on display in Kidd’s short introduction to the Laches:
“I see it [the Laches] less as a drama of character, where the beliefs of the generals Laches and Nicias are examined and tested (although certainly those of ‘Laches’ and ‘Nicias’” are involved), than a dynamic dramatic philosophical dialogue orchestrated by Plato through the medium of his chief character Socrates to a problem which he feels that we (and he) should face” (85).
- 6.
Hintikka has in mind a question asked by Socrates that first seeks definitional content (e.g., a principle question), but then transitions into a yes-no question (e.g., an operative question). An illustration of such a question can be seen in the dialogue where Socrates questions Alcibiades’ knowledge of the just and unjust:
But surely it’s disgraceful if when you’re speaking and giving advice about food—saying that a certain kind is better than another, and better at a certain time and in a certain quantity—and someone should ask you, “What do you mean by ‘better’, Alcibiades?” [principle question] you could tell him in that case that ‘better’ was ‘healthier’, though you don’t even pretend to be a doctor; and yet in a case where you do pretend to understand and are going to stand up and give advice as though you knew, if you aren’t able, as seems likely, to answer the question in this case, won’t you be embarrassed? [operative question] Won’t that seem disgraceful? [operative question] (108e4–109a3).
- 7.
Vlastos’ (1983, pp. 27–58) formulation of the elenchus is worthy of attention, but the recent scholarship on the elenchus better appreciates its sophistication. For example, Gary Alan Scott’s book (2002), Does Socrates Have a Method?, is a collection of essays written by various scholars offering interpretations of the Socratic elenchus. One of the more compelling essays in the collection, written by Carpenter and Polansky (89–100), argue that the elenchus is not a particular method at all, but the Socratic dialectic generally. They show that there are a number of refutations, such as refutations of definitions, behaviors, proposed procedures, and substantive doctrines. Due to the variety of contexts in which refutations appears, Carpenter and Polansky conclude that any attempt to establish a general method or logic for the elenchus is futile. Robert Metcalf’s (2004, pp. 37–64; esp. 41–46) interpretation of the elenchus is persuasive and very much in line with my interpretation. Metcalf emphasizes the ad hominem aspect of the elenchus that is on display in the Crito. Like Crito, Alcibiades in Alcibiades Major is one of the few interlocutors that explicitly reverses course in the span of the dialogue from having been initially skeptical of Socrates to feeling “shame” in the face of his arguments.
- 8.
The elenchus either deals with the result (shame) or the process (investigation). A version of the elenchus is found prominently in fragment 7 of Parmenides poem Truth. See Curd 1995, pp. 46–47.
- 9.
Smith’s (1999, pp. 57–62) comments on Aristotle’s discussion (Topics I. 1, 100b21–23) of dialectical arguments is further evidence that Hintikka has misconstrued the Socratic elenchus. Smith defines dialectical arguments as,
…arguments directed at another person which proceeds by asking questions….Now, people are generally likely to answer in accordance with what they believe; therefore, dialectical argument can be described as based on the opinions of the person at whom it is directed. (60)
Dialectical argumentation is precisely what the Socratic dialogues display. It is because the dialogues are highly contrived works of art that an efficient use of Socrates’ and the interlocutor’s time require that certain facts about the interlocutor’s situation be presupposed by the questions Socrates asks him.
- 10.
Examples of procedural refutations are discussed in Carpenter and Polansky (2002, pp. 95–98). One such example is found at 120c–d in Alcibiades Major. Socrates employs two arguments to refute Alcibiades’ view that his primary political competitors, the kings of Sparta and Persia, are no different from any other run of the mill politician. Socrates offers a pragmatic argument that highlights the bad consequences of Alcibiades’ view of the kings; and he offers an argument to show that Alcibiades’ view of the kings is likely to be false (95). Both of Socrates’ arguments are designed to reform Alcibiades’ behavior by having him appreciate just how formidable his competitors are. Socrates is attempting to prepare Alcibiades, both intellectually and character-wise, to compete.
- 11.
For example, see the opening scenes of Gorgias, Ion, Greater Hippias, Menexenus and Timaeus. The opening scene of the Apology is an interesting example because Socrates’ assumed factual knowledge is not about a particular interlocutor but about the Athenians as a whole.
- 12.
The passage under discussion is also significant because it shows that Socrates’ methodological preference for short speeches presupposes that such speeches are productive. It also argues against Hintikka’s presuppositionless account.
References
Carpenter, Michelle, and Ronald Polansky. 2002. Variety of Socratic elenchi. In Does Socrates have a method?, ed. Gary A. Scott. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Cooper, John M. 1997a. Alcibiades Major. Trans. D.S. Hutchinson. In Plato: Complete works. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
Cooper, John M. 1997b. Laches. Trans. R.K. Sprague. In Plato: Complete works. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
Curd, Patricia (ed.). 1995. A presocratic reader: Selected fragments and testimonia. Trans. Richard Mckirahan, Jr. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
Hintikka, Jaakko. 2007. Socratic epistemology: Explorations of knowledge-seeking by questioning. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kidd, Ian. 1992. Socratic questions. In Socratic questions: The philosophy of Socrates and its significance, ed. Michael Stokes, and Barry S. Gower. London: Routledge.
Metcalf, Robert. 2004. The elenctic speech of the laws in Plato’s Crito. Ancient Philosophy 24: 37–63.
Scott, Gary Alan. 2002. Does Socrates have a method? Rethinking the elenchus in Plato’s dialogues and beyond. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Simon, Herbert. 1986. Rational choice: The contrast between economics and psychology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Smith, Robin. 1999. Logic. In The Cambridge companion to Aristotle, ed. J. Barnes, 27–65. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stokes, Michael. 1986. Plato’s Socratic conversations. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University.
Tarrant, Harold. 2000. Plato’s first interpreters. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Vlastos, Gregory. 1983. The Socratic elenchus. Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 1: 27–58.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2015 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Archie, A. (2015). Method and Structure in Plato’s Alcibiades Major . In: Politics in Socrates' Alcibiades. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15269-1_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15269-1_2
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-15268-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-15269-1
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)