Abstract
Few disciplines make more extensive use of arguments from authority than public health. It is not difficult to see why this is the case. A well-crafted appeal to the expertise of an authority can convince an uncertain or mistrustful public to take a drug to treat hypertension or to participate in a vaccination program. In this chapter, it is argued that the argument from authority is another major informal fallacy which can play a role in a theory of public health reasoning. The argument has a simple logical structure. To the extent that a particular expert asserts x, it may be concluded that x is true. However, this simple structure belies a set of complex dialectical and epistemic considerations. These considerations are addressed within a discussion of the role of this argument in systematic and heuristic reasoning. It is contended that the argument can function as a cognitive heuristic during public health reasoning on account of its capacity to identify markers of the expertise and trustworthiness of an authority. The argument is characterized as an adaptation of our rational procedures to the problem of uncertainty in the cognitive domain. In effect, the lay person defers to the judgement of an authority rather than engage in complex deliberations about a public health issue. The chapter concludes with an examination of more findings from the public health study that was introduced in Chap. 3.
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Cummings, L. (2015). Argument from Authority. In: Reasoning and Public Health: New Ways of Coping with Uncertainty. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-15013-0_4
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