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Essays on New Institutional Economics pp 51–75Cite as

New Economic Sociology and New Institutional Economics

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Abstract

This article deals with similarities and differences between the New Economic Sociology (NES) in below explained sense and the New Institutional Economics (NIE) as described in the previous chapter. As we shall see, both deal with social actions. What are then the differences between the two fields—the fundamental differences that is—or are there none?

Updated and slightly modified version of a paper presented at the 5th Annual Meeting of the International Society for New Institutional Economics at Berkeley, USA, Sept. 13–15, 2001. I benefited from detailed comments by Mark Granovetter, Richard Swedberg, and Oliver E. Williamson. The usual disclaimer applies.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In the 2nd edition of their handbook—Smelser and Swedberg (2005)—the authors employ less sharp differences between sociology and economics, indicating that „the fields of economics and economic sociology may one day agree on some methdological compromise,…“(Smelser and Swedberg 2005: 6).

  2. 2.

    Defined by Weintraub (2002) by the following three properties: “1. People have rational preferences among outcomes. 2. Individuals maximize utility and firms maximize profits. 3. People act independently on the basis of full and relevant information.”

  3. 3.

    ”Economic Sociology Section in Formation”, Mission Statement (21.12.2000), see http://uci.edu/econsoc/mission.html

  4. 4.

    Professor of sociology, University of Wisconsin, College of Letters and Science, Graduate course Sociology 655: Microfoundation of Economic Sociology.

  5. 5.

    This is complicated, though, by Weber’s (1968: 85–86) distinction between “formal rationality” and “substantive rationality”. Swedberg (1998: 36) reads this so that according to Max Weber “value-oriented action can be just as rational as formal economic reasoning.”

  6. 6.

    A common ground on which to base “trust” and “rational action” might be the more general concept of “motives of human actions.” It include contrasts like egoistic and altruistic behavior. Thus the old German “institutionalist” Schmoller (1900: 33) writes: “We must concede that economic behavior of today and probably of all times is closely related with self-interest”…. “Yet to find out the truth it will be necessary to go a step further .. [and] … to analyze psychologically and historically, …, the basic motives of economic actions [die Triebfedern des wirtschaftlichen Handelns überhaupt]. … “The classical theory of economics [Schmoller calls it die Theorie der natürlichen Volkswirtschaft] is, in toto, based on an incomplete analysis of man…” (1900: 92). North (1990: 17) argues similarly as quoted at the beginning of this paper (see also Richter 1996: 574).

  7. 7.

    Cf. Coleman (1990: 13) uses the same “purposive theory of action.”

  8. 8.

    Leaning on Swedberg and Granovetter (1992: 1–26), Weber (1968), Nee (1998: 1–16).

  9. 9.

    Swedberg and Granovetter (1992: 16).

  10. 10.

    In Furubotn and Richter (2005), e.g., we understand NIE as a mix of property rights analysis, transaction cost economics, and contract theory.

  11. 11.

    Williamson himself outlined his scientific journey of discovery in Williamson (1996, Ch. 14).

  12. 12.

    Notably by Freeland (1996a).

  13. 13.

    Which clarifies his”ex post small numbers exchange relation” (Williamson 1975: 29). Alchian suggested to call it the “Williamson transform.” (Alchian 1987: 233).

  14. 14.

    Williamson later adds hybrid modes “located between market and hierarchy with respect to incentives, adaptability, and bureaucratic costs.” (Williamson 1996: 107).

  15. 15.

    “Like the biologist, the economist predicts the effects of environmental changes on the surviving class of living organisms; the economist need not assume that each participant is aware of, or acts according to, his cost and demand situation.” (Alchian 1950: 220 f.)

  16. 16.

    Bradach and Eccles (1989: 101).

  17. 17.

    Williamson as quoted by Perrow (1986: 237).

  18. 18.

    See also Williamson (1995: 32 ff.).

  19. 19.

    “… we do not see humans as hyperrational – as does neoclassical economics – possessing perfect information and unbounded cognitive capacity.” (Nee and Ingram 1998: 30).

  20. 20.

    Embeddedness is defined by Williamson as “informal institutions, customs, traditions, norms, religion” (Williamson 2000: 597, Fig. 1, first box).

  21. 21.

    As in Williamson (1985: 83, 1991: 280, 1996: 117).

  22. 22.

    They provide many real life examples.

  23. 23.

    The industries were telephone equipment, clothing, computer hardware, and environmental support systems. (Larson 1992: 80).

  24. 24.

    See also the collection of by now classical applications and testings of TCE in Williamson and Masten (1995).

  25. 25.

    See, e.g., Williamson (1996) as quoted in this contribution.

  26. 26.

    See above Friedman (1953: 15) and his remarks on the lengthy discussion on the shortcomings of marginal analysis in the American Economic Review 1946 –48.

  27. 27.

    Cf., e.g., Alchian 1977: 301.

  28. 28.

    Burt criticizes Williamson (1975) but disregards Williamson’s fundamental transformation concept (238 ff.).

  29. 29.

    Williamson (1985: 128).

  30. 30.

    Shapiro and Varian (1999: 11 f.).

  31. 31.

    Williamson (1976) illustrates his point by the experiences from the Oakland CATV franchise 1969–1970.

  32. 32.

    As alluded to by Schmoller (1900) or North (1990), see above n. 6. Interesting in this context is Frey’s (1997: 5ff.) concept of the homo oeconomicus matures, being controlled by extrinsic and intrinsic motivations.

  33. 33.

    Using the terminology of Hirschman (1969).

  34. 34.

    In fact, economists are taking on further sociological issues like power (Rajan and Zingales 1998), fairness (Fehr et al. 2001) social networks (Kranton and Minehart 2000), altruism (Bergstrom 1995) or status (Postlewaite 1998). There is also an increasing literature on preferences that adapt to experience (cf. Robson 2001: 17 ff.).

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    Rudolf Richter

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Richter, R. (2015). New Economic Sociology and New Institutional Economics. In: Essays on New Institutional Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14154-1_3

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