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Dynamic Spectrum Auction

  • Yanjiao ChenEmail author
  • Qian Zhang
Chapter
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Electrical and Computer Engineering book series (BRIEFSELECTRIC)

Abstract

Static spectrum auction, when applied to dynamic spectrum allocation, will cause potential utility loss. For example, in Fig. 4.1, suppose that buyer A arrives at the first time stage, requesting for 3 time slots, and his true valuation is 1 per time slot. Later at the second time stage, buyer B and buyer C arrive, each requesting for 2 time slots, and their true valuations are both 1 per time slots. If the auctioneer allocates the spectrum to buyer A at the first time stage, buyer A gets utility of 3. However, if the auctioneer rejects buyer A in the first time stage and allocates the spectrum to buyer B and C simultaneously at the second time stage, they get a total utility of 4. Although the spectrum is idle in the first time stage, overall, the spectrum utilization of the second option is higher.

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer Science and EngineeringHong Kong University of Science and TechnologyKowloonHong Kong SAR

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