Abstract
The history of nature and history as a human science and technology in a cultural lifeworld with sciences and instrumentalism.
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- 1.
The theses of this section will be not only incompatible with the Neo-Kantian but also with the Diltheyan strict methodological and epistemological separation of the natural and the human and here especially with the historical human sciences. What will be said is, however, compatible with Husserl’s reflections on the historicity of the primordial pre-givenness of the world. Cf. Hua XXXIX, text 7, 540.
- 2.
The difference between historical narrations and myths is that the reports in historical narrations refer to a certain time in the temporal sequence of a historical time that is filled with other determinable events. This assumption is irrelevant for myths and mythological thinking.
- 3.
Cf. Sect. 3.5.
- 4.
Cf. Sect. 6.2.
- 5.
Cf. Sect. 6.4.
- 6.
- 7.
CF. Hua IV, section III, ch. 3 and elsewhere.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
Cf. above, Part III, Sect. 8.3. The difficulties of ontological interpretations of quantum mechanics highlight the significance of instruments for the methodology of the natural sciences. No objective and intersubjectively acceptable knowledge is possible if it cannot be proven that the instrument warrants the objective validity of the information that can be gained with the instrument.
- 11.
- 12.
Cf. Sect. 3.2.
- 13.
For instance, the interest in the breeding of cattle.
- 14.
Terms like “concept,” “categorial intuition,” “category,” “material essences,” “formal essences” have to be understood in this investigation in the sense and only in the sense determined in Part I, Sect. 2.3.
- 15.
Practical philosophy is a theoretical reflection on practical social life in its own right and as a normative system for actions and attitudes that are of significance for social relations, it is implied in elementary understanding. However, it is not relevant for the elementary understanding of the natural environment and the elementary understanding of actions and interactions in the encounter and the struggle of practical life with the pre-given natural environment, and is therefore not in the residuum of the first abstraction that is constitutive for the natural sciences in general.
- 16.
Cf. Sect. 8.5.
- 17.
Cf. Sect. 8.3.
References
Husserl, E. Hua IV Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie II, ed. M. Biemel. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952.
Husserl, E. Hua XXXIX Die Lebenswelt. Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1916–1937), ed. R. Sowa. Dordrecht: Springer, 2008.
Seebohm, T. 2004. Hermeneutics: Method and methodology. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
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Seebohm, T.M. (2015). History and the Natural Sciences. In: History as a Science and the System of the Sciences. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 77. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13587-8_9
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