Abstract
In this paper I argue for the following conclusions. First, quotas are not normative goals in themselves but only a means to reach non-discriminatory selection procedures. Second, in a democracy quotas are most plausibly used as a means to fill offices in those bodies which have a major impact on how well interests or discourses are translated into policy. Third, quotas for the young can be justified since, due to demographic development, their discourses tend to be marginalized. Fourth, youth quotas cannot be a means to ensure long-term policy-making, but they can enhance legitimacy of long-term impacts from policy decisions taken today.
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- 1.
- 2.
Another example to understand the role of representatives of future generations is provided by Ekeli 2005.
- 3.
For a critical normative assessment of this and other proposals to secure intergenerational justice in democracy, see van Parijs 1998.
- 4.
I explain in Sect 3 what I understand by ‘political affirmative action programs’. In short, they select candidates from disadvantaged social groups for offices if they gain equal or similar voting power, rather than a candidate from an advantaged social group.
- 5.
For a helpful overview of the debate see Rössler 1993.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
This argument has been made in various forms. The first philosopher stating it was to my knowledge Thomson 1973.
- 9.
One of the recent statements of this argument with regard to education is provided by Anderson 2007.
- 10.
In calling this weakest form of quotas ‘affirmative action’ I come close to at least some aspects of what Pojman discussed under the label ‘weak quotas’ (Pojman 1998). However, I am also aware that ‘affirmative action’ broadly understood could denote any kind of preferential treatment of disadvantaged social groups which must not necessarily be linked with the idea of quotas.
- 11.
To be sure, in democratic theory it is a contested issue whether democracy should be understood only in procedural or also in more substantive terms (e.g. Buchanan 2002; Brettschneider 2005; Christiano 2004; Brettschneider 2005, 2007; van Parijs 2011). In this paper it is not possible to justify the view that genuine democracy should also incorporate a more substantive goal. However, as should become clear in the following a more substantive goal of democracy like the one suggested by Christiano is a necessary presumption in order to make possible an argument for quotas in democracy. I would like to thank Nenad Stojanovic for raising this issue.
- 12.
A more developed discussion of this problem can be found in Stojanovic 2013, pp. 133–140.
- 13.
To be sure, an argument along these lines implies that one would have to alter the understanding of democracy and its relevant representative institutions overall. It would not only have to be the discourse of the young which would have to be represented proportionally; it would also have to be all kinds of discourses present in society and not interests.
- 14.
Dryzek and Niemeyer by contrast argue that the frequency with which interests can be and are voiced have a major impact on policy decisions (Dryzek und Niemeyer 2008, p. 484). If one assumes that voiced beliefs alter political discourse, then—irrespective of the proportion of society minorities constitute—any kind of proportional representation will improve their situation. However, although voicing beliefs can have an impact on the formation of policy decisions when the chips are down, for final decisions the decisive power still lies with the larger social groups and not minorities.
- 15.
A proposal along these lines is for example made by Young 1990.
- 16.
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Wallimann-Helmer, I. (2015). Can Youth Quotas Help Avoid Future Disasters?. In: Tremmel, J., Mason, A., Godli, P., Dimitrijoski, I. (eds) Youth Quotas and other Efficient Forms of Youth Participation in Ageing Societies. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13431-4_5
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