Abstract
In 2 × 2 prisoner’s dilemma games, network reciprocity is one mechanism for adding social viscosity, which leads to cooperative equilibrium. Here we elucidate how strategy adaptation neighborhood affects on network reciprocity in spatial prisoner’s dilemma games. Presuming an appropriate range of strategy adaptation neighborhood, we can observe the evolution of cooperation than usual network reciprocity previously reported. In the discussion based on our simulation result, we explore why those enhancements are brought, which can be summarized that varying the neighborhood ranges influences on how cooperative clusters are successfully formed and expanded in evolutionary process.
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Ogasawara, T., Tanimoto, J., Fukuda, E., Hagishima, A., Ikegaya, N. (2015). Large Strategy Adaptation Neighborhood Bolsters Network Reciprocity in Prisoner’s Dilemma Games. In: Handa, H., Ishibuchi, H., Ong, YS., Tan, K. (eds) Proceedings of the 18th Asia Pacific Symposium on Intelligent and Evolutionary Systems, Volume 1. Proceedings in Adaptation, Learning and Optimization, vol 1. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13359-1_46
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13359-1_46
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-13358-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-13359-1
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