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Forming an Evolutionarily Stable Firm Strategy Under Cournot Competition Using Social Preferences

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Book cover Information and Communication Technologies in Education, Research, and Industrial Applications (ICTERI 2014)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 469))

Abstract

The paper investigates what kinds of firms’ social preferences (egoists, altruists or punishers) prove to be evolutionarily stable strategies under Cournot competition in the market of homogeneous product. Combining the traditional and evolutionary approaches to competition we define the conditions that forecast the attitude and profit dynamics of competitors under Cournot competition and adaptive behavior of rivals.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Kherson State University, 27, 40 Rokiv Zhovtnya St, Kherson, 73000, Ukraine

    Vitaliy Kobets & Maksim Poltoratskiy

Authors
  1. Vitaliy Kobets
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  2. Maksim Poltoratskiy
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Vitaliy Kobets .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Zaporizhzhya National University, Zaporizhzhya, Ukraine

    Vadim Ermolayev

  2. Institute of Applied Informatics, Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt, Klagenfurt, Austria

    Heinrich C. Mayr

  3. Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine

    Mykola Nikitchenko

  4. Kherson State University, Kherson, Ukraine

    Aleksander Spivakovsky

  5. V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, Kharkov, Ukraine

    Grygoriy Zholtkevych

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© 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

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Kobets, V., Poltoratskiy, M. (2014). Forming an Evolutionarily Stable Firm Strategy Under Cournot Competition Using Social Preferences. In: Ermolayev, V., Mayr, H., Nikitchenko, M., Spivakovsky, A., Zholtkevych, G. (eds) Information and Communication Technologies in Education, Research, and Industrial Applications. ICTERI 2014. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 469. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13206-8_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13206-8_17

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-13205-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-13206-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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